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Abstract
Byzantine agreement (BA), the task of n parties to agree on one of their input bits in the
face of malicious agents, is a powerful primitive that lies at the core of virtually every multi-
party cryptographic protocol. Interestingly, in protocols with the best overall communication,
the demands of the parties are highly unbalanced: the amortized cost is O˜(1) bits per party, but
some parties must send Ω(n) bits. In best known balanced protocols, the overall communication
is sub-optimal, with each party communicating O˜(
√
n).
In this work, we ask whether asymmetry is inherent for optimizing total communication. In
particular, is BA possible where each party sends and receives only O˜(1) bits? Our contributions
in this line are as follows:
• We identify a cryptographic primitive—succinctly reconstructed distributed signatures
(SRDS)—that suffices for constructing O˜(1) balanced BA. We provide two constructions
of SRDS from different cryptographic and Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) assumptions.
• The SRDS-based BA follows a paradigm of boosting from “almost-everywhere” agreement
to full agreement, and does so in a single round. Complementarily, we prove that PKI
setup and cryptographic assumptions are necessary for such protocols in which every party
sends o(n) messages.
• We further explore connections between a natural approach toward attaining SRDS and
average-case succinct non-interactive argument systems for a particular type of “Subset-f”
problems (generalizing Subset-Sum and Subset-Product).
Collectively, our results provide an initial mapping for the feasibility landscape of O˜(1) balanced
BA, including new approaches forward, as well as limitations and barriers. Our approach yields
the first two BA protocols with O˜(1) balanced communication, offering a tradeoff between setup
and cryptographic assumptions, and answering an open question presented by King and Saia
(DISC’09).
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1 Introduction
The problem of Byzantine agreement (BA) [78, 68] asks for a set of n parties to agree on one of their
input bits, even facing malicious corruptions. BA is a surprisingly powerful primitive that lies at
the core of virtually every interactive protocol tolerating malicious adversaries, ranging from other
types of consensus primitives such as broadcast [78, 68] and blockchain protocols (e.g., [29]), to
secure multiparty computation (MPC) [87, 53, 6, 28, 81]. In this work, we study BA in a standard
context, where a potentially large set of n parties runs the protocol within a synchronous network,
and security is guaranteed facing a constant fraction of statically corrupted parties.
Understanding the required communication complexity of BA as a function of n is the subject
of a rich line of research. For the relaxed goal of almost-everywhere agreement [46], i.e., agreement
of all but o(1) fraction of the parties, the full picture is essentially understood. The influential
work of King et al. [65] showed a solution roughly ideal in every dimension: in which each party
speaks to O˜(1) other parties (i.e., polylog degree of communication graph, a.k.a. communication
locality [15]), and sends/processes a total of O˜(1) bits throughout the protocol, in O˜(1) rounds.1
The main challenge in BA thus becomes boosting from almost-everywhere to full agreement.
In this regime, our current knowledge becomes surprisingly disconnected. It is known how to
securely compute any function with O˜(1) locality [15, 26, 17], but even for the specific task of
BA within these protocols, the number of bits that must be communicated by each party is large,
Ω(n). While it is known how to achieve BA with amortized O˜(1) per-party communication (and
computation) [19, 29, 1], the structure of these protocols is wildly unbalanced: with some parties
who must each communicate with Θ(n) parties and send Ω(n) bits. The existence of “central
parties” who communicate a large amount seems to facilitate fast convergence in these protocols.
When optimizing per-party communication, the best BA solutions degrade to Θ˜(
√
n) bits/party,
with suboptimal O˜(n3/2) overall communication [64, 66].
This intriguing gap leads us to the core question studied in this paper: Is such an imbalance
inherent? More specifically:
Is it possible to achieve Byzantine agreement with (balanced)
per-party communication of O˜(1)?
Before addressing our results, it is beneficial to consider the relevant lower bounds. It is well
known that any deterministic BA protocol requires Ω(n2) communication [45] (and furthermore, the
connectivity of the underlying communication graph must be Ω(n) [44, 47]). This result extends
to randomized BA protocols, in the special case of very strong adversarial (adaptive, strongly
rushing2) capabilities [1]. Most closely related is the lower bound of Holtby et al. [57], who showed
that without trusted setup assumptions, at least one party must send Ω( 3
√
n) messages.3 But,
the bound in [57] applies only to a restricted setting of protocols with static message filtering,
where every party decides on the set of parties it will listen to before the beginning of each round
(as a function of its internal view at the end of the previous round). We note that while the
almost-everywhere agreement protocol in [66] falls into the static-filtering model, all other scalable
1We follow the standard practice in large-scale cryptographic protocols, where O˜ hides polynomial factors in log n
and in the security parameter κ, see e.g., [37, 39].
2A strongly rushing adversary in [1] can adaptively corrupt a party that has sent a message m and replace the
message with another m′, as long as no honest party received m.
3The lower bound in [57] easily extends to a public setup such as a common reference string.
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BA protocols mentioned above crucially relied on dynamic message filtering (which is based on
incoming messages’ content). This leaves the feasibility question open.
1.1 Our Results
We perform an in-depth investigation of boosting from almost-everywhere to full agreement with
O˜(1) balanced communication. Motivated by the O˜(1)-locality protocol of Boyle, Goldwasser, and
Tessaro [15], we first achieve an intermediate step of certified almost-everywhere agreement, where
almost all of the parties reach agreement, and, in addition, hold a certificate for the agreed value.
Boyle et al. [15] showed how to boost certified almost-everywhere agreement to full agreement in a
single round, where every party talks to (and processes messages from) O˜(1) parties.
Our initial observation is that the protocol from [15] achieves low communication aside from
one expensive piece: the distributed generation of the certificate, which is of size Θ(n), and its
dissemination. We thus target this step and explore.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows.
• SRDS and balanced BA. We identify a minimal ad-hoc cryptographic primitive whose exis-
tence implies O˜(1) balanced BA: succinctly reconstructed distributed signatures (SRDS).
We define and provide two constructions of SRDS, each based on a different flavor of a public-
key infrastructure (PKI): (1) from one-way functions in a “trusted-PKI” model, and (2) from
collision-resistant hash functions (CRH) and a strong form of succinct non-interactive arguments
of knowledge (SNARKs) in a model with a “bulletin-board PKI” and a common random string
(CRS). Roughly, trusted-PKI setup assumes that parties’ keys are generated properly, whereas
bulletin-board PKI further supports the case where corrupt parties may generate keys maliciously.
We elaborate on the difference between the PKI models in Section 1.2.
• Necessity of setup for one-shot “boost.” Our SRDS-based BA follows a paradigm of boost-
ing from almost-everywhere to full agreement, and does so in a single communication round.
Complementarily, we prove two lower bounds for any such protocol in which every party sends
o(n) messages. The first shows that some form of PKI (or stronger setup, such as correlated
randomness) is necessary for this task. The second shows that given only PKI setup (as op-
posed to stronger, correlated-randomness setup), then computational assumptions (namely, at
least one-way functions) are additionally required.
In contrast to prior lower bounds (e.g., [57, 1]), this holds even against a static adversary, and
where parties can exercise dynamic filtering (i.e., without placing limitations on how parties can
select to whom to listen).
• Connections to succinct arguments. We further explore connections between a natural ap-
proach toward attaining SRDS in weaker PKI models and average-case succinct non-interactive
argument (SNARG) systems for a particular type of “Subset-f” problems (generalizing Subset-
Sum and Subset-Product). This can be interpreted as a barrier toward this approach for con-
structing SRDS without heavy “SNARG-like” tools.
Collectively, our results provide an initial mapping for the feasibility landscape of O˜(1) balanced
BA, including new approaches forward, as well as limitations and barriers. Our approach yields two
BA protocols with O˜(1) balanced communication, offering a tradeoff between the setup assumptions
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and the cryptographic assumptions. These results answer an open question presented by King and
Saia [63], asking whether cryptography can be used to construct BA with o(
√
n) communication per
party. Our BA results are summarized in Table 1 alongside other almost-everywhere to everywhere
agreement protocols.
protocol rounds
per party
max com.
setup assumptions filtering corrupt. remark
HKK’08 [57] Ω( 3
√
n) crs static static lower bound
KS’09 [63] O(1) O˜(n · √n) - - dynamic static
KS’11 [64] polylog(n) O˜(
√
n) - - dynamic adaptive
KLST’11 [66] polylog(n) O˜(
√
n) - - dynamic static
BGH’13 [19] O(1) O˜(n) - - dynamic static
BGT’13 [15] 1 O˜(n) pki owf dynamic static
CM’19 [29]† Exp O(1) O˜(n) trusted-pki RO+unique-sig dynamic adaptive
ACD+’19 [1]† Exp O(1) O˜(n) trusted-pki bilinear maps dynamic adaptive
1 Ω(n) crs dynamic static lower bound
This work 1 O˜(1) pki+crs snarks∗+crh dynamic static
1 O˜(1) trusted pki owf dynamic static
Table 1: Comparison of protocols boosting from almost-everywhere to full agreement, tolerating
(1/3 − ǫ) · n corruptions. The O˜ notation hides polynomial terms in the security parameter κ and
in log n. crs stand for a common random string, pki stands for bulletin-board pki, and trusted
pki stands for honestly generated pki. By snarks∗ we refer to snarks with linear extraction, i.e.,
where the size of the extractor is linear in the size of the prover. RO stands for random oracle and
unique-sig for unique signatures. Static corruptions are done before the protocol begins but can be
a function of the trusted setup; adaptive corruptions can occur during the course of the protocol. (†)
The protocols from [29, 1] reach agreement from scratch (hence also from almost-everywhere agree-
ment) with amortized O˜(1) communication per party; the expected round complexity is constant
and termination is guaranteed in polylog(n) rounds.
1.2 Technical Overview
We now proceed to present our results in greater detail.
Succinctly reconstructed distributed signatures. Our first contribution is identifying and
formalizing a cryptographic primitive that enables boosting from almost-everywhere agreement to
full agreement on a value, with low per-party communication.
The primitive—succinctly reconstructed distributed signatures (SRDS)—is a new type of a dis-
tributed signature scheme, with a natural motivation: allowing a set of parties to jointly produce
a signature on some message m, which can serve as a succinct certificate for proving that a ma-
jority of the parties agree on m. Interestingly, this task does not seem to be attained by existing
distributed signature notions, such as multi-signatures [60], aggregate signatures [12], or threshold
signatures [43]. For example, while multi-signatures (and, similarly, aggregate signatures) can suc-
cinctly combine signatures of many parties, to verify the signature, the (length-Θ(n)!) vector of
3
contributing-parties identities must also be communicated.4 As discussed in the related-work sec-
tion (Section 1.3), threshold signatures are implied by SRDS but also do not suffice: while identities
of the signers are no longer needed to verify a combined signature, this information is necessary
to reconstruct the combined signature in the first place (even within specific existing schemes, e.g.,
[50, 10]). We provide a more detailed comparison to different signature notions in Section 1.3.
An SRDS scheme is based on a PKI for signatures, where every party is set with a secret
signing key and a public verification key.5 The parties may receive additional setup information
that may contain, for example, public parameters for the signature scheme or a common random
string (CRS), depending on the actual construction. Given a message m, every party can locally
generate a signature on m, and signatures on the same message can be succinctly aggregated into a
new signature. The new aspect is that given a combined signature and a message m, it is possible
to verify whether is was aggregated from a “large” number of “base” signatures on m, and both
aggregation and verification can be done succinctly.
Three properties are required from an SRDS scheme: robustness means that the adversary can-
not prevent the honest parties from generating an accepting signature on a message; unforgeability
prevents the adversary controlling a minority from forging a signature; and succinctness requires
that the “final” signature (including all information needed for verification) is short (of size O˜(1))
and can be incrementally reconstructed from “base” signatures in small batches of size polylog(n).6
An SRDS scheme is t-secure if it satisfies the above properties even facing t colluding parties.
Balanced BA from SRDS. We demonstrate how to attain O˜(1)-balanced BA against βn cor-
ruptions (for β < 1/3) given black-box access to any βn-secure SRDS scheme. We begin by pre-
senting a distilled version of the “certified almost-everywhere agreement” approach from [15] that
we tailor for Byzantine agreement, where only correctness matters and privacy is not required.7
1. The parties execute the almost-everywhere agreement protocol of King et al. [65]; this estab-
lishes a polylog(n)-size supreme committee with a 2/3 honest majority and a polylog(n)-degree
communication tree connecting almost all of the parties to the supreme committee.
2. The supreme committee executes a BA protocol on their inputs to agree on the output y, and, in
addition, runs a coin-tossing protocol to agree on a random seed s. Next, the supreme committee
propagates the pair (y, s) to almost all of the parties.
3. Once a party receives the pair (y, s), the party signs it (in [15], using a multi-signature scheme),
and sends the signature back to the supreme committee that aggregates all the signatures. The
aggregated signature attesting to (y, s) is then distributed to almost all of the parties.
4Indeed, the verification algorithm of multi-signatures (and aggregate signatures) must receive the set of parties
who signed the message. This is precisely the culprit for the large Θ˜(n) per-party communication within the low-
locality protocol of [15].
5We will distinguish between a bulletin-board PKI, where every party locally chooses its keys and corrupted
parties can set their keys as a function of all verification keys (and any additional public information), and a trusted
PKI, which is honestly generated (either locally or by a trusted party) and where corrupted parties cannot change
their verification keys. See further discussion below.
6polylog(n) denotes logc(n) for some constant c > 1.
7The focus of [15] was on MPC and required stronger assumptions and additional rounds; in particular, a naïve
use of their MPC protocol cannot lead to balanced BA as it requires all parties to send information to the supreme
committee.
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Once this form of certified almost-everywhere agreement on (y, s) is reached, full agreement can
be obtained in one round. Every party Pi that receives the signed pair (y, s), uses the seed s and its
identity i to determine a set of (sufficiently random) polylog(n) parties it will talk to in that round
(e.g., by evaluating a PRF on s and i), and sends the signed (y, s) to every party in that set. A
party that receives such a signed pair, can verify that a majority of the parties agree on (y, s) (by
the guarantees of multi-signatures) and that it was supposed to receive a message from the sender
(by evaluating the PRF on s and the sender’s identity). In this case, it can output y and halt.
The protocol from [15] achieves O˜(1) locality. However, recall that even though the size of
a multi-signature might itself be “small,” the verification algorithm additionally requires a list of
contributing parties, where the description size of this list will need to be proportional to n. Hence,
the effective size of the aggregated signature, and thus per-party communication, is Θ(n).
At this point the new notion of SRDS comes into the picture. We use the succinctness property
of SRDS combined with the communication tree established by the protocol from [65] to bound
the size of the aggregated signatures by O˜(1). In essence, the parties aggregate the signatures in a
recursive manner up the communication tree such that in each step at most polylog(n) signatures
are aggregated.
This technique introduces additional subtleties that must be addressed. For example, since
the partially aggregated signature can no longer afford to describe the set of contributing par-
ties, it is essential to make sure that the same “base” signature is not aggregated multiple times
(this may allow the adversary to achieve more influence on the final aggregated signature than its
proportional fraction of “base” signatures). To ensure that the fraction of signatures that are gen-
erated by corrupted parties is equal to corruption threshold, every party is assigned with polylog(n)
(virtual) identities—one identity for each path from that party to the supreme committee in the
communication tree.
Theorem 1.1 (balanced BA, informal). Let β < 1/3 be a constant. Assuming the existence of
βn-secure SRDS, there exists an n-party, βn-resilient BA protocol that terminates after polylog(n)
rounds, and where every party sends/processes polylog(n) · poly(κ) bits.
We note that our BA protocol is the first to establish a polylog(n)-degree communication graph
where every party has an “honest path” to a 2/3-honest committee, such that the communication
per party required for establishing it is O˜(1). Thus, we can obtain the following corollaries.
Corollary 1.2 (informal). Let β < 1/3 be a constant. Assuming the existence of βn-secure SRDS:
1. Broadcast: There exists a βn-resilient 1-bit broadcast protocol such that ℓ protocol executions
(potentially with different senders) require ℓ · polylog(n) · poly(κ) communication per party.
2. MPC: Assuming fully homomorphic encryption, a function f : ({0, 1}ℓin )n → {0, 1}ℓout can be
securely computed with guaranteed output delivery tolerating a static, malicious βn-adversary,
such that the total communication complexity (of all parties) is n ·polylog(n) ·poly(κ) ·(ℓin+ℓout).
One remark regarding the corruption model is in place. In this work we consider static adver-
saries that choose the set of corrupted parties before the beginning of the protocol. As mentioned
above, our constructions are based on some form of trusted setup, which, as we prove below, is
necessary. To avoid trivialized settings, e.g., where the trusted setup determines a polylog(n)-degree
communication tree for achieving full agreement, we consider a stronger adversarial model (as is
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standard), where the adversary can adaptively corrupt the parties during the setup phase, given
the setup information of the corrupted parties and any public setup information. During the online
phase the adversary is static and cannot corrupt additional parties.
Constructing SRDS. We present two constructions of SRDS, offering a tradeoff between setup
assumptions and cryptographic assumptions.
Our first construction is influenced by the “sortition approach” of Algorand [29] and merely
requires one-way functions (OWF); however, the public-key infrastructure (PKI) is assumed to be
honestly generated (either by the parties themselves or by an external trusted third party), and
corrupted parties cannot alter their keys. The construction is based on digital signatures augmented
with an oblivious key-generation algorithm for sampling a verification key without knowing the
corresponding signing key.8 Lamport’s signatures [67], which are based on OWF, can easily be
adjusted to support this property. To establish the PKI, every party decides whether to generate
its public verification key obliviously or together with a signing key by tossing a biased coin, such
that with overwhelming probability all but polylog(n) keys are generated obliviously. Since those
with the ability to sign are determined at random (as part of the trusted PKI), only parties who
hold a signing key can sign messages, and signature-aggregation is done by concatenation.
It would be desirable to reduce the trust assumption in establishing the PKI, e.g., by using
verifiable pseudorandom functions (VRF) [76] as done in [29]. However, this approach does not
seem to translate to our setting. Indeed, [29] is defined in a blockchain model where a fresh random
string (the hash of the recent block) is assumed to be consistently available to all parties later in the
protocol and serves as the seed for the sortition; equivalently, that parties have access to a common
random string CRS independent of corrupted parties’ public keys. We note that several recent
consensus protocols [1, 24, 34, 25] also follow the sortition approach of [29]; however, similarly to
our first construction, their PKI is assumed to be honestly generated by a trusted third party.
Theorem 1.3 (SRDS from OWF and trusted PKI, informal). Let β < 1/3 and assume that OWF
exist. Then, there exists a βn-secure SRDS in the trusted-PKI model.
Our second construction is based on a weaker bulletin-board PKI setup, in which each party
locally computes its signature keys, and the adversary can corrupt parties and change their keys as
a function of honest parties’ public keys. The construction makes use of CRH and proof-carrying
data (PCD) systems [30] based on succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (SNARKs) with
efficient extraction [8]. A PCD system extends the notion of SNARKs to the distributed setting by
allowing recursive composition in a succinct way. Informally, every party can generate a succinct
proof on some statement, certifying that it satisfies a given local property with respect to its private
input and previously received messages (statements and their proofs). Bitansky et al. [8] proved
that PCD systems for logarithmic-depth DAGs exist assuming SNARKs with linear extraction, i.e.,
where the size of the extractor is linear in the size of the prover. Extractability assumptions of this
kind have been considered in, e.g., [86, 41, 54, 18].
Since PCD systems allow for propagation of information up the tree in a succinct and publicly
verifiable way, they seem to exactly capture our requirements for SRDS. A naïve construction would
8We note that standard signatures can be used if we strengthen the model assumptions, e.g., by assuming that a
party can securely erase its signature key, or by considering a trusted party that only provides the verification keys
to some parties. We opted not to rely on stronger model assumption since we can establish signatures with oblivious
key generation from the minimal assumption of one-way functions.
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be to have all the parties sign the message using their private keys and then count the number of
verified signatures aggregated so far in a distributed, publicly verifiable way. Namely, the aggregate
algorithm can locally check the validity of partially aggregated signatures/proofs, keep a count of
the number of “base” signatures aggregated so far, and give a PCD proof certifying this. To verify,
it is sufficient to check whether sufficiently many “base” signatures were aggregated.
This simple idea, however, is vulnerable to an adversary that generates a valid-looking aggregate
signature by using multiple copies of the same signature. Indeed, since the partially aggregated
signature must be succinct, the parties cannot afford to keep track of which base signatures were
already incorporated, leaving them vulnerable to a repeat occurrence. We protect against such
an attack by encoding additional information in the partially aggregated signatures. We refer the
reader to Section 5.2 for the detailed solution.
Theorem 1.4 (SRDS from CRH, SNARKs and bulletin-board PKI, informal). Let t < n/3 and
assume that CRH and SNARKs with linear extraction exist. Then, there exists a t-secure SRDS in
the CRS and bulletin-board PKI model.
Necessity of PKI for single-round boost of almost-everywhere agreement. Our SRDS-
based BA protocol (Theorem 1.1) shows how to boost almost-everywhere agreement to full agree-
ment in a single round with small communication. Both our constructions crucially rely on a
public-key infrastructure (PKI) that enables each party to publish its verification key on a bulletin
board. We show that this setup assumption is necessary for this task. That is, given only public
setup, i.e., the common reference string (CRS) model, this task is not possible.
We note that the lower bound of Holtby et al. [57] does not translate to our setting, as it
considers static message filtering, where every party chooses to whom to listen in a given round
based on its view prior to that round. The lower bound in [57] shows that dynamic filtering, i.e.,
where filtering can also be based on the content of received messages, is required (at least in the
CRS model). We present the first such lower bound in the dynamic-filtering model.
Theorem 1.5 (no single-shot boost in CRS model, informal). There is no single-round proto-
col from almost-everywhere to everywhere agreement in the CRS model where every party sends
sublinear (i.e., o(n)) many messages.
Recall that almost-everywhere agreement guarantees that all parties agree on the common
output aside from a o(n)-size set of isolated parties, whose identities are unknown to the remain-
ing honest parties. In the setting of static filtering, one can prove continued isolation for low-
communication protocols in a relatively clean manner [57]: The probability that an honest party
Pi will send messages to an honest isolated Pj is independent of the event that Pj will choose to
process messages from Pi in this round, thus placing a birthday-type bound on information suc-
cessfully being conveyed. With dynamic filtering, however, Pj may process messages dependent
on some property of this message, e.g., whether it contains particular authentication, which may
only be contained in honest messages.9 In such case, there is strong bias toward accepting honest
messages, and one must work harder to ensure that isolated parties do not reach agreement.
At a high level, the idea of our lower bound is to make a linear set of corrupted parties emu-
late the role of isolated parties during the first part of the protocol (reaching almost-everywhere
9In general, message filtering should be via a simple and “light” test, e.g., counting how many messages arrived,
or verifying a signature. We refer to [17] for a discussion on message filtering in protocols over incomplete graphs.
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agreement). This way, the honest parties cannot distinguish between isolated honest parties and
faking corrupted parties, and must attempt to communicate the output value to all such parties.
However, if each honest party only sends a sublinear number of messages, then with a very high
probability, most isolated honest parties (and faking corrupted parties) only receive messages from
a sublinear number of non-isolated parties in the last round. The adversary can use this fact to
keep an isolated honest party confused in the following sense. In the last round of an execution
with preagreement on 0 (resp., on 1), the adversary sends to this party messages corresponding to
an execution with preagreement on 1 (resp., on 0). Without private-coin setup such as PKI, an
isolated party cannot distinguish between honest messages in the real execution and fake messages
from the simulation.
To carry out this attack, we need to show that there exist parties who receive messages from
a “small” set of neighbors in both scenarios (otherwise, the adversary may not have a sufficient
corruption budget for the attack). The adversary first emulates in its head two executions, one
with preagreement on 0 and the other with preagreement on 1, where the same linear-size set of
parties act as isolated parties. We use a counting argument to show that there exist isolated parties
who received messages from a sublinear set in both executions. The adversary targets one of these
parties to attack and corrupts all “simulated isolated parties” except for the targeted one, along
with the pair of neighbor-sets. We refer the reader to Section 4.2.1 for a formal description and
analysis of the attack.
On the different PKI models. As discussed above, SRDS implies a single-round boost of
almost-everywhere to full agreement, which in turn (by Theorem 1.5) requires some form of private-
coin setup. Given this, one of our goals is to minimize the trust assumptions in the setup phase. Our
SNARK-based construction offers the minimal setup requirement—a bulletin-board PKI—where
every party locally generates its own signature keys and publishes the verification key on a bulletin
board. The adversary can adaptively corrupt parties and change their keys as a function of all the
public setup information (including the honest parties’ verification keys and the CRS, in case it
exists). This is the prevalent PKI model that has appeared in, e.g., [22, 62, 23].
Our OWF-based construction, on the other hand, assumes an honestly generated PKI, where the
adversary cannot alter the corrupted parties’ keys. Such a setup assumption is normally captured
by a trusted party who samples the keys for all the parties, and provides each party with its secret
key as well as all public keys; see, e.g., [71, 1, 24, 34, 25]. We note that our trusted-PKI setup
is weaker than a full blown trusted party in two aspects: First, the distribution from which the
trusted party samples the values is a product distribution, i.e., parties’ keys are independent; this
is weaker than a general correlated randomness setup (as used, e.g., in [2] for threshold signatures
setup). Second, we consider public-coin sampling in the sense that the sampling coins are revealed
to the corresponding party (i.e., intermediate key-generation values are not kept hidden). In fact,
one can consider the model where every party honestly generates and publishes its public key, and
corrupted parties can deviate from the protocol only in the online phase.
Necessity of OWF for single-round boost in PKI model. Theorem 1.5 states the necessity
of private-coin setup for single-round protocols (from almost-everywhere agreement to full agree-
ment) where every party sends o(n) messages. In the PKI model, where the public/private keys
of each party are independently generated, we further prove that cryptographic assumptions are
necessary. Intuitively, if one-way functions do not exist, an adversary can invert the PKI algorithm
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with noticeable probability to find a pre-image for each public key. In this case, the adversary can
carry out the attack for the CRS model, described above.
Theorem 1.6 (OWF needed for single-shot boost in PKI model, informal). If OWF do not exist,
there is no single-round protocol from almost-everywhere to everywhere agreement in the trusted
PKI model where every party sends sublinear many messages.
We note that this lower bound does not extend to more complex private-coin setups, where the
parties receive correlated secret strings that are jointly sampled from some distribution, e.g., setup
for information-theoretic signatures. Indeed, given such a setup it is possible to boost almost-
everywhere to everywhere agreement in a single round with information-theoretic security and
where every party sends polylog many messages (albeit, each of size Ω(n)) [17]. The reason that
Theorem 1.6 does not apply in this case is that when the private keys of two honest parties are cor-
related, it is unclear how an (even computationally unbounded) adversary that only receives partial
information about this correlation can consistently invert the setup information and impersonate
honest parties. We leave the feasibility of such single-round boost protocols from almost-everywhere
to everywhere in the correlated randomness model, in which every party sends sublinear many bits,
as an interesting open question.
Connection to succinct arguments. Our SRDS construction from CRH and SNARKs works
with minimal setup requirements, but relies on relatively undesirable (non-falsifiable) assumptions.
On the other hand, our construction from one-way functions uses light computational assumptions,
but (as with many other works in this area, e.g., [1, 24, 34, 25]) requires a stronger assumption of
trusted PKI. A clear goal is to obtain SRDS from better computational assumptions within a better
setup model, ultimately reducing to bulletin-board PKI, or even more fine-grained intermediate
models such as registered PKI 10 (see [10, 72] and a discussion in [5]). A natural approach toward
doing so is to build upon one of the closest existing relatives within this setting: multi-signatures.
Recall that multi-signatures almost provide the required properties of SRDS in this setting, in
that they support succinct aggregation of signatures, with the sole issue that multi-signature ver-
ification requires knowledge of the set of parties who contributed to it—information that requires
Θ(n) bits to describe. Multi-signatures have been constructed from (standard) falsifiable assump-
tions in the registered-PKI model, e.g., [72]. A natural approach toward constructing SRDS within
this model is thus to simply augment a multi-signature scheme with some method of succinctly
convincing the verifier that a given multi-signature is composed of signatures from sufficiently many
parties. We demonstrate challenges toward such an approach, by showing that in some cases this
necessitates a form of succinct non-interactive arguments.
More specifically, we observe that asserting approval of a multi-signature by sufficiently many
parties is inherently equivalent to asserting existence of a large subset of parties S ⊆ [n],
such that their corresponding verification keys {vki}i∈S satisfy a given function-target relation
fσ,m({vki}i∈S) = 1. (Here m is the message, σ is the multi-signature and fσ,m is a function
that is derived from the multi-signature verification function.) Such a task can be viewed as a
class of “Subset-f” problems on the verification keys vk1, . . . , vkn, capturing as special cases the
standard Subset-Sum and Subset-Product problems with functions fΣ({xi}i∈S) = ∑i∈S xi and
fΠ({xi}i∈S) = ∏i∈S xi, respectively.
10In the registered PKI, every party can arbitrarily choose its public key (just like in bulletin-board PKI), but in
order to publish it, the party must prove knowledge of a corresponding secret key.
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Considering even a generous setup model of trusted PKI, where parties’ verification keys
vk1, . . . , vkn are generated independently and honestly, the Subset-f problem begins taking the
form of problems where we do not know (or even possibly believe) that the witness S ⊆ [n] can
be compressed to o(n) bits. As we show, an SRDS of this form implies a type of average-case
non-interactive argument for asserting membership in Subset-f , with succinct proof size: namely, a
form of succinct non-interactive argument (SNARG) as in [8], with average-case soundness guaran-
tees. Although this average-case notion does not directly fall within the negative results of Gentry
and Wichs [51], it appears to be a powerful notion which may be interpreted as a barrier toward
this approach to SRDS construction without SNARG-like tools.
Motivated by this, we explore hardness of the Subset-f problem for more general classes of
functions f . We show that over rings with appropriate structure (namely, Hadamard Product),
NP-hardness results for Subset-Sum and Subset-Product can be extended to include (worst-case)
Subset-φ for all elementary symmetric polynomials φ.
We make explicit the above connection for the multi-signature scheme of Lu et al. [72] (LOSSW)
in relation to (average-case) Subset-Product, and extend to multi-signature schemes of appropriate
structure in relation to the Subset-φ problem for elementary symmetric polynomials φ. The reduc-
tion leverages homomorphism, where a combined signature for a set of parties on message m in the
multi-signature scheme corresponds to a valid single-party signature with respect to a specific joint
function of the parties’ verification keys vki; for LOSSW, their product vk
∗ =
∏
i vki.
Theorem 1.7 (SRDS from multi-signatures requires average-case SNARGs, informal). Any SRDS
based on the LOSSW [72] multi-signature scheme in a natural way (as we define) implies the
existence of succinct non-interactive arguments for average-case Subset-Product. This extends to a
more general class of multi-signature schemes and Subset-φ for elementary symmetric polynomials.
At a high level, the reduction interprets a (random) Subset-Product instance with target
(x1, . . . , xn, t) as a set of uniform verification keys (vk1, . . . , vkn, vkn+1 = t
−1) for the multi-signature
scheme. Given a satisfying witness S ⊆ [n] with ∏i∈S xi = t of appropriate size, this translates to
knowing a large subset of verification keys for which generating an SRDS on their behalf can be
achieved efficiently with respect to the degenerate verification key vk∗ =
∏
i∈S vki · t−1 = 1. On the
other hand, for uniformly sampled keys without such an embedded trapdoor subset, then forging
such an SRDS will be hard.
We refer the reader to Section 6 for formal definitions of these notions (including SRDS “based
on” a multi-signature scheme and average-case SNARGs), as well as further discussion and details
of our claims and proofs.
1.3 Additional Related Work
Distributed signatures. Distributed signatures come in many flavors. We compare SRDS to
existing notions from the literature.
Threshold signatures [43, 80, 50, 85, 10, 55] can guarantee that a sufficiently large number of
parties signed the message, while keeping the signature-length (including all information needed
to verify) independent of n. However, threshold signatures require the keys to be generated by a
trusted party in a correlated way (e.g., as a Shamir sharing of the signing key), and the signature-
reconstruction protocol of existing schemes does not offer succinct aggregation in “small” batches.
SRDS imply threshold signatures by having the setup algorithm produce the PKI for the parties,
and using the aggregation algorithm to reconstruct a signature.
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We note that Libert et al. [70] constructed fully distributed threshold signatures that do not
require any setup assumptions. However, this scheme is not applicable in our setting, since it
requires an interactive key-generation protocol to generate the public and secret keys, and this
protocol in turn uses a broadcast channel. In fact, as indicated by our lower bound, some form of
private-coin setup is inherently needed for constructing SRDS.
Multi-signatures [60, 77, 10, 5, 72, 13] guarantee that a subset of parties signed the message.
Unlike threshold signatures, correlated trusted setup is not needed and a bulletin-board PKI suffices;
in addition, some of the constructions enable succinct aggregation in “small” batches. Aggregate
signatures [12, 73, 11, 72, 69, 56] are a similar primitive that allows aggregating signatures on
different messages. The main distinction of SRDS is succinctness that enables verification without
knowing the signing parties. This property is crucial for our BA protocol construction.
Group signatures [27] and ring signatures [84] allow any individual party to sign a message on
behalf of a set while hiding their identity. This is different than our setting where we need to prove
that a majority of the parties signed the message.
Large-scale MPC. The focus of this work is communication complexity of Byzantine agree-
ment protocols; however, Corollary 1.2 demonstrates applications with respect to general secure
multiparty computation (MPC). Large-scale MPC was initially studied by Damgård and Ishai [37]
and successors (e.g., [38, 39, 40]), in the sense that the amortized per-party work grows only as
O˜(|C|/n + poly(n)). Dani et al. [42] applied the almost-everywhere agreement protocol [65] to
achieve MPC with amortized per-party communication of O˜(|C|/n + √n). Using cryptographic
assumptions (threshold FHE), Zamani et al. [88] reduced the amortized cost to O˜(|C|/n). Under
comparable assumptions, our results achieve amortized cost of O˜(ℓin + ℓout) (where ℓin and ℓout
stand for the function’s input/output length).
The bottleneck complexity of MPC was studied in [18], as the maximum communication com-
plexity required by any party within the protocol execution. It was shown that for some n-party
functions f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, some parties must communicate Ω(n) bits to compute f , even if
security is not required. This result rules out generic MPC with balanced, sublinear communication
per party, and motivates our MPC results of amortized sublinear communication per party. Note
that in [16] load-balanced MPC was achieved, however, amortized over large programs (and in a
model that allows each party to have a single use of a broadcast channel).
Communication-efficient BA. Known protocols that break the Ω(n2) communication barrier
from [45] (for deterministic protocols) follow one of two paradigms. The first is starting with
the almost-everywhere agreement protocol of [65] and boost it to full agreement; this approach
includes [63, 64, 66, 19, 15], as well as our results. The second is based on the sortition approach
from Algorand [29], where only a “small” set of parties are allowed to talk in every round, and
includes [29, 1]. The latter approach inherently leads to unbalanced protocols, since parties that
are eligible to talk send messages to all other parties.
We note that while [63, 66, 19, 15] and our results hold in the static-corruptions setting, some
protocols are resilient to adaptive corruptions. Assuming secure data erasures (i.e., where honest
parties can erase some parts of their internal states) O˜(
√
n)-balanced BA [64] and O˜(1)-amortized
BA [29] can be achieved against adaptive corruptions. In the erasures-free setting, [1] achieved
O˜(1)-amortized BA against adaptive corruptions. One of the interesting open questions we pose in
Section 1.4 is whether O˜(1)-balanced BA can be achieved in the adaptive setting.
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1.4 Open Questions
Our results leave open several interesting questions for followup work.
Our constructions of SRDS offer a trade-off between cryptographic assumptions and setup as-
sumptions (indeed, our lower bound indicates that some form of private-coin setup is needed). Is
it possible to get the best of both, i.e., construct SRDS with bulletin-board PKI under standard,
falsifiable assumptions? This in turn would imply O˜(1)-balanced BA from the corresponding com-
putational assumption and setup. Alternatively, does SRDS in a weak setup model require strong
computational assumptions: For example, do SRDS with bulletin-board PKI imply some kind of
succinct non-interactive arguments (SNARGs)?
Taking a step back: Is it possible to achieve O˜(1)-balanced BA unconditionally? While our
SRDS-based approach inherently makes use of computational assumptions (and our lower bound
implies this necessity for a one-shot boost from almost-everywhere to everywhere agreement in the
PKI model), this leaves open the possibility of removing cryptography via an alternative approach.
Can one further extend the lower bound in this work, identifying a minimal required round com-
plexity for generically converting from almost-everywhere to everywhere agreement within various
setup models?
In the O˜(1)-amortized BA setting, known constructions consider stronger security models.
Namely, the protocol in Braud-Santoni et al. [19] is secure against static corruptions (similarly
to our protocols); however, no trusted setup assumptions are required. The protocol of Abraham
et al. [1] guarantees security against adaptive corruptions; however, it requires a trusted PKI as-
sumption. On the contrary, the protocol of King and Saia [64] does not require setup assumptions
and is resilient to adaptive corruptions, but it provides suboptimal total communication O˜(n
√
n). It
is very interesting to explore if O˜(1)-balanced BA can be achieved without setup or in the adaptive
setting.
Regarding the communication model, the vast majority of sub-quadratic BA protocol are defined
in the synchronous model. In the asynchronous setting unbalanced sub-quadratic BA in the trusted
PKI model was recently proposed [35]. We note that balanced sub-quadratic BA is not known even
in the partially synchronous model. An interesting question is to expand our techniques beyond
the synchronous realm.
Finally, all known BA protocols with o(n2) total communication follow either the approach of
King et al. [65] or of Chen and Micali [29], that are based on electing a polylog-size committee. As
such, these protocols only support a non-optimal constant fraction of corruptions. Is it possible to
achieve o(n2) total communication while tolerating the optimal number of corruptions t < n/2?
Paper Organization
In Section 2, we provide basic definitions. SRDS are defined in Section 3. Our BA protocol and the
lower bounds appear in Section 4. Section 5 presents two constructions of SRDS, and in Section 6,
we explore the connection of SRDS based on multi-signatures to succinct non-interactive arguments.
Some of the definitions and proofs are deferred to the appendix.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we present the security model and the definition of Byzantine agreement. Additional
definitions of proof-carrying data systems, of Merkle hash proof systems, and of multi-signatures,
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can be found in Appendix A.
Protocols. All protocols considered in this paper are PPT (probabilistic polynomial time): the
running time of every party is polynomial in the (common) security parameter (given as a unary
string). For simplicity, we consider Boolean-input Boolean-output protocols, where apart from
the common security parameter, each party has a single input bit, and each of the honest parties
outputs a single bit. We note that our protocols can be used for agreement on longer strings, with
an additional dependency of the communication complexity on the input-string length.
We consider protocols in the PKI model, and we distinguish between two flavors of PKI: a
trusted PKI and a bulletin-board PKI. In both settings, a trusted party samples a secret key ski
and a public key vki, for every i ∈ [n], from some distribution. The adversary is allowed to corrupt
parties adaptively based on (vk1, . . . , vkn) and learn the secret key associated with every corrupted
party. In the bulletin-board PKI model, the adversary can replace the public key of every corrupted
party by an arbitrary string vk′i of its choice.
The communication model is synchronous, meaning that protocols proceed in rounds. In each
round every party can send a message to every other party over a private channel. It is guaranteed
that every message sent in a round will arrive at its destinations by the end of that round. The
adversary is rushing in the sense that it can use the messages received by corrupted parties from
honest parties in a given round to determine the corrupted parties’ messages for that round.
Note that an adversary can always blow up the communication complexity of a protocol by
flooding honest parties with many bogus messages. It is therefore standard to count only messages
that are actually processed by honest parties. We follow the model of [17], who formalized this
intuition. Namely, message receival consists of two phases: a filtering phase, where incoming mes-
sages are inspected according to specific filtering rules defined by the protocol, and some messages
may be discarded, followed by a processing phase, where the party computes its next-message func-
tion based on the remaining non-filtered messages. In practice, the filtering procedure should be
“lightweight,” and consist of operations like counting messages or verifying validity of a signature.
Byzantine Agreement. Informally, in an n-party, t-resilient Byzantine agreement protocol, the
honest parties must agree on one of their input bits, even when t parties collude and actively try to
prevent it. We provide two definitions for BA: the first is the standard, property-based definition
and the second is based on the real/ideal paradigm.
We start with the property-based definition. This definition captures the core properties
required for consensus; namely, agreement and validity. This is a weaker definition than the
simulation-based one, and as such is most suitable for proving lower bounds.
Definition 2.1 (BA, property-based). Let π be an n-party protocol in which every party Pi has
an input bit xi ∈ {0, 1} and outputs a bit yi ∈ {0, 1} at the end of the protocol. The protocol π
is an n-party, t-resilient BA protocol if the following properties are satisfied with all but negligible
probability when up to t parties maliciously attack the protocol:
• Agreement. For every pair of honest parties Pi and Pj it holds that yi = yj.
• Validity. If there exists a bit x such that for every honest party Pi it holds that xi = x, then
the common output is x.
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We proceed with the simulation-based definition, which requires the protocol to realize an
ideal BA functionality. We refer the reader to [20, 21, 52] for further details on the real/ideal
paradigm. We follow the standard ideal functionality for Byzantine agreement, see, e.g., [33, 32].
This definition is stronger than the property-based one, as it guarantees security under composition.
The functionality fba
The functionality fba proceeds as follows, running with parties P1, . . . , Pn and an adversary S.
1. Every Pi sends a bit xi ∈ {0, 1} as his input. The functionality sends (Pi, xi) to the adversary.
2. The adversary sends an input bit xS .
3. Once all parties provided their inputs, if there exists a bit b such that |{i | xi = b}| ≥ n − t,
then set y = b; otherwise, set y = xS . Send y to every party.
Figure 1: The Byzantine agreement functionality
Definition 2.2 (BA, simulation-based). An n-party, t-resilient Byzantine agreement protocol is
a protocol π that realizes the BA ideal functionality (defined in Figure 1) tolerating a malicious
adversary statically corrupting up to t parties.
3 Succinctly Reconstructed Distributed Signatures
In this section, we introduce a new notion of a distributed signature scheme for n parties. Every
party has signing/verification keys based on some form of PKI, and the parties may receive addi-
tional setup information consisting of public parameters for the underlying signature scheme and
potentially a common random string (CRS). Every party can locally sign a message, and “base”
signatures on the same message can be aggregated into a new signature. Given a signature, it
is possible to verify whether is was aggregated from a “large” number of “base” signatures, even
without knowing which parties signed the message. Furthermore, unlike multi-signatures, the to-
tal number of bits required to verify the aggregated signature is poly-logarithmic in n and the
aggregation process itself can be decomposed to small batches.
We allow the adversary to adaptively corrupt up to n/3 of the parties based on the setup
information and all n verification keys. We consider two PKI models; a bulletin-board PKI, where
the adversary can choose the corrupted parties’ keys, and a trusted PKI, where the keys are honestly
generated and cannot be changed. We do not permit adaptive corruptions once the parties start
signing messages.
Below, we define the new signature scheme and the security requirements. Later, in Section 5,
we present two constructions offering a tradeoff between cryptographic and setup assumptions:
the first assuming one-way functions in the trusted-PKI model and the second assuming CRH
and SNARKs with linear extraction in the CRS and bulletin-board-PKI model. In Section 6, we
show that a natural approach towards constructing SRDS in an untrusted-PKI model has strong
connections to succinct average-case argument systems for certain hard problems.
The Definition. We start by presenting the syntax of the definition, and later, define the required
properties from the scheme: succinctness, robustness, and unforgeability.
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Definition 3.1 (SRDS). A succinctly reconstructed distributed signatures scheme with message space
M and signature space X for a set of parties P = {P1, . . . , Pn}, is defined by a quintuple of PPT
algorithms (Setup, KeyGen, Sign, Aggregate, Verify) as follows:
• Setup(1κ, 1n)→ pp: On input the security parameter κ and the number of parties n, the random-
ized setup algorithm outputs public parameters pp.
• KeyGen(pp)→ (vk, sk): On input the public parameters pp, the randomized key-generation algo-
rithm outputs a verification key vk and a signing key sk.
• Sign(pp, i, sk,m) → σ: On input the public parameters pp, the signer’s identity i, a signing key
sk, and a message m ∈M, the randomized signing algorithm outputs a signature σ ∈ X ∪ {⊥}.
• Aggregate(pp, {vk1, . . . , vkn},m, {σ1, . . . , σq}) → σ: On input the public parameters pp, the set
of all verification keys {vki}i∈[n], a message m ∈ M, and a set of signatures {σi}i∈[q] for some
q = poly(n), the aggregation algorithm outputs a signature σ ∈ X ∪ {⊥}.
• Verify(pp, {vk1, . . . , vkn},m, σ)→ b: On input the public parameters pp, the set of all verification
keys {vki}i∈[n], a message m ∈ M, and a signature σ ∈ X , the verification algorithm outputs a
bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
We proceed to define three properties of an SRDS scheme: succinctness, robustness, and unforge-
ability. We define these properties with respect to t < n/3 corruptions. Although the definitions
can be stated for t < n/2, we opted for the former for clarity and concreteness, as both our BA
protocol (Section 4) and our SRDS constructions (Section 5) support no more than n/3 corruptions.
Succinctness. We require that the size of each signature is O˜(1). This holds both for signatures
in the support of Sign and of Aggregate. Additionally, we also require that the aggregate algorithm
can be decomposed into two algorithms Aggregate1 and Aggregate2. Depending on the set of
input signatures {σi}i∈[q] and the verification keys, the first algorithm Aggregate1 deterministically
outputs a subset of the signatures Ssig. The second (possibly randomized) algorithm Aggregate2
then aggregates these signatures without relying on the verification keys.
Looking ahead at the BA protocol in Section 4.1, subsets of the parties will collectively run the
aggregation algorithm. Although the inputs to the aggregation algorithm need not be kept private,
it could be the case that the randomness used should remain secret, e.g., in the SRDS construction
in Section 5.2. For this reason, the computation of Aggregate2 in the BA construction will be carried
out using an MPC protocol; to keep the overall communication of every party O˜(1), we require the
circuit size representing Aggregate2 to be O˜(1). The goal of Aggregate1 is to deterministically filter
out invalid inputs (using the verification keys), such that Aggregate2 only depends on the verified
signatures and not on the n verification keys (otherwise the circuit size will be too large).
Definition 3.2 (succinctness). An n-party succinctly reconstructed distributed signatures scheme
is succinct if it satisfies the following:
1. Size of Signatures: There exists α(n, κ) ∈ poly(log n, κ) such that X ⊆ {0, 1}α(n,κ).
2. Decomposability: The Aggregate algorithm can be decomposed into 2 algorithms Aggregate1
and Aggregate2, such that the following hold:
• Aggregate1(pp, {vk1, . . . , vkn},m, {σ1, . . . , σq})→ Ssig, where Ssig is of size poly(κ, log n).
• Aggregate2(pp,m, Ssig)→ σ, i.e., aggregate the signatures in Ssig into a new signature σ.
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Robustness. Informally, a scheme is robust if no adversary can prevent sufficiently many honest
parties from generating an accepting signature on a message. We define robustness as a game
between a challenger and an adversary A. The game is formally defined in Figure 2 and comprises
of three phases. In the setup and corruption phase, the challenger generates the public parameters
pp and a pair of signature keys for every party. Given pp and all verification keys vk1, . . . , vkn,
the adversary can adaptively corrupt a subset of t parties and learn their secret keys. In the case
of a bulletin-board PKI (but not of trusted PKI), the adversary can replace the verification key
of the corrupted party by another key of its choice. Unless specified otherwise, we consider the
bulletin-board PKI to be the default setup model.
Experiment Exptrobustmode,Π,A(κ, n, t)
The experiment Exptrobust is a game between a challenger and the adversary A. The game is
parametrized by an SRDS scheme Π and proceeds as follows:
A. Setup and corruption. In the first phase, the challenger generates the public parameters
and the signature keys for the parties. Given the public information, A can adaptively corrupt
parties, learn their secret information, and potentially change their public keys.
(1) Compute pp ← Setup(1κ, 1n).
(2) For every i ∈ [n], compute (vki, ski)← KeyGen(pp).
(3) Invoke A on (1κ, 1n, pp, {vk1, . . . , vkn}) and initialize I = ∅.
(4) As long as |I| ≤ t and A requests to corrupt a party Pi:
(a) Send ski to A and receive back vk′i.
(b) If mode = bb-pki, set vki = vk
′
i.
(c) Set I = I ∪ {i}.
B. Robustness challenge. In this phase, A tries to break the robustness of the scheme.
(1) A chooses a message m ∈ M and a subset S ⊆ [n] of size |S| > 2n/3.
(2) For every i ∈ [n] \ I, let σi ← Sign(pp, i, ski,m).
(3) Send {σi}i∈[n]\I to A and receive back {σi}i∈(S∩I) and a directed rooted tree T = (V,E)
of height O(log(n)), in which the leaf nodes are indexed and ordered by the parties in S.
(4) For each ℓ = {2, . . . , height(T )} and every vertex v on level ℓ:
• Compute σv ← Aggregate(pp, {vk1, . . . , vkn},m, {σu}u∈child(v)), where child(v) ⊆ V
refers to the set of children of the node v ∈ V .
C. Output Phase. Output Verify(pp, {vk1, . . . , vkn},m, σroot), where root is the root node in T .
Figure 2: Robustness experiment for SRDS
In the robustness challenge phase, the adversary chooses a message m ∈M and a subset S of at
least 2n/3 parties. Given signatures of all honest parties on the message m, the adversary chooses a
tree T describing the order in which the signatures of parties in S are to be aggregated, i.e., the leaf
nodes correspond to parties in the set S. The adversary also computes signatures for the corrupted
parties in S. The challenger aggregates all these signatures in the order specified by the tree T .
Finally, in the output phase, the challenger runs the verification algorithm on the message m and
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the final aggregated signature obtained in the root of the tree, and A wins if the verification fails.
An SRDS scheme is robust if no adversary can win this game except with negligible probability.
Definition 3.3 (Robustness). Let t < n/3. An SRDS scheme Π is t-robust with a bulletin-board
PKI (resp., with a trusted PKI) if for mode = bb-pki (resp., mode = tr-pki) and for any (stateful)
PPT adversary A it holds that:
Pr
[
Exptrobustmode,Π,A(κ, n, t) = 0
]
≤ negl(κ, n).
The experiment Exptrobustmode,Π,A is defined in Figure 2.
We note that robustness is a strictly stronger notion than completeness. In a complete scheme
correctness is guaranteed if all the parties in S are honest. In a robust scheme, even if a subset of
parties are corrupted, as long as there are sufficiently many honest parties in S, correctness is still
guaranteed. Hence, any signature scheme satisfying robustness, immediately satisfies completeness.
Unforgeability. Informally, a scheme is unforgeable if no adversary can use signatures of a large
majority of the honest parties on a message m and of a few honest parties on messages of its choice
to forge an aggregated SRDS signature on a message other than m.
In a similar way to robustness, we consider an unforgeability game between a challenger and
an adversary. The setup and corruption phase is identical to that in the robustness game. In the
forgery challenge phase, the adversary chooses a set S ⊆ [n] \ I such that |S ∪ I| < n/3 and
messages m and {mi}i∈S . Given signatures of all honest parties outside of S on the message m
and a signature of each honest party Pi in S on the message mi, the adversary outputs a signature
σ. In the output phase, the challenger checks whether σ is a valid signature on a message different
than m; if so the adversary wins. An SRDS scheme is unforgeable if no adversary can win the game
except for negligible probability.
Experiment Exptforgemode,Π,A(κ, n, t)
The experiment Exptforge is a game between a challenger and the adversary A. The game is
parametrized by an SRDS scheme Π and consists of the following phases:
A. Setup and Corruption. As in the robustness experiment.
B. Forgery Challenge. In this phase, the adversary tries to forge a signature.
(a) A chooses a subset S ⊆ [n] \ I such that |S ∪ I| < n/3. It also chooses messages m and
{mi}i∈S from M.
(b) For every i ∈ S, compute σi ← Sign(pp, i, ski,mi).
(c) For every i /∈ (S ∪ I), compute σi ← Sign(pp, i, ski,m).
(d) Send {σi}i∈[n]\I to A and get back σ′ ∈ X and m′ ∈M.
C. Output Phase. Output 1 if and only if Verify(pp, {vk1, . . . , vkn},m′, σ′) = 1 and m′ 6= m.
Figure 3: Forgery experiment for SRDS
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Definition 3.4 (Unforgeability). Let t < n/3. An SRDS scheme Π is t-unforgeable with a bulletin-
board PKI (resp., with a trusted PKI) if for mode = bb-pki (resp., mode = tr-pki) and for every
(stateful) PPT adversary A it holds that
Pr
[
Expt
forge
mode,Π,A(κ, n, t) = 1
]
≤ negl(κ, n).
The experiment Exptforgemode,Π,A is defined in Figure 3.
We note that as described, the security definition is only for one-time signatures. Although this
is sufficient for our applications in Section 4, it is possible to extend the definition and provide the
adversary an oracle access to signatures of honest parties on messages of its choice. However, in
that case, the adversary must choose the set S before getting oracle access.
Security. We say that an SRDS scheme is secure in the respective PKI model, if it satisfies all
the above properties.
Definition 3.5 (Secure SRDS). Let t < n/3. An SRDS scheme Π is t-secure with a bulletin-board
PKI (resp., with a trusted PKI) if it is succinct, t-unforgeable and t-robust with a bulletin-board
PKI (resp., with a trusted PKI).
4 Balanced Communication-Efficient Byzantine Agreement
In this section, we consider Byzantine agreement protocols with O˜(1) communication per party. In
Section 4.1, we show how to use SRDS to boost almost-everywhere agreement to full agreement
in a balanced way via a single communication round. In Section 4.2, we show that a similar task
cannot be achieved under weaker setup assumptions.
4.1 Balanced Byzantine Agreement from SRDS
We start by showing how to combine succinctly reconstructed distributed signatures with the
protocol of [15] to obtain BA with balanced O˜(1) communication. We prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1 (Theorem 1.1, restated). Let β < 1/3 and assume existence of a βn-secure SRDS
scheme in the bulletin-board PKI model (resp., trusted PKI model). Then, there exists a βn-resilient
BA protocol (according to Definition 2.2) in a hybrid model for generating the SRDS setup and the
relevant PKI, s.t:
• The round complexity and communication locality are polylog(n); every party sends/proceeses
polylog(n) · poly(κ) bits.
• The adversary can adaptively corrupt the parties based on the public setup and the PKI before
the onset of the protocol. For bulletin-board PKI, the adversary can additionally replace the
corrupted parties’ public keys.
Instantiating Theorem 4.1 with our SRDS constructions from Section 5, we get the following
corollaries.
Corollary 4.2. Let β < 1/3. Assuming OWF, there exists a βn-resilient BA protocol in the
trusted-PKI model with balanced O˜(1) communication per party.
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Corollary 4.3. Let β < 1/3. Assuming CRH and SNARKs with linear extraction, there exists a βn-
resilient BA protocol in the bulletin-board PKI and CRS model with balanced O˜(1) communication
per party.
High-level overview. The protocol is defined in a hybrid model that abstracts the communica-
tion tree of [65]. The parties can communicate in a way that mimics almost-everywhere agreement,
and the adversary is allowed to isolate a o(1) fraction of the parties. Each party is assigned to
z = O(log4 n) leaf nodes in the communication tree. Since each party will send a signature to every
leaf node he is assigned to, it is essential to ensure the same fraction of signatures is generated by
corrupted parties as their fraction in the party-set. For this reason, we allocate z “virtual identities”
to every party. The SRDS is used for n · z virtual identities and each party samples separate SRDS
keys for each of his virtual identities.
The protocol starts by invoking fae-comm (defined below) to obtain an n-party almost-everywhere
communication-tree where each party is assigned to z leaves. The supreme committee members
(parties assigned to the root-node) run Byzantine agreement on their inputs to agree on the output
y and run a coin-tossing protocol to agree on a random seed s. The supreme committee then makes
use of the communication-tree to distribute these values to all non-isolated parties. The parties
then collectively generate an SRDS signature to certify the pair (y, s).
To compute this signature, each party locally signs the received pair of values; this is done using
a different virtual identity for every leaf node corresponding to the party. Each signature is sent to
all parties assigned to the corresponding leaf node. For each node in the tree, the assigned parties
aggregate the received signatures and propagate them to the node’s parent in a recursive way until
reaching the root, where the final aggregated signature is computed.
Next, the supreme-committee again uses the communication-tree to distribute this aggregated
signature to all non-isolated parties. Each non-isolated party evaluates a PRF on the seed s and its
identity to determines a set of parties, to which he sends the pair (y, s) along with the signature.
Isolated parties can now verify the signature and be convinced about the correct output y. Here
correctness crucially relies on the fact that the adversary could not have forged an aggregated SRDS
signature on any other value.
In Section 4.1.1, we define the functionalities to be used in the BA protocol and in Section 4.1.2
we describe the protocol and prove its security. Finally, in Section 4.1.3, we present applications of
our protocol to broadcast and MPC.
4.1.1 Functionalities used in the Protocol
We start by describing the functionalities used in our construction.
Almost-everywhere communication. The functionality fae-comm is a reactive functionality
that abstracts the properties obtained by the protocol from [65]. In the first invocation, the
adversary specifies a special communication tree that allows all honest parties to communicate,
except for a o(1) fraction of isolated parties D. In all subsequent calls the “supreme committee,”
i.e., the parties associated with the root of the tree, can send messages to all of the parties but D.
Definition 4.4. Let I ⊆ [n] be a subset of size βn for a constant β < 1/3. A directed rooted tree
T = (V,E) is an n-party almost-everywhere-communication tree with respect to I if the following
properties are satisfied:
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1. The height of T is ℓ∗ ∈ O(log n/ log log n). Each node v from level ℓ > 1 has log n children in
level ℓ− 1.
2. Each leaf node of the tree is assigned a set of log5 n parties.
3. Each non-leaf node of the tree is assigned a set of log3 n parties.
4. Each party is assigned to O(log4 n) nodes at each level.
5. A node is good if less than a third of the parties assigned to it are in I. Then, it holds that the
root is good.
6. All but a 3/ log n fraction of the leaves have a good path (consisting of good nodes) to the root.11
The functionality fae-comm
The n-party reactive functionality fae-comm proceeds as follows:
• First invocation: Upon receiving an init message from each party, the functionality asks the
adversary for a communication tree T = (V,E) and does the following:
1. Verify that T is an n-party almost-everywhere-communication tree with respect to the set of
corrupted parties I (otherwise, output ⊥ to all parties).
2. Let D be the set of isolated parties in T and let C be the set of parties assigned to the root.
3. The functionality sends to each Pi for i ∈ [n] its local view in the tree, consisting of:
– All the nodes that Pi is assigned to (and the parties assigned to them).
– All the parent and children nodes (and the parties assigned to them) of the nodes that Pi is
assigned to.
• Subsequent invocations: Every party Pi with i ∈ C provides a message mi. If more than 2/3 of
the parties in C provided the same message m, send m to the adversary and receive back {mˆj}j∈D.
For every i /∈ D deliver m to Pi and for every j ∈ D deliver mˆj to Pj .
Figure 4: The almost-everywhere communication functionality
The protocol of King et al. [65] securely realizes fae-comm in the authenticated-channels model
tolerating a computationally unbounded, malicious adversary statically corrupting βn parties, for a
constant β < 1/3. Every invocation requires polylog(n) rounds, and every party sends and processes
polylog(n) bits. Throughout all invocations, every party sends to, and processes messages received
from polylog(n) other parties.
Byzantine agreement. We consider the standard Byzantine agreement functionality fba as
defined in Section 2. Every party sends its input to the trusted party who forwards the input
value to the adversary. If more than n− t inputs equal the same value y ∈ {0, 1}, then deliver y as
the output for every party. Otherwise, let the adversary choose the value y ∈ {0, 1} to be delivered.
The n-party BA protocol of Garay and Moses [48] realizes fba over authenticated channels
tolerating a computationally unbounded, malicious adversary statically corrupting t < n/3 parties
11As observed in [15], the fact that 1− o(1) fraction of the leaves are on good paths to the root implies that for a
1− o(1) fraction of the parties, majority of the leaf nodes that they are assigned to are good.
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using t + 1 rounds and poly(n) communication complexity. An immediate corollary is that for
n′ = polylog(n), the n′-party BA functionality fba can be instantiated using polylog(n) rounds and
polylog(n) communication complexity.
Coin tossing. The coin-tossing functionality fct samples a uniformly distributed s ∈ {0, 1}κ and
delivers s to all the parties. The protocol of Chor et al. [31] realizes fct over a broadcast channel
assuming an honest majority (by having each party vss a random value, and later reconstruct all
values and XOR them). By instantiating the broadcast channel using the protocol of [48], n′ =
polylog(n) parties can agree on a random κ-bit string in polylog(n) rounds and polylog(n) · poly(κ)
communication.
Signature aggregation. The signature-aggregation functionality faggr-sig (formally described in
Figure 5) is an n′-party functionality, where every party Pi provides a message mi and a set of
signatures. The functionality first determines the set of signatures received from a majority of the
parties and aggregates only those signatures to obtain a new signature σ, which is delivered as the
output for every party.
Note that the inputs to the aggregation procedure are not private, so if the aggregation algorithm
Aggregate2 is deterministic (for example, in the OWF-based SRDS construction in Section 5.1) the
parties simply need to agree on the common set of input signatures Ssig and locally run Aggregate2 to
obtain the same aggregated signature. To agree on Ssig, each party broadcasts its input signatures
and filters-out invalid signatures by running the deterministic algorithm Aggregate1. However, if
the algorithm Aggregate2 is randomized, it may be the case that security relies on keeping the
random coins hidden from the parties (this is the case with the SNARKs-based SRDS construction
in Section 5.2). For this reason, after the parties agree on Ssig, we use an MPC protocol to compute
the aggregated signature and realize faggr-sig.
The functionality faggr-sig(P)
The n′-party functionality faggr-sig, running with parties P = {P1, . . . , Pn′} and the adversary, is
parameterized by the public parameters pp and proceeds as follows.
1. Every party Pi sends (mi, Ssigi) as input, where Ssigi is a set of signatures.
2. If at least 2/3 of the parties provided the same message m and the same set Ssig, then compute
σ ← Aggregate2
(
pp,m, Ssig
)
.
Else, let the adversary choose σ.
3. Finally, deliver σ to every party Pi.
Figure 5: The signature-aggregation functionality
Assuming the existence of one-way functions, the protocol of Damgård and Ishai [36] can be used
to realize the n′-party functionality faggr-sig, for n
′ = polylog(n), over secure channels, tolerating a
malicious adversary corrupting a minority of the parties. In addition, if the size of set Ssig is O˜(1)
the protocol requires polylog(n) · poly(κ) communication. In our construction, this functionality
is used by the parties assigned to a node (in the almost-everywhere communication-tree obtained
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from fae-comm) for aggregating signatures received from parties assigned to their children. From
Definition 4.4, we know that each node only has log(n) child nodes and each node is assigned
polylog(n) parties. Therefore, faggr-sig is only used for aggregating at most polylog(n) signatures.
Note that in [36] a broadcast channel is also required and the resulting protocol is constant round.
For n′ = polylog(n) the broadcast can be realized by a deterministic protocol, e.g., from [48], and
the resulting protocol has polylog(n) rounds and polylog(n) · poly(κ) communication.
4.1.2 The Byzantine Agreement Protocol
Having defined the ideal functionalities, we are ready to present our BA protocol in Figure 6. To
reduce the security of πba to that of the SRDS scheme, we will show that by robustness every honest
party will receive an accepting signature on (y, s), and by unforgeability, no party will receive an
accepting signature on a different value. Before proceeding to the proof, we discuss some subtleties
in the reduction.
Recall that robustness of an SRDS scheme ensures that an adversary who after the setup and
corruption phase is allowed to choose a message m, a set S > 2n/3 of parties and the order of
aggregation (using a directed rooted tree T ), cannot prevent the honest parties from successfully
signing m. Note that if in πba, an adversary can prevent the honest parties from signing (y, s),
then we can derive the corresponding tree and partially aggregated signatures of the corrupted
parties to break the robustness of the SRDS scheme. The parties forming the set S (leaves of the
tree) will consist of all the non-isolated honest parties and any corrupted parties that the adversary
wants to include. Note that if any particular node in the communication tree consists of more
than a third of the corrupted parties (henceforth referred to as a bad node), then the adversary
can send any arbitrary signature corresponding to that node. Since these signatures might not
have any bearing with the signatures received from its child nodes, we can view the derived tree
as a truncated communication tree where the subtrees rooted at each of the bad nodes have been
pruned.
The derived tree has the following two types of leaf nodes; (1) leaves on the bottom most
level that correspond to any one of the parties in the set S, and (2) leaves on some higher level
(bad nodes in the original tree) that correspond to a corrupted party in S. Recall that the virtual
parties, assigned to each intermediate node in the original communication tree, collectively compute
a partially aggregated signature in the original communication tree. We note that bad nodes (or
leaf nodes of type (2) in the derived tree) do not correspond to any single corrupted party in the
original communication tree; however, since the adversary can choose the signature that bad nodes
compute, such a node can be viewed as a leaf node associated with some corrupted party in the
derived tree, for which the adversary is free to provide any signature of its choice.
Lemma 4.5. Let β < 1/3 and assume the existence of PRF and βn-secure SRDS in the bulletin-
board PKI model (resp., trusted PKI model). Then, protocol πba is a βn-resilient BA protocol in
the (fae-comm, fba, fct, faggr-sig)-hybrid model such that:
• The round complexity and the locality of the protocol are polylog(n); the number of bits
sent/processed by each party is polylog(n) · poly(κ).
• The adversary can adaptively corrupt the parties based on the public setup of the SRDS, i.e., pp
and {vk1,1, . . . , vkn,z} before the onset of the protocol. For bulletin-board PKI, the adversary can
additionally replace the corrupted parties’ public keys.
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The proof of Lemma 4.5 can be found in Appendix B.1.
Protocol πba
• Common Input: An SRDS scheme and a PRF family F = {Fs}s∈{0,1}κ mapping elements of
[n] to subsets of [n] of size polylog(n).
• Private Input: Every party Pi, for i ∈ [n], has input xi ∈ {0, 1}.
• Setup: Denote by z = O(log4 n) the bound on the number of leaves assigned to each party and
let pp ← Setup(1κ, 1n·z). Every party Pi locally computes (vki,j , ski,j)← KeyGen(pp) for every
j ∈ [z]. The public output consists of pp and the set of public keys vk = {vki,j}i∈[n],j∈[z].
• Hybrid Model: The protocol is defined in the (fae-comm, fba, fct, faggr-sig)-hybrid model.
• The Protocol:
1. Every party invokes fae-comm and receives back its local view in the communication tree T =
(V,E). Let C denote supreme committee, i.e., the parties assigned to the root node.
2. Every party Pi in the supreme committee (i.e., with i ∈ C) proceeds as follows:
(a) Invoke fba on his input value xi and receive back y ∈ {0, 1}.
(b) Invoke fct and receive back s ∈ {0, 1}κ.
3. The parties in the supreme committee C send (y, s) to fae-comm. For every i ∈ [n] denote the
output of party Pi as (yi, si).
4. Every party Pi signs the received message (yi, si) for each virtual identity j ∈ [z] as σi,j ←
Sign(pp, (i, j), ski,j , (yi, si)). Let Li = {vi,1, . . . , vi,z} ⊆ V be the subset of leaves assigned to Pi.
For each j ∈ [z], party Pi sends σi,j to all the parties assigned to the leaf node vi,j .
5. Let party(v) denote the set of parties assigned to a node v ∈ V . Similarly, let child(v) and
parent(v) denote the set of children nodes and parent node of v ∈ V , respectively. For each level
ℓ = 1, . . . , ℓ∗ and for each node v on level ℓ, the protocol proceeds as follows:
(a) For each i ∈ party(v), let Si,ℓ,1sig be the set of signatures received by Pi in the previous
round (for ℓ = 1, i.e., for leaf nodes, from each Pj with v ∈ Lj ; for ℓ > 1, from every party
Pj assigned to a child node of v).
(b) Every Pi with i ∈ party(v) broadcasts Si,ℓ,1sig to all the parties in party(v). Let Si,ℓ,2sig be the
union of all sets received from the parties in party(v).
(c) Every Pi with i ∈ party(v) computes Aggregate1(pp, {vk1,1, . . . , vkn,z}, (yi, si), Si,ℓ,2sig ) →
Si,ℓ,3sig and invokes faggr-sig on input ((yi, si), S
i,ℓ,3
sig ) to obtain the aggregated signature σv.
(d) If ℓ < ℓ∗, for each i ∈ party(v), party Pi sends σv to all parties in parent(v).
6. Let σroot be the signature obtained by the supreme committee. The parties in the supreme
committee send (y, s, σroot) to fae-comm. Let the output of party Pi for i ∈ [n] be (y′i, s′i, σ′i)
7. Each party Pi (for i ∈ [n]) computes Ci = Fs′
i
(i), and sends (y′i, s
′
i, σ
′
i) to every party in Ci.
8. A party Pj that receives a valid message (y, s, σ) from a party Pi, satisfying j ∈ Fs(i) and
Verify(pp, {vk1,1, . . . , vkn,z}, (y, s), σ) = 1, outputs y and halts.
Figure 6: Byzantine agreement with balanced polylog communication
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4.1.3 Applications
We point out a few applications of our BA protocol.
Broadcast with balanced polylog communication. Consider a single a run of the protocol
(on dummy inputs). The communication graph forms a tree with stronger properties than Defini-
tion 4.4, achieving everywhere agreement of all parties on the supreme committee, such that every
party sends only O˜(1) throughout the protocol constructing it. Having established the communica-
tion tree, it is possible to run a simple broadcast protocol in the PKI model. The sender signs his
input bit and sends it up to the supreme committee, which in turn sends the signed bit to all other
parties. If fact, since the communication tree is reusable, after multiple executions (with different
senders) the communication will grows in a proportional way only to the number of bits that have
been broadcasted. In particular, note that the SRDS PKI is only needed for a single run of the
protocol (to establish the communication tree) and is not needed afterwards.
Corollary 4.6. Let β < 1/3 be a constant. Assuming βn-secure SRDS schemes, there exists an
n-party binary broadcast protocol tolerating a malicious adversary that can statically corrupt βn
of the parties, such that the communication locality of ℓ executions is polylog(n), and the round
complexity and the number of bits each party sends/processes is ℓ · polylog(n) · poly(κ).
MPC with amortized polylog communication overhead. Following the MPC protocol
from [15], the supreme committee can run among themselves a protocol establishing an encryp-
tion key of a public-key encryption scheme where the decryption key is secret shared among the
committee members, and broadcast the public key. Every party encrypts its input and sends it
up the tree to the supreme committee that run an MPC protocol for decrypting all ciphertexts
and compute the function. Using FHE-based MPC that minimize the communication (e.g., [4]) we
obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 4.7. Let β < 1/3 be a constant. Assuming βn-secure SRDS and FHE schemes, every
n-party functionality f : ({0, 1}ℓin)n → {0, 1}ℓout can be securely computed tolerating a malicious
adversary that can statically corrupt βn parties, such that communication locality and round com-
plexity are polylog(n), and amortized communication complexity is (ℓin + ℓout) · polylog(n) · poly(κ).
4.2 Lower Bound on Balanced Byzantine Agreement
In the previous section, we showed how to extend almost-everywhere agreement to full agreement
in one round. The minimal setup assumptions used were a bulletin-board PKI and CRS. In Sec-
tion 4.2.1, we show the some form of private-coin setup is necessary for this task.12 In Section 4.2.2,
we show that in the PKI model, where the public/private keys of each party are independently sam-
pled, cryptographic assumptions are further needed.
4.2.1 Lower Bound on Balanced Byzantine Agreement in CRS Model
We denote by f∗ae-comm a weakened version of the functionality fae-comm (from Figure 4) that enables
communication between almost all of the parties, except for an isolated set D that is randomly
12We note that, our lower bound easily extends to the random oracle model, for the sake of simplicity we prove it
merely with a CRS setup.
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chosen by the functionality, rather than by the adversary. The purpose of this adjustment is to
provide a stronger lower bound, as the adversary’s capabilities are more restricted. In fact, we only
require that with some inverse-polynomial probability, there exists a single isolated party that is
chosen by the functionality.
Theorem 4.8 (Theorem 1.5, restated). Let π be a βn-resilient Byzantine agreement protocol in
the (fcrs, f
∗
ae-comm)-hybrid model, for β < 1. Assume that π has two parts: the first consists of a
polynomial number of rounds where communication is via f∗ae-comm, and the second consists of a
single round over point-to-point channels. Then, there exists a party that sends Θ(n) messages in
the last round.
Proof. By classical results [78, 47], BA protocols cannot tolerate one third of corrupted parties,
even in the CRS model; therefore, we can assume that β < 1/3. Let π be a protocol in the
(fcrs, f
∗
ae-comm)-hybrid model that invokes f
∗
ae-comm for polynomially many rounds followed by a
single point-to-point round, and assume that the number of messages sent by every party in the
last round is o(n). We will construct an adversarial strategy that violates the validity of π with
noticeable probability.
Choosing the corrupted set. Given the common reference string crs, the adversary starts by
deciding on the set of corrupted parties. The adversary chooses a random subset J ⊆ [n] of size
βn/2 and simulates two executions of π inside its head.
• In the first execution, all parties have input bit 0 where every party Pj with j ∈ J is corrupted
and does not send any message throughout the protocol. For every j ∈ J , denote the set
of parties that sends messages to Pj in the last point-to-point round by C0j and record the
messages as {mˆ0i→j}i∈C0j .
• In the second execution, all parties have input bit 1 where every party Pj with j ∈ J is
corrupted and does not send any message throughout the protocol. For every j ∈ J , denote
the set of parties that sends messages to Pj in the last point-to-point round by C1j and record
the messages as {mˆ1i→j}i∈C1j .
In each of the virtual executions described above, from the joint view of all parties Pi with
i /∈ J , every party Pj with j ∈ J could be an isolated honest party, so they must join forces and
send messages to every such Pj . Note that it could be that some parties in J receive a linear
number of messages, e.g., if every party Pi with i /∈ J sends a message to the same party Pj for
some j ∈ J . However, as each party sends only o(n) messages in this step, the number of such
parties cannot be too large; in particular, there must be a party who receives o(n) messages in both
of the above executions.
Claim 4.9. There exists j ∈ J such that |C0j ∪ C1j | ∈ o(n).
Proof. Consider the first virtual execution, where all honest parties start with input 0. Denote by
J ′ = {j ∈ J | |C0j | ∈ Θ(n)} the set of parties that receive a linear number of messages from {Pi}i/∈J
(i.e., receive δ(n) messages for some δ ∈ Θ(n)). If |J ′| ∈ Θ(n), i.e., there are linear many parties
that receive a linear number of messages, it must be that the number of messages sent from {Pi}i/∈J
to {Pj}j∈J is quadratic. This will contradict to the assumption that every party in {Pi}i/∈J only
sends a sublinear number of messages. Therefore, |J ′| ∈ o(n), and it holds that |C0j | ∈ o(n) for a
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majority of j ∈ J . By an analogue argument, also in the second virtual execution, where all honest
parties start with input 1, it holds that |C1j | ∈ o(n) for a majority of j ∈ J . Hence, there exists
j ∈ J for which |C0j ∪ C1j | ∈ o(n).
The adversary proceeds by choosing uniformly at random i∗ ∈ J . If it holds that |C0i∗ ∪ C1i∗ | ≥
βn/2, the adversary aborts the attack and halts. By Claim 4.9 the adversary does not abort with
probability at least 1/n. Next, the adversary chooses a random subset I ⊆ [n] \ {i∗} of size βn,
such that J ∪ C0i∗ ∪ C1i∗ \ {i∗} ⊆ I. Denote by E the event where the adversary does not abort
and that party Pi∗ is isolated by f
∗
ae-comm with respect to the set of corrupted parties I as defined
above. By the definition of f∗ae-comm and by Claim 4.9, this event happens with inverse-polynomial
probability. The attack defined below will be analyzed conditioned on the event E .
The attack. We proceed by defining a series of hybrid experiments to contradict the validity of
π. For the first claim, we define the adversarial strategy A1, where the corrupted parties are Pi
with i ∈ J . The parties in J \ {i∗} do not send messages throughout the protocol, whereas party
Pi∗ does not send any message during the first part of the protocol, but in the last round sends
messages as an honest party with input 0 that was isolated in the first part.
Claim 4.10. Consider an execution of π with A1, where all parties start with input bit 1. Then,
all honest parties output 1 with all but negligible probability.
Proof. The claim follows immediately by the validity property of π.
For the second claim, we define the adversarial strategy A2, where the set of corrupted parties
is I. The parties in J \{i∗} do not send messages throughout the protocol, and the parties in I \J
play honestly on input 1, except that in the last round, the set of parties in C0i∗ additionally sends
the messages {mˆ0i→i∗}i∈C0
i∗
to Pi∗ .
Claim 4.11. Consider an execution of π with A2, where party Pi∗ starts with input bit 0 and all
other parties with input bit 1. Then, conditioned on E, all honest parties (including Pi∗) output 1
with all but negligible probability.
Proof. Conditioned on E , the view of all honest parties other than Pi∗ , is identically distributed
as in Claim 4.10. It follows that every honest party but Pi∗ will output 1 except for negligible
probability. By agreement, Pi∗ will also output 1 except for negligible probability.
Next, consider the adversarial strategy A3, where the set of corrupted parties is I. The parties
in J \ {i∗} do not send messages throughout the protocol, and the parties in I \ J play honestly
on input 0, except that in the last round, the set of parties in C1i∗ additionally sends the messages
{mˆ1i→i∗}i∈C1
i∗
to Pi∗ .
Claim 4.12. Consider an execution of π with A3 where all parties starts with input bit 0. Then,
conditioned on the event E, all honest parties output 1 with noticeable probability.
Proof. We will show that, conditioned on E , the view of Pi∗ in this scenario will be distributed as
in previous scenario with noticeable probability; hence, by Claim 4.11, party Pi∗ will output 1 with
the same probability. By agreement so will all other honest parties.
To analyze the view of Pi∗ in the first scenario (where all parties outside of J start with input
1), let B1 be the set of honest parties that send messages to Pi∗ in the last round. Denote by
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{m1i }i∈B1 the messages sent by these parties to Pi∗ . The view of Pi∗ consists of his input bit 0, his
random coins, the crs, the messages {mˆ0i→i∗}i∈C0
i∗
, and messages {m1i }i∈B1 .
To analyze the view of Pi∗ in the second scenario (where all parties outside of J start with
input 0), let B0 be the set of honest parties that send messages to Pi∗ in the last round. Denote by
{m0i }i∈B0 the messages sent by these parties to Pi∗ . The view of Pi∗ consists of his input bit 0, his
random coins, the crs, the messages {mˆ1i→i∗}i∈C1
i∗
, and messages {m0i }i∈B0 .
Recall that by Claim 4.9, when running two independent executions of π in which the parties
in J do not talk till the last round, the first where every Pj with j ∈ [n] \ J starts with 0 and the
second when every such Pj starts with 1, there exists j
∗ ∈ J such that Pj∗ receives o(n) messages
in both executions with probability at least 1/n. Since the executions in the first and second
scenarios are independent of each other and also of the two virtual executions run in the head of
the adversary, it holds that there exists a party Pj∗ with j
∗ ∈ J that receives o(n) messages in
each of the four executions with probability at least 1/n2. Since i∗ is chosen uniformly at random
in J , it holds that the sizes of C0i∗ , C1i∗ , B0, and B1 are all is o(n) with probability at least 1/n3.
In this case it holds that the pair of sets {mˆ1i→i∗}i∈C1
i∗
and {m0i }i∈B0 is identically distributed as
{mˆ0i→i∗}i∈C0
i∗
and {m1i }i∈B1 , and the view of Pi∗ is identically distributed in both the first and
second scenarios.
Since by assumption, the event E occurs with inverse-polynomial probability, the attack succeeds
with inverse-polynomial probability. This concludes the proof of Theorem 4.8.
4.2.2 Lower Bound on Balanced Byzantine Agreement in PKI Model
We proceed to prove the second lower bound, showing that in the trusted PKI model, where
each party receives an independently sampled pair of public/private keys, one-way functions are
necessary for extending almost-everywhere agreement to full agreement in a single communication
round. Note that a lower bound in the trusted PKI model readily implies a lower bound in weaker
PKI models.
Theorem 4.13 (Theorem 1.6, restated). Let π be a βn-resilient Byzantine agreement protocol in
the trusted PKI and f∗ae-comm-hybrid model, for β < 1. Assume that π has two parts: the first
consists of a polynomial number of rounds where communication is via f∗ae-comm, and the second
consists of a single round over point-to-point channels. Then, if one-way functions do not exist,
there exists a party that sends Θ(n) messages in the last round.
At a high level, the proof of the theorem considers an adversary that receives the public keys
(vk1, . . . , vkn) of the PKI setup, where each vki is sampled with a secret ski independently of
other keys. Under the assumption that one-way functions do not exist, with noticeable probability
the adversary can find a corresponding secret key s˜ki (i.e., a pre-image) for every vki, and then
carry out the attack from Section 4.2.1. This intuition, however, is not sufficient for proving the
theorem, since the distribution of randomly generated keys {(vki, ski)}i∈[n] may be different than
the distribution of the inverted keys {(vki, s˜ki)}i∈[n]. In this case, the simulated messages generated
by the adversary when emulating the executions in its head may be different than those generated
in the real protocol, and so honest parties can tell them apart.
To overcome this subtlety, recall that Impagliazzo and Luby [58] showed that the existence of
distributional one-way functions (functions for which it is hard to sample a uniform pre-image)
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implies the existence of one-way functions. Stated differently, if one-way functions do not exist,
then for any polynomial p(·) and any polynomial-time computable function f , there exists a PPT
algorithm Inv such that, for infinitely many n, the following distributions are 1/p(n)-statistically
close:
• {(x, f(x)) | x← {0, 1}n}.
• {(Inv(f(y)), y) | x← {0, 1}n, y = f(x)}.
In this case, we say that Inv inverts f with 1/p(n)-statistical closeness. In case the distributions
are identically distributed we call the inverter perfect and denote it by PInv.
Proof of Theorem 4.13. Without loss of generality, in the following we consider n = κ. The trusted
PKI setup can be modeled by a trusted party that for every i ∈ [n] samples uniformly random
ri ∈ {0, 1}n, computes a polynomial-time function (vk1, . . . , vkn) = fpki(r1, . . . , rn), where for every
i ∈ [n], vki = f ipki(ri) for some function f ipki. The trusted party outputs to each party Pi the random
coins ri along with (vk1, . . . , vkn). Denote by 1/p(n) the success probability of the attack in the
proof of Theorem 4.8 and let Inv be the inverter algorithm for fpki that is guaranteed to exist by [58]
with 1/2p(n)-statistical closeness under the assumption that one-way functions do not exist.
Let π be a protocol in the trusted PKI and f∗ae-comm-hybrid model that invokes f
∗
ae-comm for
polynomially many rounds followed by a single point-to-point round, and assume that the number
of messages sent by every party in the last round is o(n). Following the lines of the proof of
Theorem 4.8, we will construct an adversarial strategy that violates the validity of π with non-
negligible probability.
Choosing the corrupted set. Initially, the adversary receives the public keys (vk1, . . . , vkn)
from the trusted party modeling the trusted PKI, and computes (r˜1, . . . , r˜n) ← Inv(vk1, . . . , vkn).
Next, the adversary chooses a random subset J ⊆ [n] of size βn/2 and simulates two executions of
π inside its head.
• In the first execution, every party Pi has input bit 0 and receives r˜i and (vk1, . . . , vkn) from
the trusted PKI. Every party Pj with j ∈ J is corrupted and does not send any message
throughout the protocol. For every j ∈ J , denote the set of parties that sends messages to
Pj in the last point-to-point round by C0j and record the messages as {mˆ0i→j}i∈C0j .
• In the second execution, every party Pi has input bit 1 and receives r˜i and (vk1, . . . , vkn) from
the trusted PKI. Every party Pj with j ∈ J is corrupted and does not send any message
throughout the protocol. For every j ∈ J , denote the set of parties that sends messages to
Pj in the last point-to-point round by C1j and record the messages as {mˆ1i→j}i∈C1j .
Claim 4.14. There exists j ∈ J such that |C0j ∪ C1j | ∈ o(n), except for probability 1/2p(n).
Proof. Consider a perfect inverter PInv for fpki. In that case for every j ∈ J , the simulated messages
by the adversary {mˆ0i→j}i∈C0j (resp., {mˆ
1
i→j}i∈C1j ) are identically distributed as the messages that Pj
receives in the last round in an honest execution where all parties in [n] \ J have input 0 (resp., 1)
and parties in J \{j} are corrupted and do not send messages. Therefore, by an identical argument
to Claim 4.9, there exists j ∈ J such that |C0j ∪ C1j | ∈ o(n).
The claim follows since Inv is an inverter with 1/2p(n)-statistical closeness.
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The adversary proceeds by choosing uniformly at random i∗ ∈ J , and as before, if |C0i∗ ∪ C1i∗ | ≥
βn/2, the adversary aborts the attack and halts. By Claim 4.14 the adversary does not abort with
probability at least 1/n − 1/2p(n) (recall that by the proof of Theorem 4.8, 1/p(n) ≤ 1/n; hence,
1/n−1/2p(n) > 0). Next, the adversary chooses a random subset I ⊆ [n]\{i∗} of size βn, such that
J ∪ C0i∗ ∪ C1i∗ \ {i∗} ⊆ I. Denote by E the event where the adversary does not abort and that party
Pi∗ is isolated by f
∗
ae-comm with respect to the set of corrupted parties I as defined above. By the
definition of f∗ae-comm and by Claim 4.14, this event happens with inverse-polynomial probability.
The rest of the proof proceeds exactly as in the proof of Theorem 4.8, with the only difference
that the statistical distance of the PKI private keys in the protocol and those simulated by the
adversary is bounded by 1/2p(n). Since the attack in the proof of Theorem 4.8 succeeds with
probability 1/p(n), it holds that 1/p(n)− 1/2p(n) is noticeable.
5 Constructions of SRDS
In Section 5.1, we present an SRDS scheme with trusted PKI based on OWF, and in Section 5.2,
an SRDS scheme with bulletin-board PKI based on proof-carrying data and CRH.
5.1 SRDS from One-Way Functions
Theorem 5.1 (Theorem 1.3, restated). Let β < 1/3 be a constant. Assuming the existence of
one-way functions, there exists a βn-secure SRDS scheme in the trusted PKI model.
The main building block in our construction is an augmented version of digital signatures with
the ability to obliviously sample a verification key without knowing the signing key. Note that
by assuming secure erasures, or a trusted party that does not reveal the key-generation coins, our
construction can be based on any digital signatures scheme.
Definition 5.2 (signatures with oblivious key generation). A digital signature scheme (DS.KeyGen,
DS.Sign, DS.Verify) has oblivious key generation if there exists an algorithm DS.OKeyGen that on
input the security parameter 1κ outputs a key ovk, such that the following hold:
• Indistinguishability. The distribution of vk, where (vk, sk)← DS.KeyGen(1κ), should be com-
putationally indistinguishable from ovk, where ovk ← DS.OKeyGen(1κ).
• Obliviousness. A PPT adversary A can win the following game with negligible probability:
1. Challenger computes ovk = DS.OKeyGen(1κ; r) and sends (ovk, r) to A.
2. A responds with a pair (m,σ), and wins if DS.Verify(ovk,m, σ) = 1.
Claim 5.3. Assuming the existence of one-way functions, there exists a one-time digital signature
scheme with oblivious key generation.
Proof Sketch. Recall the one-time signatures of Lamport [67] for ℓ-bit messages. Given a one-
way function f , the signing key consists of 2ℓ random κ-bits strings x01, x
1
1, . . . , x
0
ℓ , x
1
ℓ and the
verification key is y01, y
1
1, . . . , y
0
ℓ , y
1
ℓ , where y
b
i = f(x
b
i). A signature on a message m = (m1, . . . ,mℓ)
is σ = (xm11 , . . . , x
mℓ
ℓ ). To verify a signature σ = (σ1, . . . , σℓ), check for each i ∈ [ℓ] if f(σi) = f(xmii ).
By instantiating the one-way function with a length-doubling pseudorandom generator G, we
can define the oblivious key-generation algorithm by sampling 2ℓ random 2κ-bit strings. Indistin-
guishability follows from the pseudorandomness of G, and obliviousness from its one-wayness.
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Note that via standard transformations (e.g., [52, Sec. 6.4]) the one-time signature construction
above can be extended to multi-message signatures with oblivious key generation.
Overview of the construction. Our construction makes use of a digital signature scheme with
oblivious key generation (Definition 5.2). For each party toss a biased coin that outputs heads with
probability ℓ/n, for some ℓ = ω(log(n)). If the output is heads, sample standard signature keys
(vki, ski)← DS.KeyGen(1κ); otherwise, obliviously sample vki ← DS.OKeyGen(1κ). A signature on
a message m can be computed only by parties with a valid signing key. The aggregation algorithm
concatenates these valid signatures.13 Verification of a signature requires counting how many valid
signatures were signed on the message.
The construction of the SRDS scheme is formally described in Figure 7 and the proof of Theo-
rem 5.1 can be found in Appendix C.1.
SRDS from OWF
Let (DS.KeyGen,DS.OKeyGen,DS.Sign,DS.Verify) be a signature scheme with oblivious key generation,
let α(n, κ) ∈ poly(logn, κ), and let ℓ = logc(n) for some constant c > 1.
• Setup(1κ, 1n) : Output pp = 1κ.
• KeyGen(pp) : Toss a biased coin that outputs heads with probability ℓ/n. If the outcome is heads,
compute (vk, sk) ← DS.KeyGen(1κ); else compute vk ← DS.OKeyGen(1κ) and set sk = ⊥. Output
(vk, sk).
• Sign(pp, i, sk,m) : If sk 6= ⊥, compute sig ← DS.Sign(sk,m) and set σ = {(i,m, sig)}; otherwise, set
σ = ⊥. Output σ.
• Aggregate1(pp, {vk1, . . . , vkn},m, {σ1, . . . , σq}): Initialize Ssig = ∅. For every i ∈ [q]:
– Parse σi as a set of signature-tuples {(ij,mij , sigij )}ij∈Si (for some set Si).
– For every (ij ,mij , sigij ) ∈ σi, check whether m = mij and DS.Verify(vkij ,m, sigij ) = 1 and
∄(ij , ·, ·, ·) ∈ Ssig. If so, set Ssig = Ssig ∪ {(ij,m, sigij )}.
If
∑
σ∈Ssig
‖σ‖ ≤ α(n, κ),a output Ssig; else, output ⊥.
• Aggregate2(pp,m, Ssig) : If
∑
σ∈Ssig
‖σ‖ ≤ α(n, κ), output Ssig; else, output ⊥.
• Verify(pp, {vk1, . . . , vkn},m, σ): Initialize Sver = ∅.
– Parse σ as a set of signature-tuples {(i,mi, sigi)}i∈S (for some set S).
– For each (i,mi, sigi) ∈ σ, if m = mi and DS.Verify(vki,mi, sigi) = 1 and ∄(i, ·, ·) ∈ Sver, set
Sver = Sver ∪ {(i,mi, sigi)}.
– If
∑
σ∈Sver
‖σ‖ ≤ α(n, κ) and |Sver| > ℓ′/3, where ℓ′ = ℓ/2, output 1; else, output 0.
a‖σ‖ stands for the bit length of σ.
Figure 7: succinctly reconstructed distributed signatures from one-way functions
13Since this aggregation process is deterministic, decomposing the algorithm is redundant – we represent it by two
algorithms for completeness, to make the syntax compatible with the BA protocol in Section 4.1.
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5.2 SRDS from SNARKs
The construction in Section 5.1 was in the trusted PKI model. In this section, we show how
to construct SRDS in the bulletin-board PKI, albeit under stronger cryptographic assumptions.
Namely, we consider CRH and SNARKs with linear extraction, where the size of the extractor
is linear in the size of the prover (i.e., |EP∗ | ≤ c · |P∗| for some constant c). An extractability
assumption of this kind has been considered in [86, 41, 54, 18].
Theorem 5.4 (Theorem 1.4, restated). Let t < n/3. Assuming the existence of CRH, digital
signatures, and SNARKs with linear extraction, there exists a t-secure SRDS scheme in the CRS
model with a bulletin-board PKI.
The construction of the SRDS scheme is formally described in Figure 8 and the proof of Theo-
rem 5.4 can be found in Appendix C.2.
Overview of the construction. As discussed in the Introduction, a PCD system allows for
propagation of information up the tree in a succinct and publicly verifiable way. Having the parties
locally sign the message and keep track of the number of verified signatures aggregated so far via
the PCD system, seems to capture most of our requirements for SRDS. However, in order to prevent
an adversary from aggregating fake signatures or multiple copies of the same signature, we need to
devise a mechanism of verifying the base signatures in the compliance predicate.
One approach is to hard-wire all verification keys into the compliance predicate and verify each
base-level signature. However, this will blow-up the size of the predicate to O(n) and, as a result,
the PCD-prover algorithm will run in time O(n). In this case the scheme will no longer be succinct,
as the algorithm Aggregate2 internally runs the PCD prover. Indeed, recall that in the BA protocol
(in Section 4.1.2) Aggregate2 is executed via an MPC protocol; hence, its complexity must be O˜(1).
To get around this barrier, we use a Merkle tree to hash all the verification keys; A Merkle tree
enables a long string (here, the list of all verification keys (vk1, . . . , vkn)) to be hashed to a short
value in a committing way, such that one can prove inclusion of the key vki in the input string by
providing an “opening” to vki in low complexity (here, logarithmic in n) (see Appendix A.2 for
details). Each incoming and outgoing PCD transcript will now contain this hash value Hvk. The
base-level transcript will also consist of:
1. The signature γi and corresponding verification key ki = vki.
2. A Merkle proof pi certifying that ki is the i’th verification key in the computation of Hvk.
The compliance predicate, in this case, will verify:
1. The signature γi with respect to the ki.
2. That ki is properly hashed in the Merkle tree.
To prevent an adversary from using a different Hvk value, we add an additional check in the
compliance predicate that the value ofHvk is consistent in all the incoming and outgoing transcripts.
Finally, to prevent an adversary from potentially aggregating multiple copies of the same base
signature, we encode a maxima max and a minima min of the indices of the keys used to sign the
base signatures in each transcript of the PCD proof.
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SRDS from CRH and SNARKs
Let (DS.KeyGen,DS.Sign,DS.Verify) be a digital signature scheme, let (PCD.Gen, PCD.Prover,
PCD.Verify) be a publicly verifiable proof-carrying data (PCD) system for logarithmic-depth poly-
nomial-size compliance predicates C, and let (Merkle.Setup,Merkle.Hash,Merkle.Proof,Merkle.Verify)
be the Merkle hash proof system corresponding to a hash function H . Let α(n, κ) ∈ poly(log n, κ).
• Setup(1κ): Sample seed ← Merkle.Setup(1κ) and PCD keys corresponding to a compliance predicate
C (defined below), as (σpcd, τpcd)← PCD.Gen(1κ, C).
The predicate C: Given an input vector ~zin of length ℓ, such that for j ∈ [ℓ] the j’th entry of ~zin
is of the form ~zin[j] = (min,j , cin,j ,maxin,j,minin,j, γin,j , Hvk,j, kin,j , pin,j), and output data of the form
zout = (mout, cout,maxout,minout, γout, Hvk,out, kout, pout), the predicate C(~zin, zout) equals 1 iff:
1. For every j ∈ [ℓ], it holds that Hvk,j = Hvk,out.
2. For every j ∈ [ℓ], if it is a base level (i.e., if maxin,j = minin,j and γin,j 6= ⊥), then
DS.Verify(kin,j ,min,j , γin,j) = 1 and Merkle.Verify(seed, (maxin,j||kin,j), Hvk,out, pin,j) = 1.
3. It holds that minin,ℓ ≤ maxin,ℓ and for every j ∈ [ℓ − 1] that minin,j ≤ maxin,j < minin,j+1, i.e.,
max of an input is greater than or equal to its min and less than the min of the next input.
4. min of the output transcript is equal to the min of the first input, i.e., minout = minin,1.
5. max of the output transcript is equal to the max of the last input, i.e., maxout = maxin,ℓ.
6. cout stores a count of the number of signatures aggregated so far, i.e., cout =
∑
j∈[ℓ] cin,j .
The output is pp = (1κ, σpcd, τpcd, seed).
• KeyGen(pp): Parse pp = (1κ, σpcd, τpcd, seed), compute (vk, sk)← DS.KeyGen(1κ), output (vk, sk).
• Sign(pp, i, ski,mi): Compute γi ← DS.Sign(ski,mi), set z′ = (mi, 1, i, i, γi), and output σ = (z′,⊥).
• Aggregate1(pp, {vk1, . . . , vkn},m, {σ1, . . . , σq}): Parse pp = (1κ, σpcd, τpcd, seed). Compute Hvk =
Merkle.Hash(seed, (1||vk1), . . . , (n||vkn)) and set Ssig = {Hvk}. For each i ∈ [q] do the following:
– Parse σi = (z
′
i, πi) and z
′
i = (mi, ci,maxi,mini, γi)
– For base level (where maxi = mini, m = mi, πi = ⊥, γi 6= ⊥ and DS.Verify(vkmaxi ,mi, γi) = 1),
compute pi = Merkle.Proof(seed, (1||vk1), . . . , (n||vkn), (maxi||vkmaxi)), prepare the transcript
zi = z
′
i||(Hvk, vkmaxi , pi), and set Ssig = Ssig ∪ {(zi, πi)}.
– Else, set zi = z
′
i||(Hvk,⊥,⊥) and check whether PCD.Verify(τpcd, zi, πi) = 1 and m = mi. If
so, set Ssig = Ssig ∪ {(zi, πi)}.
If ‖Ssig‖ ≤ α(n, κ),a output Ssig; else, output ⊥.
• Aggregate2(pp,m, Ssig): Parse pp = (1κ, σpcd, τpcd, seed) and set cout = 0. Parse Ssig = {Hvk, . . .}. For
each σi ∈ Ssig \{Hvk}, parse σi = (z′i, πi) and z′i = (mi, ci,maxi,mini, γi) and set cout = cout+ci. Let
(zin,1, πin,1) be the first element in Ssig where zin,1 = (·, ·, ·,minin,1, ·). Set minout = minin,1. Similarly,
denote u = |Ssig| and let (zin,u, πin,u) be the last element in Ssig where zin,u = (·, ·,maxin,u, ·, ·). Set
maxout = maxin,u, set z
′
out = (m, cout,maxout,minout,⊥), and set zout = (z′out, Hvk,⊥,⊥). Compute
πout ← PCD.Prover(σpcd, Ssig, linp = ⊥, zout) and output σ = (z′out, πout).
• Verify(pp, {vki}i∈[n],m, σ): Parse pp = (1κ, σpcd, τpcd, seed), σ = (z′, π), z′ = (m′, c,max,min, γi).
Compute Hvk = Merkle.Hash((1||vk1), . . . , (n||vkn); seed) and z = z′||(Hvk,⊥,⊥). If m′ = m,
PCD.Verify(τpcd, z, π) = 1, c ≥ n/3, and ‖σ‖ ≤ α(n, κ), output 1; else, output 0.
a‖Ssig‖ stands for the bit length of Ssig.
Figure 8: succinctly reconstructed distributed signatures from CRH and SNARKs
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We proceed to give a more detailed overview of our construction. Each base signature (and
aggregate signature) corresponds to a “truncated” PCD transcript and a corresponding proof.
For base signatures, this proof is set to ⊥ and in the remaining aggregated signatures, this proof
corresponds to a PCD proof. Each truncated transcript z′ = (m, c,max,min, γ) consists of a message
m over which the signature is computed, a counter c to keep a count of the number of distinct keys
used to sign this signature, a maxima max and minima min of the indices of the keys that signed
the message, and a value γ that in the base case is a signature on m corresponding to vkmax and in
all other cases is set to ⊥.
Each party starts by locally signing the message using its signing key ski and preparing z
′
i.
The algorithm Aggregate1 collects base signatures and/or partially aggregated signatures, checks
for their validity and prepares their corresponding PCD transcripts. For base signatures (where
z′ = (m, 1, i, i, γ) and π = ⊥), Aggregate1 checks that γ and m verify with respect to vki; if
so, it prepares a Merkle proof p for vki and the PCD transcript is set to z = z||(Hvk, vki, p).
For partially aggregated signatures (where z′ = (m, c,max,min,⊥) and π 6= ⊥), it completes the
transcript by setting z = z′||(Hvk,⊥,⊥) and runs the PCD verification algorithm on (z, π). The
algorithm Aggregate2 computes the outgoing transcript that is compliant with the valid incoming
PCD transcripts and computes a PCD proof certifying this, i.e., that it is based on c distinct and
valid individual signatures. Finally, to verify (z′, π), set z = z′||(Hvk,⊥,⊥), verify the PCD (z, π),
and count the total number of keys used for signing this signature.
6 Connection with Succinct Arguments
In Section 5, we showed how to construct SRDS with a strong setup assumption (trusted PKI)
from OWF, and with relatively weak setup assumptions (bulletin-board PKI) at the expense of
strong, non-falsifiable, cryptographic assumptions (SNARKs with linear extractors). A natural
approach towards constructing SRDS that balances the cryptographic and setup assumptions, is
to augment a multi-signature scheme with some method of convincing the verifier that sufficiently
many parties contributed to the signing process. Indeed, multi-signatures are known to exist under
standard falsifiable assumptions in the registered PKI model [72]. In this model each party locally
generates its own keys (as with bulletin-board PKI) but to publish its verification key, the party
must prove knowledge of the corresponding secret key, see [10, 72] and a discussion in [5].
In this section, we discuss challenges toward such an approach, by showing that in some cases
this necessitates some form of succinct non-interactive arguments. We begin in Section 6.1 by
formalizing the notion of SNARGs for average-case instances of a language, and formalizing the
notion of SRDS “based on” multi-signatures. Next, in Section 6.2, we show that any SRDS based on
LOSSWmulti-signatures imply SNARGs for average-case instances of the Subset-Product problem.
Finally, in Section 6.3, we explore hardness of various Subset-f problems and their connection to
SRDS based on more general multi-signature schemes.
6.1 Average-Case SNARGs and SRDS based on Multi-signatures
Average-Case SNARGs. We consider a notion of SNARGs for average-case instances of an
NP language L. This constitutes a weaker primitive than standard SNARGs (as per [9]), which
requires soundness against worst-case instances, and may be viewed as a variant of the notion for
cryptographically hard languages considered in [14]. An average-case SNARG for a language L
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is parameterized by an efficiently sampleable distribution Dyes over the instance-witness pairs in
L, and an efficiently sampleable distribution Dno over instances outside of L. In a similar way
to regular SNARGs, average-case SNARGs consist of setup, prover, and verification algorithms.
Intuitively, given any instance-witness pair (x,w) in Dyes, the prover algorithm should output a
verifying succinct proof with overwhelming probability. At the same time, it should be hard for an
adversary to compute a verifying proof for a random instance x from Dno.
Definition 6.1 (Average-Case SNARG for (Dyes,Dno)). Let L be an NP language associated with a
relation RL, and let Dyes and Dno be efficiently sampleable distributions over (x,w) ∈ RL and x /∈ L,
respectively. A succinct non-interactive argument system Π for average-case L, parameterized by
the distributions (Dyes,Dno), is defined by PPT algorithms (S.Setup,S.Prove,S.Verify) as follows:
• S.Setup(1κ, 1n) → crs. On input the security parameter κ and the instance size n, the setup
algorithm outputs a common reference string crs.
• S.Prove(crs, x, w)→ π. On input the crs and an instance-witness pair (x,w) ∈ RL, the prover
algorithm outputs a proof π.
• S.Verify(crs, x, π) → b. On input the crs, an instance x, and a proof π, the verification
algorithm outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
We require the argument system to satisfy the following properties:
1. Succinctness: |π| = poly(log n, κ) for all (x,w)← Dyes(1n).
2. Completeness: For any instance-witness pair (x,w) in the support of Dyes, it holds that
Pr [S.Verify(crs, x, π) = 1 | crs ← S.Setup(1κ, 1n), π ← S.Prove(crs, x, w)] ≥ 1− negl(n, κ).
3. Average-Case Soundness: For any non-uniform PPT prover P∗, it holds that
Pr [S.Verify(crs, x, π) = 1 | crs ← S.Setup(1κ, 1n), x← Dno(1n), π ← P∗(crs, x)] ≤ negl(n, κ).
SRDS based on multi-signatures. We consider implications of SRDS constructions based on
an underlying multi-signature scheme (see Appendix A.3) in the following sense. While rigorously
specifying the notion is rather involved, at a high level, such a scheme is one that satisfies three
natural properties:
1. Structure: The aggregate SRDS signature is a pair (σms, π), where σms is a multi-signature
and π is some (small) auxiliary information (of size O˜(1)).
2. Completeness: Given a valid multi-signature σms on a message m corresponding to a suf-
ficiently large subset of keys {vki}i∈S , together with knowledge of the subset S, it is easy to
compute a valid SRDS signature certifying m.
3. Soundness: Given a set of honestly generated verification keys, it is difficult to output a
verifying SRDS signature (σms, π) on a message m such that the multi-signature σms does not
verify on m against any sufficiently large subset of keys.
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In order to prove that sufficiently many parties agree on a message m, it suffices to certify that there
exists an s-size subset of parties (where s is sufficiently large) who agree on the same message m.
Therefore, moving forward for SRDS based on multi-signatures, we only focus on proving that
exactly s parties agree on a particular message. We now formalize SRDS based on multi-signatures.
Definition 6.2 (SRDS based on multi-signatures). An SRDS scheme Π = (Setup(1κ, 1n),
KeyGen, Sign, Aggregate, Verify) with bulletin-board PKI, is based on a multi-signature scheme
(MS.Setup,MS.KeyGen,MS.Sign,MS.Verify,MS.Combine,MS.MVerify) if there exists s(n) ∈ Θ(n),
for which the following hold:
• Structure. The SRDS has the following structure:
– Setup(1κ, 1n): Outputs public parameters of the form ppsrds = (ppms, pp2), where ppms ←
MS.Setup(1κ) and pp2 are (potentially) additional public parameters.
– KeyGen(ppsrds): Parses ppsrds = (ppms, pp2) and outputs (sk, vk)← MS.KeyGen(ppms).
– Aggregate: Any SRDS σ output by Aggregate is of the form (σms, π) ∈ Xms×{0, 1}poly(κ,logn),
where σms ∈ Xms is a multi-signature (in the support of MS.Combine).
• Completeness. There exists a PPT algorithm P, such that with overwhelming probability (in
(n, κ)) over honestly sampled ppsrds = (ppms, pp2) ← Setup(1κ, 1n) and independently sampled
verification keys (vki, ·)← KeyGen(ppsrds) for i ∈ [n], the following holds:
Let m ∈ M, let S ⊆ [n] of size s(n), and let σms ∈ Xms be a multi-signature sat-
isfying MS.MVerify(ppms, vk1, . . . , vkn, S,m, σms) = 1. Then, with overwhelming probability
(in (n, κ)) over the auxiliary information π ← P(ppsrds, vk1, . . . , vkn, S,m, σms), it holds that
Verify(ppsrds, vk1, . . . , vkn,m, (σms, π)) = 1.
• Soundness. Every non-uniform polynomial-time adversary A wins the following experiment
with at most negligible probability (in (n, κ)):
1. The challenger samples ppsrds = (ppms, pp2) ← Setup(1κ, 1n) and for every i ∈ [n], sets
(vki, ski)← KeyGen(ppsrds).
2. The challenger gives A the values (ppsrds, vk1, . . . , vkn) and get back (m, (σms, π)).
3. The adversary wins the game if and only if Verify(ppsrds, vk1, . . . , vkn,m, (σms, π)) = 1
and, in addition, there does not exist a subset S ⊆ [n] of size s(n), such that
MS.MVerify(ppms, vk1, . . . , vkn, S,m, σms) = 1.
(Observe that the output of this experiment is not necessarily efficiently computable.)
Note that for our purposes it will suffice to consider soundness against an adversary A who does
not have access to a subset of keys {ski}i∈S or to a signing oracle. This is a weaker requirement
than a comparable soundness guarantee when given corrupted secret keys, which means a barrier
against such primitive is stronger.
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6.2 Multi-signatures of Lu et al. [72] and Subset-Product
We proceed to show that any SRDS based on the multi-signature scheme of Lu et al. [72] (“LOSSW”)
as defined above implies SNARGs for a natural average-case version of Subset-Product. Intuitively,
an LOSSW multi-signature σms for a set of parties S ⊆ [n] is equivalent to a single signature under
the product of the verification keys
∏
i∈S vki. In turn, existence of a large set of approving parties
S for σms is equivalent to existence of a large set of verification keys {vki}i∈S for which
∏
i∈S vki
takes a particular desired value determined by σms.
The multi-signature scheme of Lu et al. [72], is based on the Bilinear Computational Diffie-
Hellman (BCDH) assumption, parametrized by a bilinear map e : G ×G → GT , where G and GT
are multiplicative cyclic groups of order p. In Appendix A.4, we formally describe the LOSSW
multi-signature scheme; their scheme roughly works as follows:
Construction 6.3 (LOSSW Multi-signatures [72]).
• MS.Setup(1κ): The setup algorithm outputs public parameters ppms = (G,GT , p, g, e).
• MS.KeyGen(1κ): The key-generation algorithm outputs a signing key sk ∈ Zp, and the corre-
sponding verification key vk ∈ GT , computed as e(g, g)sk.
• MS.Sign(ppms, sk,m): There is a deterministic function fmsg that takes the public parameters
ppms and the message m ∈ M as input and outputs an element in G (see Appendix A.4 for full
specification). Given this fmsg, a signature on m with secret key sk is generated by sampling
r ← Zp and computing σ = (sig1, sig2) as follows:
sig1 = g
sk · (fmsg(ppms,m))r and sig2 = gr.
• MS.Combine(ppms, vk1, . . . , vkn, {σi}i∈S ,m): Given a set of individual signatures {σi}i∈S on a
message m ∈M, the combine function parses each σi as (sig(i)1 , sig(i)2 ) and computes:
sig1 =
∏
i∈S
sig
(i)
1 and sig2 =
∏
i∈S
sig
(i)
2 .
The output is the combined multi-signature σms = (sig1, sig2).
Remark. Recall that sig
(i)
1 and sig
(i)
2 for each i ∈ S, is of the form
sig
(i)
1 = g
ski · (fmsg(ppms,m))ri and sig(i)2 = gri
for some ri ∈ Zp. Therefore,
sig1 = g
sk∗ · (fmsg(ppms,m))r
∗
and sig2 = g
r∗ ,
where sk∗ =
∑
i∈S ski and r
∗ =
∑
i∈S ri. Note that the multi-signature σms = (sig1, sig2) can now
be viewed as an individual signature on m corresponding to secret key sk∗ and randomness r∗.
• MS.MVerify(ppms, vk1, . . . , vkn, S,m, σms): Given a message m, a multi-signature σms and the
corresponding set S of verification keys, the verification algorithm outputs 1 if and only if
e(sig1, g) · e(sig2, fmsg(ppms,m))−1 =
∏
i∈S
vki.
Note that the same algorithm can be used to verify individual signatures (with S = {i}).
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Average-case subset-product problem. We proceed to show a connection between any SRDS
based on LOSSW multi-signatures, and the following average-case version of the Subset-Product
problem.
Definition 6.4 (Average-Case Subset-Product Problem). Let s = s(n) be an integer and let G
be a multiplicative group. Given an instance x = (a1, . . . , an, t) ∈ Gn+1, the (s,G)-Subset-Product
problem is the problem of deciding if there exists a subset S ⊆ [n] of size |S| = s, such that∏
i∈S ai = t. All such instances are said to be in the (s,G)-Subset-Product language L×.
We consider the average-case version of this problem characterized by the following two distri-
butions:
1. Dyes(1n)→ (x,w): For i ∈ [n], sample ai ∈ G uniformly at random. Sample a set S ⊆ [n] of
size s uniformly at random. Set t =
∏
i∈S ai. Output x = (a1, . . . , an, t) and w = S.
2. Dno(1n) → x: For i ∈ [n], sample ai ∈ G uniformly at random. Sample a target t ∈ G
uniformly at random. Output x = (a1, . . . , an, t).
Note that for appropriate parameter regimes, Dno yields instances (x /∈ L×) with high proba-
bility. For example, consider s = n/2 and G = Z∗M for M = 2
4n: the probability that there exists
a subset S such that
∏
i∈S ai is equal to a randomly chosen value t is approximately 2
−2n.
Remark. Subset-Product is a well-studied problem, with known NP-hardness results in the worst
case, and conjectured hardness in the average-case version considered above.
• Hardness of Worst-Case Subset Product: For G = Z∗M and s ∈ Θ(n), the hardness of worst-
case (s,G)-Subset-Product depends on the density n/ logM of the instance. For M = 2Θ(n)
(i.e., n/ logM ∈ Θ(1)), there exists s ∈ Θ(n) for which the (s,Z∗M )-Subset-product is NP-
complete [61, 49, 59, 74].14
• Hardness of Average-Case Subset Product: The average-case version of Subset-Product
is thought to be computationally hard when n/ logM is constant or even O(1/ log n) [59], with
the best known algorithms requiring at least 2Ω(n) time. Hardness of distinguishing between
distributions Dyes and Dno as above is used (in an indirect way) as a computational hardness
assumption in an assortment of cryptographic systems [59, 3, 82, 83, 79, 74].15
LOSSW-based SRDS implies SNARGs for average-case Subset-Product. We now show
that an SRDS scheme based on the LOSSW multi-signature scheme implies the existence of
SNARGs for average-case Subset-Product over the target group GT for the underlying bilinear
map e : G×G→ GT . Intuitively, the construction takes the following form.
Given an instance x = (a1, . . . , an, t) ∈ Gn+1T (coming from either Dyes or Dno), we will interpret
a1, . . . , an and an+1 = t
−1 as n+1 verification keys {vki}i∈[n+1] for the SRDS scheme. The succinct
14The Subset-Sum problem for arbitrary subset-sizes in this parameter regime was amongst the initial 21 problems
that were shown to be NP-complete by Karp [61]. There exists a generic reduction to reduce any instance of 3-SAT
to an instance of the Subset-Sum problem for arbitrary subset-sizes. A slight modification to this reduction shows
that there exists some s ∈ Θ(n) for which (s,ZM )-Subset-Sum problem is also NP-complete. There also exists a
generic reduction from any instance of the (s,ZM )-Subset-Sum problem, where ZM is an additive group of order M ,
to an instance of the (s,GM )-Subset-Product problem, where GM is a cyclic multiplicative group of order M (with
efficient exponentiation).
15This follows from the constructions in [59, 3, 82, 83, 79, 74] based on the Subset-Sum problem.
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proof certifying that x is in the language will be an SRDS signature on a message m ∈ M with
respect to the set of parties S∪{n+1} for which∏i∈S ai = t. The scheme is succinct by construction;
the required completeness and average-case soundness properties will hold as follows:
• Completeness: If x was generated as (x,w)← Dyes for w = S ⊆ [n], then by definition∏i∈S ai = t
and consequently t−1 · ∏i∈S ai = 1. Knowledge of the corresponding set of verification keys
thus enables the prover to generate a valid LOSSW multi-signature under these keys, using the
trivial sk∗ = 0 for vk∗ =
∏
i∈S∪{n+1} vki = 1. By the completeness of the LOSSW-based SRDS
(Definition 6.2), the prover can then translate this multi-signature to a valid SRDS.
• Average-case Soundness: On the other hand, if x was generated as x ← Dno, then since t and
consequently t−1 is uniform conditioned on a1, . . . , an, the resulting verification keys {vki}i∈[n+1]
are jointly uniform. Thus (for appropriate parameters n and |GT |), soundness of the argument
system holds from the soundness property of the LOSSW-based SRDS (see Definition 6.2).
Lemma 6.5. Assume there exists an SRDS scheme based on the LOSSW multi-signature scheme,
where Setup(1κ, 1n) generates ppms = (G,GT , p, g, e), as per Definition 6.2, with n/ log |GT | < 1.
Let 0 < α < 1 be a constant and let s(n) = α · n. Then, there exist SNARGs for average-case
(s(n),GT )-Subset-Product (as defined in Definition 6.4).
Proof. We construct average-case SNARGs for (s,GT )-Subset-Product using an SRDS scheme
based on the LOSSW multi-signature scheme as per Definition 6.2. Recall that the LOSSW multi-
signature scheme is parametrized by a bilinear map e : G × G → GT , where G and GT are multi-
plicative cyclic groups of order p. Let M be the message domain of the LOSSW multi-signature
scheme.
1. S.Setup(1κ, 1n) : Run the setup of the SRDS scheme ppsrds = (ppms, pp2)← Setup(1κ, 1n) and
output crs = ppsrds.
2. S.Prove(crs, x, w) : Given an average-case yes instance-witness pair, (x,w) ← Dyes(1n) of the
form x = (a1, . . . , an, t) and w = S, proceed as follows:
• Parse crs = (ppms, pp2) and interpret the set {a1, . . . , an, t−1} as a set of (n+1) verification
keys {vk1, . . . , vkn+1}. Note that ∏i∈S′ vki = 1 for S′ = S ∪ {n + 1}.
• Since in the LOSSW multi-signature scheme, (aggregate) verification key vk∗ = ∏i∈S′ vki
corresponds to a valid signing key sk∗ =
∑
i∈S′ ski, where vk
∗ = e(g, g)sk
∗
, it holds that if
vk∗ = 1, then sk∗ = 0. Choose an arbitrary m ∈ M and sample r ← Zp. Compute an
LOSSW signature σms = (sig1, sig2) on m with respect to vk
∗ = 1, where
sig1 = g
0 · (fmsg (ppms,m))r and sig2 = gr.
• Use the algorithm P (that is guaranteed to exist by Definition 6.2) to compute the auxiliary
information π ← P(ppsrds, vk1, . . . , vkn+1, S′,m, σms) from the signature σms and the set
S′ ⊆ [n+ 1].
• Finally output (m,σms, π).
3. S.Verify(crs, x, (m,σms, π)) : Parse x = (a1, . . . , an, t) and proceed as follows:
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• Parse crs = (ppms, pp2) and interpret the set {a1, . . . , an, t−1} as a set of (n+1) verification
keys {vk1, . . . , vkn+1}.
• Run the verification algorithm of the LOSSW multi-signature scheme with respect to com-
bined verification key vk∗ = 1, i.e., parse σms = (sig1, sig2) and check if
e(sig1, g) · e(sig2, fmsg(ppms,m))−1 = 1.
In other words, compute
b′ =
{
1, if e(sig1, g) · e(sig2, fmsg(ppms,m))−1 = 1
0, otherwise
.
• Run the verification algorithm of the SRDS scheme on (σms, π) with respect to m:
b← Verify(ppsrds, vk1, . . . , vkn+1,m, (σms, π)).
• Output b ∧ b′.
We now argue succinctness, completeness, and average-case soundness for this construction:
Succinctness. Succinctness follows from the succinctness of the SRDS scheme.
Completeness. Given any average-case yes instance-witness pair (x,w) ← Dyes(1n), with x =
(a1, . . . , an, t) and w = S, it holds that
∏
i∈S aj = t or equivalently t
−1 · ∏i∈S aj = 1. Let S′ =
S ∪ {n+ 1}. Recall that in the LOSSW scheme∏
i∈S′
vki =
∏
i∈S′
e(g, g)ski = e(g, g)
∑
i∈S′
ski ,
where ski is the secret key associated with vki. It follows that if
∏
i∈S′ vki = 1 then
∑
i∈S′ ski = 0.
Hence, σms = ((fmsg (ppms,m))
r , gr) is a valid multi-signature on m with respect to {ski}i∈S′ .
Since the multi-signature verifies MS.MVerify(ppms, vk1, . . . , vkn+1, S
′,m, σms) = 1, completeness of
SRDS based on a multi-signature scheme (see Definition 6.2) implies that the output of P, given
this signature and S′, will be a valid SRDS signature.
Average-Case Soundness. Recall that each of the values (a1, . . . , an, t) in x ← Dno(1n) are
sampled uniformly at random. Since t is a randomly sampled value, so is t−1. Therefore, the
verification keys {vk1, . . . , vkn, vkn+1}, where vki = ai for i ∈ [n] and vkn+1 = t−1, are uniformly
distributed over Gn+1T . Since by assumption, n/ log |GT | < 1, it holds with overwhelming probability
(bounded by 2n+1/|GT |) that there does not exist a subset S′ ⊆ [n + 1] of size s + 1, such that∏
i∈S′ vki = 1.
Given (m,σms, π), we check if: (1) σms is a valid multi-signature on m with respect to vk
∗ = 1,
and (2) if (σms, π) is a valid SRDS on m. Recall that given a multi-signature σms = (sig1, sig2),
a message m, the public parameters ppms, and a set of verification keys {vki}i∈S , the verification
algorithm of the LOSSW multi-signature scheme checks if
e(sig1, g) · e(sig2, fmsg(ppms,m))−1 =
∏
i∈S
vki.
In other words, given a valid multi-signature σms on a message m, there exists a unique aggregate
verification key
∏
i∈S vki for which σms verifies. Therefore, if check (1) goes through, then vk
∗ = 1 is
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the only aggregate verification key for which σms is a valid multi-signature on m. As argued earlier,
with a high probability there does not exist a subset S′ ⊆ [n + 1] such that Πi∈S′vki = 1. Also,
from the soundness of SRDS based on a multi-signature scheme (Definition 6.2), we know that if
there does not exist a subset S′ ⊆ [n + 1] of size s+ 1, such that σms is a valid multi-signature on
m with respect to {vki}i∈S′ , then the probability of an adversary computing a valid SRDS (σms, π)
on a message m is negligible. Soundness now follows from the soundness of SRDS based on a
multi-signature scheme.
6.3 General Multi-Signatures and the Subset-f Problem.
Although the proof of Lemma 6.5 depends on the specific LOSSW multi-signature scheme, the
overall approach only depends on certain properties of that scheme; in particular, there is no
inherent reliance on the structure of multiplication of keys and Subset-Product. Motivated by this
observation, in this section, we start by exploring hardness of Subset-f problems for a more general
class of functions f , focusing on the class of elementary symmetric polynomials φℓ. We begin by
demonstrating (worst-case) NP-hardness results for Subset-φℓ. We then abstract out the properties
used in Lemma 6.5 (deemed “SNARG-compliance”), and show that existence of SRDS based on a
SNARG-compliant multi-signature scheme implies existence of SNARGs for corresponding Subset-
φℓ problems.
The Subset-f problem. We first define the following analogous variant of average-case Subset-
Product problem for more general functions f . We restrict our attention to the natural setting of
symmetric functions f ; one can extend to arbitrary f , e.g., given a canonical ordering of inputs.
Definition 6.6 (Average-Case Subset-f). Let s = s(n) be an integer, let R be a ring, and let
f : Rs → R an efficiently computable symmetric function. Given an instance x = (a1, . . . , an, t) ∈
Rn+1, the (s,R)-Subset-f problem is the problem of deciding if there exists a subset S ⊆ [n] of size
|S| = s, such that f((ai)i∈S) = t. Such instances are said to be in the (s,R)-Subset-f language Lf .
We consider the average-case version of this problem characterized by the following two distri-
butions:
1. Dyes(1n) → (x,w): For each i ∈ [n], sample ai ∈ R uniformly at random. Sample a set
S ⊆ [n] of size s uniformly at random. Set t = f((ai)i∈S). Output x = (a1, . . . , an, t), w = S.
2. Dno(1n) → x: For each i ∈ [n], sample ai ∈ R uniformly at random. Sample a target t ∈ R
uniformly at random. Output x = (a1, . . . , an, t).
We also consider a variant of the (s,R)-Subset-f problem, where the instance does not include the
size of the subset, i.e., given an instance x = (a1, . . . , an, t) ∈ Rn+1, the R-Subset-f problem is the
problem of deciding if there exists a subset S ⊆ [n] of any size such that f((ai)i∈S) = t.
Note that Subset-f is within NP for any function f describable by a polynomial-size circuit. For
appropriate parameter regimes, the hardness of Subset-f problems depends on the function f . In
Theorem 6.9 below, we show that for rings (of appropriate size) with Hadamard product, Subset-f
for all elementary symmetric polynomials f is NP-complete.
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NP-hardness of Subset-φℓ. Recall that Hadamard product (also known as entry-wise product)
takes two vectors of the same dimension and produces another vector of matching dimension where
the ith element of the resulting vector is a product of the ith elements of the two input vectors.
Definition 6.7 (Hadamard product). Let F be a field and let ~a = (a1 . . . , an),~b = (b1 . . . , bn) ∈ Fn
be vectors of length n. The Hadamard product of ~a and ~b is the vector ~a⊙~b = (a1b1, . . . , anbn) ∈ Fn.
We now define elementary symmetric polynomials.
Definition 6.8 (Elementary Symmetric Polynomials). Let n ∈ N and ℓ ∈ [n]. The elementary
symmetric polynomial φℓ(x1, . . . , xn) is defined as:
φℓ(x1, . . . , xn) =
∑
1≤j1<...<jℓ≤n
xj1 · . . . · xjℓ.
In the following theorem, we show that for certain rings R that admit Hadamard product, and
any elementary symmetric polynomial φℓ, the (s,R)-Subset-φℓ problem is NP-complete. In partic-
ular, we show this for suitably sized rings of the form R = Fn, where for ℓ = 2, the characteristic
of the field must be at least 63 and for ℓ > 2, the characteristic of the field must be at least ℓ+ 2.
Theorem 6.9. There exists s(n) ∈ Θ(n) such that, for any field F with char(F) ≥ max(ℓ+ 2, 63),
any ring R = Fn of size |R| = 2Θ(n) with Hadamard product, and any elementary symmetric
polynomial φℓ, the (s,R)-Subset-φℓ problem is NP-complete.
We next present a high-level overview of the proof; the full proof can be found in Appendix D.1.
We start with a recap of the proof for NP-completeness of subset sum by Karp [61].
NP-completeness of Subset Sum. The proof for NP-completeness of ZM -Subset-Sum [61]
16
shows a polynomial-time reduction from 3-SAT. At a high level, the reduction proceeds as follows:
Given a 3-SAT instance with N variables {xi}i∈[N ] and m clauses {Cj}j∈[m], define a ZM -Subset-
Sum instance with the following 2(N +m) numbers, each with N +m digits, for M ≥ 10N+m:
1. For each input i ∈ [N ], define two numbers vi and v′i. The ith least significant digit of both
these numbers is set to 1. If xi ∈ Cj , then the (N + j)th least significant digit of vi is set to
1, else if ¬xi ∈ Cj , then the (N + j)th least significant digit of v′i is set to 1. The remaining
digits in both these numbers are set to 0.
2. For each clause j ∈ [m], define two numbers c1j and c2j . The (N + j)th least significant digit
of both these numbers is set to 1 and all the remaining digits are set to 0.
3. The target number t is also an (N +m)-digit number in which the first N digits are set to 1,
while the remaining digits are set to 3.
Intuitively, given a satisfying assignment for the 3-SAT instance, the corresponding witness for
the ZM -Subset-sum instance includes the following: For each i ∈ [N ], it includes vi if xi = 1, and
v′i if xi = 0. For each j ∈ [m], it includes any one of c1j or c2j if there are two literals with value 1
in the jth clause, and both c1j or c
2
j if there is only one literal with a value of 1 in the j
th clause.
16Recall that this is a variation of the (s,ZM )-Subset-sum problem, where the instance does not include the size
of the subset, as defined in Definition 6.6.
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1
1 0 0 0 0
N
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m
0 0 0 0 0 0
α1, . . . , αℓ−1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
vi
v′i
∀i ∈ [N ]
∀j ∈ [m]
c1j , . . . , c
ℓ−1
j
t
0 0 0 0 1
i
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
p
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
q
0 0 if xi ∈ Cp
and xi ∈ Cq
0 0 0 0 1
i
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
r s
if ¬xi ∈ Cr
and ¬xi ∈ Cs
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
j
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Figure 9: Reducing an instance of 3-SAT with N variables {xi}i∈[N ] and m clauses {Cj}j∈[m] to an
instance of R-Subset-φℓ for ℓ ≥ 3 with n = ℓ+ 2N + (ℓ− 1)m elements in R, where R = F1+N+m.
Here, 0 (resp., 1) values inside the vectors refer to the 0 (resp., 1) element of F.
Proof sketch of Theorem 6.9. We extend this reduction to show that R-Subset-φℓ for ℓ > 1 is also
NP-complete, where R is a ring of appropriate size with Hadamard product. Each of the ai (for
i ∈ [n]) elements and the target value t in an instance of R-Subset-φℓ is an element in R and
thereby a vector of elements in F. Unlike simple addition, since φℓ is a sum of products, if (any) k
th
entry in the target value is a non-zero element in F, the solution to a yes instance of R-Subset-φℓ
must consist of at least ℓ elements with non-zero kth entries. Therefore, depending on ℓ, we need to
define additional elements in the reduction. We give an overview of our reduction from any 3-SAT
instance to R-Subset-φℓ for ℓ ≥ 3; the special case of ℓ = 2 requires a slight modification that is
addressed in Appendix D.1. In a similar way to Subset-Sum, this reduction can also be adjusted
to show that there exists s ∈ Θ(n), for which (s,R)-Subset-φℓ problem is also NP-complete, which
is sketched in Appendix D.1.
Given a 3-SAT instance with N variables {xi}i∈[N ] and m clauses {Cj}j∈[m], define a R-Subset-
φℓ instance with ℓ+ 2N + (ℓ − 1)m elements, where R = F1+N+m. As shown in Figure 9, each of
these elements is a vector of 1 +N +m elements in the field F and are defined as follows:
• An element α0 ∈ R, whose first entry is 1. All the remaining entries in α0 correspond to 0.
• For each k ∈ [ℓ− 1], define αk ∈ R, whose first N +1 entries correspond to 1, and the remaining
entries correspond to 0.
• For each i ∈ [N ], define two elements vi ∈ R and v′i ∈ R. The (1 + i)th entry of both these
numbers is set to 1. If xi ∈ Cj, then the (1 + N + j)th entry of vi is set to 1, else if ¬xi ∈ Cj ,
then the (1 +N + j)th entry of v′i is set to 1. All the remaining entries correspond to 0.
• For each j ∈ [m] and k ∈ [ℓ−1], define element ckj ∈ R. The (1+N+ j)th entry in ckj corresponds
to 1 and the remaining entries correspond to 0.
• The target element t is also a vector of 1 +N +m elements in F, with all its entries set to 1.
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Now, given a satisfying assignment for the 3-SAT instance, the corresponding witness for the
R-Subset-φℓ instance includes the following: It includes α0 and each αk for k ∈ [ℓ − 1]. For each
i ∈ [N ], it includes vi if xi = 1, and v′i if xi = 0. For each j ∈ [m], it includes any ℓ − 3 of the
elements cj if all three literals in the j
th clause have value 1, else if any two literals have value 1
then it includes any ℓ− 2 of the elements cj and if only one of the literals has value 1 then all the
ℓ− 1 elements cj are included in the witness. This guarantees that the value 1 appears precisely ℓ
times in the column of each satisfied clause, so that φℓ will evaluate to the target value 1 in these
positions.
Similarly for soundness, a valid witness S for the R-Subset-φℓ instance must include a0, . . . , aℓ−1
in order to get ℓ times the value 1 in the first column. Apart from a1, . . . , aℓ−1, the only other
elements that have the value 1 in the next N columns are vi and v
′
i. For each i ∈ [N ], if both vi
and v′i are included in the set S, a total of ℓ + 1 elements in S will have value 1 in the (i + 1)
th
column. The (i + 1)th entry in the result obtained by applying φℓ over such a set is ℓ + 1. Since
the characteristic of the field F is at least ℓ + 2, we know that ℓ + 1 6= 1. Therefore, S can either
contain vi (implying xi = 1) or v
′
i (implying ¬xi = 1) for each i ∈ [N ], but not both. For each of
the last m columns, S can contain some or all of the elements cj (for each j ∈ [m]). But since this
set of cj elements can only contribute at most ℓ− 1 times the value 1 in the (1 +N + j)th column,
we need at least one of the v or v′ elements to contribute a 1 value to that column, in order to
get a non-zero (1 + N + j)th entry in the result of φℓ. This guarantees at least one variable with
a value of 1 in each clause. We give a full proof of completeness and soundness for this reduction
Appendix D.1.
SNARG-compliant multi-signatures and Subset-φℓ. We now identify the properties of the
LOSSW multi-signature scheme used in Lemma 6.5 to provide the connection with average-case
SNARGs. Roughly, these properties are:
• Verification keys are sampled independently and uniformly from the key-space of the multi-
signature scheme. This property is important for arguing soundness in Lemma 6.5.
• The verification algorithm with keys {vki}i∈S , is equivalent to the verification algorithm with a
single aggregate key vkagg =
∏
i∈S vki. In other words, there exists a key-aggregation function
fagg (e.g., fagg =
∏
in the LOSSW multi-signature scheme), such that the verification algorithm
can be decomposed into first applying fagg over the set of keys to obtain an aggregate key vkagg
and then running some residual function MS.Verifyagg-key to perform the remaining verification
with respect to vkagg.
• Given a valid multi-signature σms on a message m, there exists a unique and well-defined aggre-
gate key vk for which the residual function MS.Verifyagg-key (as defined in the previous bullet)
outputs 1. Moreover, this aggregate key is easy to compute. For example, for LOSSW, this
property is crucially used for arguing soundness in Lemma 6.5.
• And finally, there exist degenerate keys skdeg and vkdeg (e.g., skdeg = 0 ∈ G and vkdeg = 1 ∈ GT in
the LOSSW multi-signature scheme) that allow forging a multi-signature on any message. This
property is used in the completeness argument in Lemma 6.5.
We call multi-signature schemes that satisfy these properties as SNARG-compliant multi-signature
schemes. We formally define this notion in Definition D.1 in Appendix D.2. Finally, by using
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the properties of a SNARG-compliant multi-signature scheme, we are able to prove a generalized
version of Lemma 6.5. Namely, we show in Lemma D.2 that an SRDS scheme based on a SNARG-
compliant multi-signature scheme with key-aggregation function fagg = φℓ, implies SNARGs for
average-case Subset-φℓ.
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A Preliminaries (Cont’d)
In this section, we provide additional definitions: for proof-carrying data and multi-signatures.
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A.1 Proof-Carrying Data
A proof-carrying data system (PCD system) is a cryptographic primitive introduced by Chiesa
and Tromer [30]. Informally speaking, given a predicate C, consider a distributed system where
nodes perform computations; each computation takes as input messages and generates a new output
message. The security goal is to ensure that each output message is compliant with the predicate C.
Proof-carrying data ensures this goal by attaching short and easy-to-verify proofs of C-compliance
to each message.
Concretely, a generator PCD.Gen first sets up a reference string and a verification state. Anyone
can then use the prover algorithm PCD.Prover, which is given as input the reference string, prior
messages zin with proofs πin, and an output message zout, to generate a proof πout attesting that
zout is C-compliant. Anyone can use the verification algorithm PCD.Verify, which is given as input
the verification state, a message z, and a proof π, to verify that z is C-compliant.
Crucially, the running time of proof generation and proof verification are “history independent”:
the first only depends on the time to execute C on input a node’s messages, while the second only
on the message length.
We now formally define the notions associated with a PCD system as defined in [8]. We refer
the reader to [8, 7] for a detailed discussion.
Definition A.1. A (distributed computation) transcript is a triplet trans = (G, linp, data), where
G = (V,E) is a directed acyclic graph, linp : V → {0, 1}∗ are local inputs (node labels), and
data : E → {0, 1}∗ are edge labels (messages sent on the edge). The output of trans, denoted
out(trans), is equal to data(u˜, v˜) where (u˜, v˜) is the lexicographically first edge such that v˜ is a sink.
Syntactically a proof-carrying transcript is a transcript where messages are augmented by proof
strings, i.e., a function proof : E → {0, 1}∗ provides for each edge (u, v) an additional label prove
(u, v), to be interpreted as a proof string for the message data(u, v)
Definition A.2. A proof-carrying (distributed computation) transcript PCT is a pair (trans, proof)
where trans is a transcript and proof : E → {0, 1}∗ is an edge label.
Next, we define what it means for a distributed computation to be compliant, which as defined
in [8] is the notion of “correctness with respect to a given local property.” Compliance is captured
via an efficiently computable compliance predicate C, which must be locally satisfied at each vertex;
here, “locally” means with respect to a node’s local input, incoming data, and outgoing data. For
convenience, for any vertex v, we let child(v) and parent(v) be the vector of v’s children and parents
respectively, listed in lexicographic order.
Definition A.3. Given a polynomial-time predicate C, we say that a distributed computation tran-
script trans = (G, linp, data) is C-compliant (denoted by C(trans) = 1) if for every v ∈ V and
w ∈ child(v) it holds that
C(data(v,w); linp(v), inputs(v)) = 1,
where inputs(v) := data(u1, v), . . . , data(uc, v) and (u1, . . . , uc) := parent(v). Furthermore, we say
that a message z from node v to w is C-compliant if C(data(v,w); linp(v), inputs(v)) = 1 and there
is a transcript trans such that v is the sink and C(trans) = 1.
Definition A.4. Given a distributed computation transcript trans = (G, linp, data) and any edge
(v,w) ∈ E, we denote by ttrans,C(v,w) the time required to evaluate C(data(v,w); linp(v), inputs(v)).
We say that trans is B-bounded if ttrans,C(v,w) ≤ B for every edge (v,w).
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Definition A.5. The depth of a transcript trans, denoted d(trans), is the largest number of nodes
on a source-to-sink path in trans minus 2 (to exclude the source and the sink). The depth of a
compliance predicate C, denoted d(C), is defined to be the maximum depth of any transcript trans
compliant with C. If d(C) := ∞ (i.e., paths in C-compliant transcripts can be arbitrarily long) we
say that C has unbounded depth.
We note that for our application in Section 4, we can assume that for every v ∈ V , the label
input is linp(v) = ⊥.
We now give a formal definition of a PCD system.
Definition A.6. A proof-carrying data (PCD) system for a class of compliance predicates C is a
triple of algorithms (PCD.Gen,PCD.Prover,PCD.Verify) that work as follows:
• PCD.Gen(1κ, C) → (σpcd, τpcd): on input the security parameter κ and compliance predicate C ∈
C, the (probabilistic) generator PCD.Gen outputs a reference string σpcd and a corresponding
verification state τpcd.
• PCD.Prover(τpcd, zin, πin, linp, zout) → πout: given a reference string τpcd, inputs zin with cor-
responding proofs πin, a local input linp, and an output zout, the (honest) prover algorithm
PCD.Prover produces a proof πout attesting to consistency of zout with a C-compliant transcript.
• PCD.Verify(τpcd, zout, πout) → b: given the verification state τpcd, an output zout, and a proof
string πout, the verifier algorithm PCD.Verify accepts if it is convinced that zout is consistent with
some C-compliant transcript.
After the generator PCD.Gen is run to obtain σpcd and τpcd, the prover PCD.Prover is used
(along with σpcd) at each node of a distributed computation transcript to dynamically com-
pile it into a proof-carrying transcript by generating and adding a proof to each edge. Each
of these proofs can be checked using the verifier PCD.Verify (along with τpcd). A PCD system
(PCD.Gen,PCD.Prover,PCD.Verify) must satisfy the following properties:
Completeness: An honest prover can convince a verifier that the output of any compliant tran-
script is indeed compliant. Namely, for every security parameter κ, compliance predicate C, and
distributed-computation generator G (described below),
Pr

trans is B-bounded (σpcd, τpcd)← PCD.Gen(1κ, C)
C(trans) = 1 (z, π, trans)← ProofGen(C, σpcd, G,PCD.Prover)
PCD.Verify(τpcd, z, π) 6= 1
 ≤ negl(κ).
Above, ProofGen is an interactive protocol between a distributed-computation generator DCGen
and the PCD prover PCD.Prover, in which both are given the compliance predicate C and the
reference string σpcd. Essentially, at every time step, DCGen chooses to do one of the following
actions: (1) add a new unlabeled vertex to the computation transcript so far (this corresponds to
adding a new computing node to the computation), (2) label an unlabeled vertex (this corresponds
to a choice of local data by a computing node), or (3) add a new labeled edge (this corresponds
to a new message from one node to another). In case DCGen chooses the third action, the PCD
prover PCD.Prover produces a proof for the C-compliance of the new message, and adds this new
proof as an additional label to the new edge. When DCGen halts, the interactive protocol outputs
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the distributed computation transcript trans, as well as trans’s output and corresponding proof.
Intuitively, the completeness property requires that if trans is compliant with C, then the proof
attached to the output (which is the result of dynamically invoking PCD.Prover for each message
in trans, as trans was being constructed by DCGen) is accepted by the verifier.
Proof of Knowledge (and Soundness): Loosely speaking, if the verifier accepts a proof for
a message, the prover “knows” a compliant transcript trans with output z. For every polynomial-
size prover PCD.Prover∗ there exists a polynomial-size extractor EPCD.Prover such that for every
polynomial-size compliance predicate C ∈ C and every auxiliary input aux ∈ {0, 1}poly(κ),
Pr

PCD.Verify(τpcd, z, π) = 1 (σpcd, τpcd)← PCD.Gen(1κ, C)
out(trans) 6= z ∨ C(trans) 6= 1 (z, π)← PCD.Prover∗(σpcd, aux)
trans ← EPCD.Prover∗(σpcd, aux)
 ≤ negl(κ).
Succinctness: There exists a universal polynomial p(·) such that for every compliance predicate
C ∈ C, every time bound B ∈ N, and every B-bounded distributed computation transcript trans,
• The computation time of PCD.Prover(σpcd, zin, πin, linp, zout) is p(κ+ |C|+B).
• The verification algorithm PCD.Verify(τpcd, z, π) runs in time p(κ+ |C|+ |z|+ logB)
• An honestly generated proof has size p(κ+ logB).
Theorem A.7 ([8]). Let the size of a compliance predicate C, denoted by s(C), be the largest
number of nodes in any transcript compliant with C. Assuming the existence of SNARKs with linear
extraction (i.e., |EP∗ | ≤ c|P∗| for some constant c), there exist PCD systems for logarithmic-depth
and polynomial-size compliance predicates.
A.2 Merkle Hash Proof System
AMerkle hash proof system [75] corresponding to a hash functionH : {0, 1}κ×{0, 1}λ → {0, 1}λ/2 is
defined by a tuple of algorithms (Merkle.Setup,Merkle.Hash,Merkle.Proof,Merkle.Verify) as follows:
• Merkle.Setup(1κ): On input the security parameter, the setup algorithm samples and outputs
a random seed
$← {0, 1}κ for the hash function.
• Merkle.Hash(seed, x1, . . . , xn): On input the seed and a vector x1, . . . , xn, the Merkle hash
algorithm computes a hash using a Merkle tree as follows:
– For each i ∈ [n], compute y0i = H(seed, xi).
– For each ℓ ∈ [log(n)] and i ∈ [n/2ℓ],17 compute yℓi = H(seed, yℓ−12i−1||yℓ−12i ).
Output y = y
log(n)
1 .
17For simplicity, we assume that n is a power of 2. The general case follows by including additional elements 0λ,
such that the length of the resulting input string becomes a power of 2.
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• Merkle.Proof(seed, x1, . . . , xn, xi): On input the seed, a vector x1, . . . , xn, and an element
xi, the Merkle proof algorithm computes and outputs a proof p as follows: Initialize p =
{(i, sibling(y0i ))} and for each ℓ ∈ [log(n)], set p = p ∪ {(⌈i/2ℓ⌉, sibling(yℓ⌈i/2ℓ⌉))}.
• Merkle.Verify(seed, xi, y, p): On input the seed, an input element xi, Merkle hash y, and a
Merkle proof p, the Merkle verification algorithm parses p = ((i0, x
0), . . . , (ilog(n), x
log(n)))
and proceed as follows:
– If i0 is an even number, compute y
1 = H(seed,H(seed, xi)||x0), else compute y1 =
H(seed, x0||H(seed, xi)).
– For each ℓ ∈ [log(n)], if iℓ is an even number, compute yℓ = H(seed,H(seed, yℓ−1)||xℓ),
else compute yℓ = H(seed, xℓ||H(seed, yℓ−1)).
If ylog(n) = y, output 1; else, output 0.
The Merkle Hash Proof System has the following properties.
Theorem A.8 (Merkle Hash Proof System). Assuming existence of a length-halving, seeded, col-
lision resistant hash function H : {0, 1}κ × {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}λ/2, the Merkle hash proof system
(Merkle.Setup,Merkle.Hash,Merkle.Proof ,Merkle.Verify) satisfies the following properties:
• Completeness: For any input string x1, . . . , xn ∈ {0, 1}nλ and i ∈ [n], it holds that:
Pr

seed ← Merkle.Setup(1κ)
Merkle.Verify(seed, xi, y, p) = 1 y = Merkle.Hash(seed, x1, . . . , xn)
p = Merkle.Proof(seed, x1, . . . , xn, xi)
 = 1.
• Soundness: No PPT adversary A, can win the following game with more than negligible
probability (in κ):
1. The challenger samples seed ← Merkle.Setup(1κ) and sends to A.
2. A responds with (i, {xj}j∈[n]\{i}).
3. The challenger samples xi
$← {0, 1}λ, computes Merkle.Hash(seed, x1, . . . , xn) = y and
sends (xi, y) to A.
4. A responds with a pair (x′, p), and wins if Merkle.Verify(seed, x′, y, p) = 1 and x′ 6= xi
for every i ∈ [n].
A.3 Multi-signatures
In a multi-signature scheme, a single short object—the multi-signature—can take the place of n
signatures by n signers, all on the same message.18 The first formal treatment of multi-signatures
was given by Micali, Ohta, and Reyzin [77]. We consider a variant of this model due to Boldyreva
[10] that is also used by Lu et al. [72]. In this model, the adversary is given a single challenge
verification key vk, and a signing oracle for that key. His goal is to output a forged multi-signature
18Note that multi-signatures are a special case of aggregate signatures [12], which in contrast allow combining
signatures from n different parties on n different messages.
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σ∗ on a messagem∗ under keys vk1, . . . , vkℓ, where at least one of these keys is a challenge verification
key (without loss of generality, vk1). For the forgery to be nontrivial, the adversary must not have
queried the signing oracle at m∗. The adversary is allowed to choose the remaining keys, but must
prove knowledge of the private keys corresponding to them.
Definition A.9. A multi-signature scheme is a tuple of algorithms
• MS.Setup(1κ)→ pp: On input the security parameter, the setup algorithm outputs public param-
eters pp.
• MS.KeyGen(pp) → (vk, sk): On input the public parameters pp, the key-generation algorithm
outputs a pair of verification/signing keys (vk, sk).
• MS.Sign(pp, sk,m)→ σ: On input pp, a signing key sk, and a message m, the signing algorithm
outputs a signature σ.
• MS.Verify(pp, vk, σ,m)→ b: On input pp, a verification key vk, a signature σ, and a message m,
the verification algorithm outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
• MS.Combine(pp, {vki, σi}ℓi=1,m) → σ: On input pp, a collection of signatures (or multi-
signatures), and a message m, the combine algorithm outputs a combined multi-signature σ,
with respect to the union of verification keys.
• MS.MVerify(pp, {vk1, . . . , vkn}, S,m, σ)→ b: On input pp, the set of all verification keys, a subset
§ ⊆ [n], a message m, and a multi-signature σ, the multi-signature verification algorithm outputs
a bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
We require the following properties from a multi-signature scheme.
Correctness: The correctness requirement of digital signatures must hold for (MS.Setup,
MS.KeyGen,MS.Sign,MS.Verify). In addition, for any message m, any collection of honestly gen-
erated signatures {σi ← MS.Sign(pp, ski,m)}i∈S on m (for some S ⊆ [n]), the combined multi-
signature formed by σ¯ ← MS.Combine(pp, {vki, σi}i∈S ,m) will properly verify with overwhelming
probability, i.e., Pr [1← MS.MVerify(pp, {vk1, . . . , vkn}, S,m, σ¯)] ≥ 1− negl(k).
Unforgeability: For any PPT adversary A, the probability that the challenger outputs 1 when
interacting with A in the following game is negligible in the security parameter κ:
1. Setup. A selects a proper subset I ⊆ [n] (corresponding to corrupted parties). The challenger
samples a pair of verification/signing keys (vki, ski)← MS.KeyGen(pp) for every i ∈ [n]\I, and
gives A all verification keys {vki}i∈[n]\I . Next, A chooses keys {ski, vki}i∈I for the corrupted
parties and sends them to the challenger.
2. Signing queries. A can make polynomially many adaptive signature queries of the form
(m, vki). For each query, the challenger responds with a signature σ ← MS.Sign(pp, ski,m)
on the message m with respect to the signing key ski corresponding to vki.
3. Output. A outputs a triple (σ¯∗,m∗, {vki}i∈S). The challenger outputs 1 if at least one of
the provided verification keys vki corresponds to a challenge (honest party) key, the message
m∗ was not queried to the signature oracle with this verification key vki, and the provided
forgery σ∗ is a valid multi-signature, i.e., 1← MS.MVerify(pp, {vk1, . . . , vkn}, S,m∗, σ∗).
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A.4 The Multi-Signatures scheme of Lu et al. [72]
In this section we describe the LOSSW multi-signature scheme that is used in Section 6. We will let
G and GT are multiplicative groups of prime order p, and denote g a generator of G. In addition,
let e : G×G→ GT be an efficiently computable non-degenerate bilinear map. The multi-signature
scheme of Lu et al. [72] is based on the Bilinear Computational Diffie-Hellman (BCDH) assumption.
The message space is {0, 1}k for some fixed k. The following is taken verbatim from [72]:
• MS.Setup(1κ): Sample random elements u′, u1, . . . , uk ∈ G and output the public parameters
ppms, consisting of descriptions of G,GT , p, e, u
′, u1, . . . , uk and the generator g of G.
• MS.KeyGen(ppms): Sample a random signing key sk ∈ Zp and set the corresponding verification
key vk as e(g, g)sk.
• MS.Sign(ppms, sk,m): Parse the message m as (m1, . . . ,mk) ∈ {0, 1}k, sample r ← Zp, and
compute σ = (sig1, sig2) as follows:
sig1 = g
sk ·
(
u′ ·
k∏
i=1
umii
)r
and sig2 = g
r.
• MS.Verify(ppms, vk,m, σms) : Parse the message m as (m1, . . . ,mk) ∈ {0, 1}k and σms =
(sig1, sig2), and outputs 1 if and only if
e(sig1, g) · e
(
sig2, u
′ ·
k∏
i=1
umii
)−1
= vk.
• MS.Combine(ppms, {vki, σi}i∈S ,m): Parse each σi as (sig(i)1 , sig(i)2 ) and compute the combined
multi-signature σms = (sig1, sig2) as follows:
sig1 =
∏
i∈S
sig
(i)
1 and sig2 =
∏
i∈S
sig
(i)
2 .
• MS.MVerify(ppms, {vk1, . . . , vkn}, S,m, σms): Output 1 if and only if
e (sig1, g) · e
(
sig2, u
′ ·
k∏
i=1
umii
)−1
=
∏
i∈S
vki.
B Balanced Communication-Efficient BA (Cont’d)
In this section, we provide supplementary material for Section 4.
B.1 Balanced Byzantine Agreement from SRDS (Cont’d)
In this section, we give the proof of Lemma 4.5 and discuss applications of our Byzantine agreement
protocol.
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Proof. Let A be a PPT adversary for πba. We construct a simulator S as follows. The simulator
S starts by simulating the setup for the protocol, while allowing adaptive corruptions by A (in
a similar way to the robustness and unforgeability games). First, S runs the setup algorithm as
pp ← Setup(1κ, 1n·z), and for every i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [z] computes (vki,j, ski,j) ← KeyGen(pp). Next,
S sends (1κ, 1n·z, pp, {vki,j}i∈[n],j∈[z]) to A. As long as |I| ≤ β ·n and A requests to corrupt a party
Pi, the simulator sends {ski,j}j∈[z] to A and receives back {vk′i,j}j∈[z]; in the bulletin-board PKI
mode, S updates each vki,j = vk′i,j. Let {vki,j}i∈[n],j∈[z] be the PKI keys at the end of this process.
The simulator S proceeds to simulate the protocol execution towards A. Initially, S receives
from fba the input bits of all honest parties {xi}i/∈I . To simulate fae-comm, the simulator receives
from A the communication-tree T defining the set of isolated parties D. The simulator simulates
sending the output to every corrupted party. Let C denote the supreme committee (the parties
assigned to the root).
To simulate fba for the supreme committee in Step 2a, S sends to A the input bit xi for every
i ∈ C \I and receives inputs {xi}i∈I∩C . If 2/3 of the honest committee members’ bits are the same,
denote this value by y; otherwise, let A determine y. Output the value y to every corrupted party
in C. To simulate fct in Step 2b, sample a random s ∈ {0, 1}κ and send s to A for every Pi for
i ∈ I ∩ C.
To simulate the call to fae-comm in Step 3, receive inputs from A on behalf of corrupted supreme-
committee members, and send (y, s) to A for every i ∈ I. In addition, receive (yi, si) for i ∈ D
from A.
Next, for every honest party Pi for i /∈ I do the following:
• For i /∈ D, compute σi,j ← Sign(pp, (i, j), ski,j, (y, s)) for each j ∈ [z].
• For i ∈ D, compute σi,j ← Sign(pp, (i, j), ski,j, (yi, si)) for each j ∈ [z].
To simulate Step 4, for every i ∈ [n] \ I, let Li = {vi,1, . . . , vi,z} ⊆ V be the subset of leaves
assigned to Pi. For each j ∈ [z], sends σi,j to all corrupted parties assigned to the leaf node vi,j on
behalf of Pi. In addition, for every Pi assigned to a leaf node v, receive a signature σj,k from every
corrupt Pj for which v = vj,k ∈ Lj.
To simulate Step 5, for each level ℓ = 1, . . . , ℓ∗ of the tree and each node v on level ℓ:
1. For each i ∈ party(v) \ I, prepare the set of signatures received in Step 5a as follows:
• For ℓ = 1: let Sℓ,i,1sig be the set of following signatures. For every honest Pj with v =
vj,k ∈ Lj, the signature σj,k simulated in the previous step. For every corrupt Pj with
v = vj,k ∈ Lj, the signature σij,k received from the adversary (note that the adversary
might send different signatures to different parties).
• For ℓ > 1: let Sℓ,i,1sig be the set of following signatures. For each child node u ∈ child(v)
and each j ∈ party(u) \ I, the signature σu (that was simulated for level ℓ − 1). For each
j ∈ party(u) ∩ I, the signature σiu received from the adversary A (note that the adversary
might send different signatures to different parties).
2. Next, simulate |party(v)| broadcast protocols in Step 5b, where for every i ∈ party(v), party
Pi broadcasts S
ℓ,i,1
sig . Let S
ℓ,i,2
sig be the union of the sets of the broadcasted signatures.
3. To simulate Step 5c, compute Sℓ,i,3sig ← Aggregate1(pp, {vk1,1, . . . , vkn,z}, (y, s), Sℓ,i,2sig ) for each
i ∈ party(v) \ I, . To simulate faggr-sig, for every i ∈ party(v) ∩ I, receive from A a message
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((y˜i, s˜i), S˜
ℓ,i,3
sig ). If |party(v) \ {I ∪ D}| ≥ 2|party(v)|/3 (i.e., the node is good), compute
σv ← Aggregate2
(
pp, (y, s), Sℓ,i,3sig
)
,
Else (i.e., the node is bad), get σv from A. Finally, send σv to A as the output of faggr-sig.
4. If ℓ < ℓ∗, send for every σv from each honest party in party(v) to every corrupt party in
party(u), where u = parent(v). In addition, receive from A a signature σ′v from every corrupt
party in party(v) to every honest party in party(u).
To simulate the call to fae-comm in Step 6, receive inputs from A on behalf of corrupted supreme-
committee members, and send (y, s, σroot) to A for every i ∈ I. In addition, receive (y′j, s′j , σ′j) for
j ∈ D from A. Finally, to simulate Step 7, for every i /∈ I ∪ D evaluate Ci = Fs(i) and simulate
party Pi sending (y, s, σroot) to every party Pj for j ∈ I ∩ Ci. For every i ∈ D evaluate Ci = Fs′j (i)
and simulate party Pi sending (y
′
j, s
′
j , σ
′
j) to every party Pj for j ∈ I ∩ Ci.
To conclude the simulation, the simulator sends the value y to the ideal functionality fba as the
“tie-breaker” value and outputs whatever A outputs.
Note that S simulates a random honest execution towards the adversary, with only the syntactic
difference that S simulates the ideal functionalities computing fae-comm, fba, fct and faggr-sig (rather
than using trusted parties). Thus, the view of the adversary is perfectly distributed in the real and
ideal worlds. What remains to prove is that conditioned on the view of the adversary, the output
of the honest parties is correct and identical in the real and ideal worlds. In other words, we need
to show that this Byzantine agreement protocol satisfies both agreement and validity.
Claim B.1 (Agreement). For any adversarial strategy of A, all honest parties output the same
value, except for negligible probability.
We show that our protocol satisfies agreement in three main steps; (1) We start by showing
that with an overwhelming probability, each isolated party receives a message from at least one
non-isolated honest party in the last round. (2) Next, we show that the aggregate signature σroot
obtained by the end of Step 5 is a valid SRDS on (y, s), where y and s are the outputs of fba and
fct in Step 2b, respectively. We prove this by showing a reduction to the robustness property of
the SRDS scheme. Thereby showing that each honest party receives a valid SRDS on the same
message (y, s). (3) Finally we prove that each honest party only receives one valid SRDS (which
is on (y, s)). We prove this by showing that an adversary cannot forge a valid SRDS on any other
message by relying on the unforgeability of the SRDS scheme. Thus, each honest party outputs
the same value y. Now we proceed to the formal proof.
Proof of Claim B.1. Let Fs be a truly random function. Then the set Ci defined by Fs(i) is chosen
randomly for each i ∈ [n]. Therefore, in expectation, each party Pj appears in polylog(n) sets.
From Chernoff bound, except with some negligible probability (in n), each party receives messages
from polylog(n) ± δ for δ = O(1) other parties. Similarly, except with negligible probability, each
party receives messages from at least one non-isolated honest party. Therefore, each isolated party
Pi for i ∈ D in the initial phase of the protocol, receives a message from at least one non-isolated
honest party Pj ∈ [n]\{I ∪D}. If this is true for a truly random function, the same must also hold
for a pseudorandom Fs with overwhelming probability (in κ) over a random seed s. Recall that
the message sent by Pj to Pi is (y, s, σroot) (where y is the output of fba in Step 2a). It remains to
show that except with some negligible probability, σroot is a valid SRDS on (y, s).
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Receiving valid signatures on (y, s). Let us assume for the sake of contradiction that σroot
is not a valid SRDS on (y, s). We now construct an adversary B that can break robustness of
the SRDS scheme. The adversary B interacts with the challenger of the SRDS scheme and the
adversary A and proceeds as follows:
• B maps each corrupt virtual party to a party in the set [n · z] and chooses to corrupt each of
these in the robustness game of the SRDS scheme. In other words, B runs the setup algorithm
as pp ← Setup(1κ, 1n·z), and for every i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [z] computes (vki,j , ski,j) ← KeyGen(1κ).
Next, it sends (1κ, 1n·z, pp, {vki,j}i∈[n],j∈[z]) to A. For each i ∈ I that A requests to corrupt, B
chooses to corrupt the set {z(i − 1) + j}j∈[z] of virtual parties and receives {skz(i−1)+j}j∈[z] from
the challenger, which it forwards to A. Next, B receives verification keys {vk′z(i−1)+j}i∈I,j∈[z] of
the corrupted parties from A.
• B then simulates step 1, as described in the simulator to receive the communication-tree T from
A. For each i ∈ D, the adversary B additionally chooses to corrupt the set {z(i− 1) + j}j∈[z]
of virtual parties and receives {skz(i−1)+j}j∈[z] from the challenger. B sends verification keys
{vk′z(i−1)+j}i∈I∪D,j∈[z] to the challenger, where for each i ∈ D and j ∈ [z], the keys vk′z(i−1)+j =
vki,j and {vk′z(i−1)+j}i∈I,j∈[z] are received from A.
• For the bulletin-board PKI mode, B updates vki,j = vk′z(i−1)+j for each i ∈ I and j ∈ [z].
• B then proceeds to simulate steps 2a, 2b, and 3 as described in the simulator. It choosesm = (y, s)
and the set S to be the set of all corrupted virtual parties and honest non-isolated virtual parties
that are assigned to leaves that have a good path to the root node. Note that since for 1 − o(1)
fraction of the honest parties, majority of the leaf nodes that they are assigned to are good by
definition, there are more than 2n/3 parties in S.
• B receives signatures {σz(i−1)+j}i∈[n]\(I∪D),j∈[z] of the honest parties from the challenger and
forwards them to the adversary A. In Step 4, for each k ∈ {z(i − 1) + j | ∀i ∈ D, j ∈ [z]}, it
computes σk ← Sign(pp, (i, j), ski,j , (yi, si)).
• For each level ℓ = 1, . . . , ℓ∗ of the communication tree and each node v on level ℓ, it simulates
Step 5 as described in the simulator.
• Given the communication-tree T , the adversary B constructs a tree Ttrunc as follows:
1. Prune all nodes in the subtrees of T that are rooted at bad nodes (excluding the root nodes
of these subtrees). Here a node is bad (or not “good”), if more than a third of the parties
assigned to it are in I.
2. For each of the remaining nodes on level 1, add a new leaf node on level 0 corresponding to
each virtual party assigned to it.
3. Assign a corrupt virtual party in S to each leaf node on level > 1 of the truncated tree.
This assignment is done such that all the leaf nodes (on level 0 and on level > 1) in Ttrunc
are now indexed and ordered by the parties in S. We note that the bottommost layer in
Ttrunc is level 0, while in our notation the bottommost layer of the tree is always on level 1.
This can be easily handled by re-numbering the levels in Ttrunc such that it starts from 1
instead of 0.
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• For each leaf node on level 0 in Ttrunc corresponding to a corrupt virtual party in S, set its
corresponding signature to be the signature received from A in Step 5. For each leaf node v on
level > 1, set its corresponding signature to σv as computed in Step 5. B sends these signatures
along with Ttrunc to the challenger of the SRDS scheme.
Note that if for some adversarial strategy A, the signature σroot is not a valid SRDS on (y, s),
then by construction, B wins the robustness game of the SRDS scheme. From robustness of the
SRDS scheme, we know that this only happens with at most negligible probability, therefore our
assumption is incorrect and with overwhelming probability, σroot is a valid SRDS on (y, s).
Finally, we show that except with some negligible probability, no adversary can compute a
valid SRDS on any message other than (y, s). If this is true, then we are guaranteed that with
overwhelming probability, each isolated honest party only receives one valid SRDS (which is on
(y, s) and we are done).
Not receiving valid signatures on other values. We now show that if the adversary A can
forge an SRDS on any other message, then we can use this adversary to construct another adversary
B that can break unforgeability of the SRDS scheme. The adversary B proceeds as follows:
• B maps each corrupt virtual party to a party in the set [n · z] and chooses to corrupt each of
these in the unforgeability game of the SRDS scheme. In other words, B runs the setup algorithm
as pp ← Setup(1κ, 1n·z), and for every i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [z] computes (vki,j, ski,j) ← KeyGen(pp).
Next, it sends (1κ, 1n·z, pp, {vki,j}i∈[n],j∈[z]) to A. For each i ∈ I that A requests to corrupt, B
chooses to corrupt the set {z(i − 1) + j}j∈[z] of virtual parties and receives {skz(i−1)+j}j∈[z] from
the challenger, which it forwards to A. At the end it receives verification keys {vk′z(i−1)+j}i∈I,j∈[z]
of the corrupted parties from A and forwards these to the challenger. In the bulletin-board PKI
mode, B updates vkz(i−1)+j = vk′z(i−1)+j for each i ∈ I, j ∈ [z].
• B then proceeds to simulate Steps 1, 2a, 2b, and 3 as described in the simulator. It chooses
m = (y, s) and S = D and sends it to the challenger. For each i ∈ D and j ∈ [z], it sets
mz(i−1)+j = (yi, si) as received from the adversary.
• It receives signatures {σz(i−1)+j}i∈[n]\I,j∈[z] of the honest parties from the challenger and sends
it to the adversary A.
• It then simulates Steps 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 as described in the simulator.
• Finally if A manages to send a valid SRDS on a message other than (y, s) to any of the honest
parties, B forwards that to the challenger.
Clearly, B wins the forgery game only if A succeeds in forging a valid SRDS on a message other than
(y, s). Since our SRDS scheme is unforgeable, this only happens with negligible probability.
Claim B.2 (Validity). For any adversarial strategy of A, if there exists a value x such that xi = x
for each honest party Pi ∈ [n] \ I, then the output of all honest parties is y = x.
Proof. From Claim B.1, we know that with overwhelming probability, the final output y of all
honest parties is the same as the output of fba in Step 2a. All that remains to prove now is that
if there exists a value x, such that xi = x for each honest party Pi ∈ [n] \ I, then the output of
fba in Step 2a is x. Recall that fba in Step 2a is computed over the inputs of all parties in the
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supreme-committee C. From Definition 4.4, we know that at least 2/3 fraction of the parties in C
are honest. Therefore, if there exists a value x such that x is the input of all honest parties, then the
input of all honest parties in C is also x. Now, irrespective of the inputs of the remaining malicious
parties in C, from the validity of fba, we are guaranteed that the output of fba is y = x.
This concludes the proof of Lemma 4.5.
C Constructions of SRDS (Cont’d)
In this section we present the proofs on the SRDS constructions from Section 5.
C.1 SRDS from One-Way Functions (Cont’d)
We now present the proof of Theorem 5.1.
Theorem 5.1. Let β < 1/3 be a constant. Assuming the existence of one-way functions, there
exists a βn-secure SRDS scheme in the trusted PKI model.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. In Lemma C.1, we prove succinctness, in Lemma C.2, we prove robustness,
and in Lemma C.5, we prove unforgeability.
Lemma C.1. The construction in Figure 7 is succinct.
Proof. We start by proving the size of the signatures is succinct. Let C = {i | ski 6= ⊥} and let X
be a random variable representing |C|. By construction, E[X] = ℓ and ℓ = ω(log(n)). Therefore,
by Chernoff bound for µ = ℓ and δ = 1/2,19 it holds that
Pr [|X − ℓ| ≥ ℓ/2] ≤ 2e−ℓ/12 = negl(n).
We therefore conclude that ℓ/2 ≤ |C| ≤ 3ℓ/2 with overwhelming probability (in n). By definition
of digital signatures, every signature in the support of DS.Sign is polynomial in κ. Therefore,
every σ in the support of Sign (of the SRDS scheme) is also polynomial in κ. By construction,
unless an adversary is able to successfully break the obliviousness of the signature scheme (which
only happens with negligible probability in κ), an aggregate signature only consists of |C| “base”
signatures from the parties in C. Further, in the negligible event where the aggregate signature
consists of more than |C| base signatures, the output is ⊥. Therefore, the length of an aggregated
signature is bounded by α(n, κ) ∈ poly(log n, κ).
Proving decomposability is immediate. Since the aggregation algorithm is deterministic, it can
be entirely captured by the first algorithm Aggregate1, which outputs a set of polylog(n) signatures
(since there are at most |C| signatures, with all but negligible probability). The second algorithm
Aggregate2 simply outputs the same set of signatures.
Lemma C.2. The construction in Figure 7 is βn-robust.
19The exact Chernoff bound used is Pr [|X − µ| ≥ δµ] ≤ 2e−µδ2/3 for 0 < δ < 1, where µ = E[X].
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Proof. Let A be a PPT adversary. We will show that A can win the game Exptrobusttr-pki,Π,A(κ, n, βn)
(with the trusted PKI mode) with at most negligible probability. The game begins when the
challenger computes pp ← Setup(1κ, 1n) and (vki, ski) ← KeyGen(pp) for every i ∈ [n]. Denote
C = {i | ski 6= ⊥}. Next, the adversary adaptively selects the set of corrupted parties; denote by I
the set of corrupted parties.
In the robustness challenge phase, the adversary A chooses a message m ∈ M and a subset
S ⊆ [n] of size |S| ≥ 2n/3. We proceed to show that with overwhelming probability (in n), there
are more than ℓ′/3 honest parties in S with a valid signing key, where ℓ′ = ℓ/2.
Claim C.3. Pr [|C ∩ (S \ I)| ≤ ℓ′/3] ≤ negl(n).
Proof. In order to maximize its chance of winning the robustness game, an adversary who is allowed
to arbitrarily choose the set S, will without loss of generality include all the corrupted parties in S.
Denote by HS = S \ I the set of honest parties in S. Since |I| = (1/3− ǫ) · n (where ǫ = 1/3− β),
it holds that
|HS | > 2
3
· n−
(
1
3
− ǫ
)
· n =
(
1
3
+ ǫ
)
· n.
Thus, there are more than (1/3 + ǫ) · n honest parties in the set S. Given the information with
the adversary and the fact that the set of parties with valid signing keys are chosen at random, he
will get the same success probability for any arbitrary choice of C. Let X be a random variable
representing the number of honest parties in S who have a valid signing key, i.e., |C ∩ HS|. If
Pr [|C ∩ HS| ≤ ℓ′/3] ≤ negl(n) holds for |C| = ℓ′, it will also hold for any |C| > ℓ′. By Lemma C.1,
we know that |C| ≥ ℓ′ with an overwhelming probability. Therefore, we can assume that |C| = ℓ′;
in this case it holds that
E[|C ∩ HS |] = ℓ
′
n
·
(
1
3
+ ǫ
)
· n =
(
1
3
+ ǫ
)
· ℓ′.
By Chernoff bound for µ = ℓ′ (1/3 + ǫ) and δ = 3ǫ/(1 + 3ǫ),20 it holds that
Pr [X ≤ (1− δ)µ] = Pr
[
X ≤
(
1− 3ǫ
1 + 3ǫ
)
· ℓ′ ·
(
1
3
+ ǫ
)]
= Pr
[
X ≤
(
1
1 + 3ǫ
)
· ℓ′ ·
(
1 + 3ǫ
3
)]
= Pr
[
X ≤ ℓ′/3]
≤ e−
9ǫ2
2(1+3ǫ)2
ℓ′(1/3+ǫ)
= e
− 3ǫ
2
2(1+3ǫ)
ℓ′
.
Since ǫ > 0 is constant, we conclude that
Pr
[
X ≤ ℓ′/3] ≤ e−ω(log n) = negl(n).
Hence, for any arbitrary strategy deployed by the adversary, the probability that less than ℓ′/3
honest parties with a valid signing key are chosen in the set S is negligible.
20The exact Chernoff bounds used is Pr [X ≤ (1− δ)µ] ≤ e− δ
2
2
µ for 0 < δ < 1, where µ = E[X].
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The robustness challenge phase proceeds when the challenger signs the message m on behalf of
all the honest parties {σi}i∈[n]\I (i.e., by all the honest parties with a valid signing key in S) and
hands their signatures to A who responds with a directed rooted tree T = (V,E), in which the leaf
nodes correspond to the parties in S, and signatures for corrupted parties {σi}i∈{S∩I} (potentially
also for parties whose signing key is ⊥) in S. Let σ be the aggregated signature obtained from the
“base” signatures {σi}i∈S according to the tree T = (V,E).
Claim C.4. Pr [Verify(pp, {vk1, . . . , vkn},m, σ) = 0] ≤ negl(κ, n).
Proof. An accepting signature on a message m consists of at least ℓ′/3 valid signatures of the
form σi = (i,m, sigi), satisfying DS.Verify(vki,m, sigi) = 1. As proved earlier in Lemma C.1, since
ℓ ∈ ω(log n) it holds with overwhelming probability that ℓ/2 ≤ |C| ≤ 3ℓ/2; therefore, by the
obliviousness of the signature scheme that the aggregate signature can consist of at most |C| base
signatures.
The aggregate algorithm then checks if the “base” signatures contain a valid signature on m.
We rely on the correctness of the underlying digital signature scheme to ensure that only valid
signatures from the adversary (i.e., by committee members) get aggregated with an overwhelming
probability (in κ).
Additionally, in the case where the adversary does not provide sufficiently many valid signatures,
from Claim C.3 we know that the number of honest parties with a valid signing key in S is more
than ℓ′/3 with an overwhelming probability (in n). Therefore, the signatures of these honest parties
in S are sufficient for generating an accepting signature.
This concludes the proof of Lemma C.2.
Lemma C.5. The construction in Figure 7 is βn-unforgeable.
Proof. Let A be a PPT adversary. We will show that A can win the game Exptforgetr-pki,Π,A(κ, n, βn)
with at most negligible probability. The game begins when the challenger computes pp ←
Setup(1κ, 1n) and (vki, ski) ← KeyGen(pp) for every i ∈ [n]. Next, the adversary adaptively se-
lects the set of corrupted parties; denote by I the set of corrupted parties.
In the forgery challenge phase, the adversary A chooses a subset S ⊆ [n] \I such that |S ∪I| <
(1/3 − ǫ′)n for some constant 0 < ǫ′ < ǫ, where ǫ = 1/3 − β, and messages m and {mi}i∈S from
M. We now prove that with an overwhelming probability (in n), the fraction of parties who have
a valid signing key in S ∪ I is less than a third.
Claim C.6. The number of parties with a valid signing key in a set S ∪I is less than ℓ′/3 with an
overwhelming probability in n, i.e.,
Pr
[|C ∩ (S ∪ I)| ≥ ℓ′/3] ≤ negl(n).
Proof. The parties with a valid signing key are chosen at random, and the information about
whether a party has a valid signing key is not revealed to the adversary A, unless it chooses to
corrupt that party or it sees a signature from that party. The adversary chooses the honest set S
only based on the knowledge of corrupted parties and their signing keys. Given this information
with the adversary and the fact that the parties with valid signing keys are chosen at random, he
will get the same success probability for any arbitrary choice of S.
Let X be a random variable representing the number of parties in C ∩ (S ∪ I). If for |C| = 3ℓ/2
it holds that Pr [|C ∩ (S ∪ I)| ≤ ℓ′/3] ≤ negl(n), it will also hold for any |C| < 3ℓ/2. By Lemma C.1,
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we know that |C| < 3ℓ/2 with an overwhelming probability. Therefore, we an assume that |C| =
3ℓ/2 = 3ℓ′; in this case it holds that E[X] = 3(1/3 − ǫ′′)ℓ′ for some ǫ′′ > ǫ′. By Chernoff bound for
µ = 3ℓ′ (1/3 − ǫ′′) and δ = 9ǫ′′−23−9ǫ′′ (note that δ > 0 since 0 < ǫ′′ < 1/3),21 it holds that
Pr [X ≥ (1 + δ)µ] = Pr
[
X ≥
(
1 +
9ǫ′′ − 2
3− 9ǫ′′
)
· ℓ′ ·
(
1
3
− ǫ′′
)
· 3
]
= Pr
[
X ≥
(
1
3− 9ǫ′′
)
· ℓ′ ·
(
3− 9ǫ′′
3
)]
= Pr
[
X ≥ ℓ′/3]
≤ e− δ
2
2+δ
µ
= e
−
(9ǫ′′−2)2/(3−9ǫ′′)2
(4−9ǫ′′)/(3−9ǫ′′)
3ℓ′(1/3−ǫ′′)
= e
−
(9ǫ′′−2)2
3(4−9ǫ′′)
ℓ′
.
Since 0 < ǫ′′ < 1/3 is a constant, it holds that 4− 9ǫ′′ > 0, hence we conclude that
Pr
[
X ≥ ℓ′/3] ≤ e−ω(log n) = negl(n).
Hence, the probability that for any arbitrary strategy deployed by the adversary, the probability
that more than ℓ′/3 of the parties with a valid signing key are in S ∪ I is negligible.
The forgery challenge phase proceeds when for each i ∈ S, the challenger signs the message
mi on behalf of honest Pi, and signs the message m on behalf of all the remaining honest parties
i 6∈ S ∪ I. Next, the challenger hands these signatures {σi}i∈[n]\I to A who responds with an
aggregate signature σ′ ∈ X and a message m′ ∈M.
Claim C.7. Pr[(Verify(pp, {vk1, . . . , vkn},m′, σ′) = 1) ∧ (m′ 6= m)] ≤ negl(κ, n).
Proof. An accepting signature on any message m′ 6= m consists of at least ℓ′/3 valid signatures of
the form σi = (i,m
′, sigi), satisfying DS.Verify(vki,m
′, sigi) = 1.
By Claim C.6, the number of parties with a valid signing key in S ∪I are less than ℓ′/3 with an
overwhelming probability (in n). Essentially, the adversary receives valid signatures on a message
other than m only from less than ℓ′/3 parties (in C ∩ (S ∪ I)). Hence, the only way A can produce
more than ℓ′/3 valid signatures on any message other than m is by forging a valid signature for
a corrupt party whose signing key is ⊥ or by forging a signature for an honest party. Since the
verification keys of the parties whose signing keys are ⊥ correspond to oblivious keys, we rely on
the obliviousness of these keys (see Definition 5.2) to ensure that this only happens with negligible
probability (in κ). Similarly we can rely on the unforgeability of a digital signature scheme to
ensure that an adversary will be able to forge a valid signature for an honest party with a valid
signing key only with a negligible probability (in κ). Hence, except with negligible probability
negl(κ, n), the adversary is unable to forge an accepting SRDS signature.
This concludes the proof of Lemma C.5
This concludes the proof of Theorem 5.1.
21The exact Chernoff bound used is Pr [X ≥ (1 + δ)µ] ≤ e− δ
2
(2+δ)
µ
where µ = E[X]
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C.2 SRDS from SNARKs (Cont’d)
We present the proof of Theorem 5.4.
Theorem 5.4. Let t < n/3. Assuming the existence of CRH, digital signatures, and SNARKs
with linear extraction, there exists a t-secure SRDS scheme in the CRS model with a bulletin-board
PKI.
Proof of Theorem 5.4. In Lemma C.8 we will show that the construction in Figure 8 is succinct, in
Lemma C.9, we will show robustness and in Lemma C.10, we will show unforgeability.
Lemma C.8. The construction in Figure 8 is succinct.
Proof. We start by proving the size of the signatures is succinct. Each SRDS signature consists of
a “truncated transcript” z′ of size (|m|+ |c|+ |max|+ |min|+ |γ|) along with a proof π. For “base”
SRDS signatures, γ corresponds to a digital signature, and in all other cases γ = ⊥. By definition,
size of each digital signature is poly(κ). Hence, the total size of each truncated transcript z′ is
poly(κ)+log n+log n+log n+log n = poly(κ)+O(log(n)). Since π = ⊥ for base signatures, the total
size of each base SRDS signature (truncated transcript + digital signature) is poly(κ) +O(log(n)),
and is thus succinct.
In each aggregate SRDS signature, this proof corresponds to the output of PCD.Prover. In
our construction, the size of PCD transcript z is |z′| + |Hvk| + |k| + |p| = poly(κ) + O(log(n)).
The Merkle verification algorithm runs in time poly(κ) + polylog(n); therefore, by construction,
the size of the compliance predicate is poly(κ) + polylog(n) and the bound B on its running time
is |Ssig| · (κ + polylog(n)), where |Ssig| ≤ q ≤ n. Therefore, by the succinctness property of PCD
systems (see Appendix A.1), the size of each proof is poly(k+ logB) = poly(κ) · polylog(n). Hence,
the total size of each aggregate signature is poly(κ) · polylog(n).
The time required to verify validity of each “base” signature in this construction is poly(log n, κ)
(here polylog(n) appears because of the binary representation of indices). The time required to verify
a PCD proof in our construction is poly(κ+ |C|+ |z|+logB) = poly(κ+log n) (Definition A.6). Fi-
nally, the time required to generate an aggregate signature is equal to the time required to compute
zout and the time to run PCD.Prover. The time required to generate zout includes the time required
to compute Merkle hash on all the verification keys, which is poly(κ, n), and the time required to
verify in the incoming transcripts and proofs, which is q · poly(κ + log n). Therefore, the running
time of Aggregate1 is q · poly(κ, n). The time required to run Aggregate2 includes the time required
for computing zout given the above information, which is |Ssig| ·O(log n) and the time required to
run PCD.Prover, which is O(log n) + poly(κ + |C| + logB) = poly(κ + log n) (see Definition A.6).
Therefore, the total time required to run Aggregate2 is |Ssig| · poly(κ+ log n) = poly(log n, k) (since
‖Ssig‖ is bounded by α(n, κ) ∈ poly(log n, κ) as enforced by the check in Aggregate1).
Lemma C.9. The construction in Figure 8 is t-robust.
Proof. Let A be a PPT adversary. We will show that A can win the game Exptrobustbb-pki,Π,A(κ, n, t)
with at most negligible probability. The game begins when the challenger computes pp =
(1κ, σpcd, τpcd, seed) ← Setup(1κ) and (vki, ski) ← KeyGen(pp) for every i ∈ [n]. Next, the ad-
versary adaptively selects the set of corrupted parties I and determines their verification keys.
During the robustness challenge phase, A chooses a message m ∈ M and a subset S ⊆ [n] of
size |S| > 2n/3. Since |I| < n/3, it holds that the number of honest parties HS in the set S is at
least |HS| ≥ 2n/3− |I| > n/3.
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Next, the adversary gets signatures {σi}i∈[n]\I of all the honest parties on the message m.
The adversary then chooses a directed rooted tree T = (V,E) of height O(log(n)), in which
the leaf nodes are indexed by the parties in S, and computes signatures of corrupted parties
{σi}i∈S∩I . Signatures of all the parties in S are then aggregated by computing the signature
σv ← Aggregate(pp, {vk1, . . . , vkn},m, {σu}u∈child(v)) for ℓ = {2, . . . , height(T )} and every vertex v
on level ℓ, where child(v) ⊆ V refers to the set of children of the node v ∈ V .
Recall that the aggregation algorithm first checks the validity of incoming transcripts and proofs
and only aggregates transcripts with a convincing proof. Starting from the “base” signatures, if
the adversary does not provide valid signatures on m on behalf of the corrupted parties, they will
not pass the validity check at level ℓ = 2 (this follows from the correctness of the digital signature
scheme). The aggregation algorithm on the remaining “verified” base signatures mimics the in-
teractive protocol ProofGen (as described in the completeness definition of PCD in Appendix A.1).
The tree T chosen by the adversary acts as the distributed-computation generator G (see Def-
inition A.6). For each node in T , the reconstruction algorithm aggregates the signatures (i.e.,
computes a C-compliance transcript and PCD proof) from its incoming edges and labels the out-
going edges from the node with this partially aggregated signature. The aggregation algorithm
halts at the root node and outputs the corresponding truncated transcript and proof (i.e., the ag-
gregated signature (z′out, πout)). From this construction, we now have that the output transcript is
compliant with C, and since there were at least n/3 honest signatures from the honest parties, from
the correctness of the digital signature scheme and completeness of the Merkle hash proof system,
it follows that cout ≥ n/3. Robustness now follows from the completeness and succinctness of the
PCD system.
Lemma C.10. The construction in Figure 8 is t-unforgeable.
Proof. Let A be a PPT adversary. We will show that A can win the game Exptforgebb-pki,Π,A(κ, n, t)
with at most negligible probability. The game begins when the challenger computes pp =
(1κ, σpcd, τpcd, seed)← Setup(1κ) and (vki, ski)← KeyGen(pp) for every i ∈ [n]. Next, the adversary
adaptively selects the set of corrupted parties and determines their verification keys; denote by I
the set of corrupted parties.
In the forgery challenge phase, the adversary A chooses a subset S ⊆ [n]\I, such that |S∪I| <
n/3, and messages m and {mi}i∈S from M. Subsequently, for each i ∈ S, the challenger signs the
message mi on behalf of honest Pi, and signs the message m on behalf of all the remaining honest
parties i 6∈ S ∪ I. Next, the challenger hands these signatures {σi}i∈[n]\I to A who responds with
an aggregate signature σ′ ∈ X and a message m′ ∈M.
Let us assume for the sake of contradiction that the adversary manages to generate an aggregate
signature σ′ = (z′, π), such that Verify(pp, {vk1, . . . , vkn},m′, σ′) = 1 and m′ 6= m. From the proof
of knowledge property of the PCD system, we know that given a verifying proof from a polynomial-
size prover, there exists a polynomial-size extractor EPCD.Prover that can extract the witness. Recall
that given a vector of input transcripts zin and an output transcript zout, the compliance predicate
in our construction checks if the maximas and minimas of the input and output transcripts are
ordered properly, the value of counter c in the output transcript is equal to the sum of the counter
values in the input transcripts and that the same Merkle hash of keys is used in all transcripts.
Additionally, if any of the input transcripts correspond to base signatures, the compliance predicate
also checks that the signature is valid with respect to the verification key specified in that transcript
and also verifies the Merkle proof corresponding to this key and the Merkle hash. We now design
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an adversary B that uses this extractor to either break unforgeability of the digital signature
scheme or break soundness of the Merkle hash proof system. The adversary B starts by computing
z = z′||(Hvk,⊥,⊥), where Hvk = Merkle.Hash(seed, (1||vk1), . . . , (n||vkn)), initializing Sval = ∅ and
running the following recursive algorithm Bext(σpcd, z):
1. Compute trans ← EPCD.Prover(σpcd, z).
2. If C(trans) = 1, for each valid input “base” transcript in trans of the form (zi,⊥) on m′ with
zi = (m
′, 1, i, i, γi,Hvk, ki, pi) and γi 6= ⊥, set Sval = Sval ∪ {(zi, πi)}. For each partially
aggregated signature on m′ in trans of the form (zi, πi) with zi = (m
′, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·), check
whether PCD.Verify(τpcd, zi, πi) = 1 and if so, run Bext(σpcd, zi).
If |Sval| ≥ n/3, the adversary B succeeds in extracting at least n/3 transcripts of the form
(m′, 1, i, i, γi,Hvk, ki, pi), each with a distinct i (as enforced by the checks on the maximas and
minimas) such that the following holds for each of these transcripts:
(a) DS.Verify(vki,m
′, γi) = 1.
(b) Merkle.Verify(seed, (i||ki),Hvk, pi) = 1.
Since Hvk was computed honestly by B, it holds for each extracted “base” transcript that either γi
is a valid signature with respect to ki = vki, or if ki 6= vki, then the adversary A has managed to
break the soundness of the Merkle proof hash proof system. However, from Theorem A.8, we know
that this only happens with at most negligible probability (in κ). Now, since each i (and thereby
each ki) is distinct in the extracted “base” transcripts, adversary B has managed to extract at least
n/3 valid signatures (γi) on m
′. Since the adversary only had access to signatures on m′ from less
than n/3 parties, this would imply that it has successfully forged signatures of some honest parties
in the set [n] \ S. From unforgeability of the digital signature scheme, we know that this can only
happen with at most negligible probability (in κ).
Lemmas C.8 to C.10 rely on PCD systems for logarithmic-depth and polynomial-size compliance
predicates. By Theorem A.7, such PCD systems exist assuming the existence of SNARKs with
linear extraction. This concludes the proof of Theorem 5.4.
D Connection with Succinct Arguments (Cont’d)
In this section, we provide supplementary material for Section 6. In Appendix D.1, we prove
Theorem 6.9, and in Appendix D.2 we formally define SNARG-compliant multi-signature schemes.
D.1 Proof of Theorem 6.9
Theorem 6.9. There exists s(n) ∈ Θ(n) such that, for any field F with char(F) ≥ max(ℓ+2, 63),
any ring R = Fn of size |R| = 2Θ(n) with Hadamard product, and any elementary symmetric
polynomial φℓ, the (s,R)-Subset-φℓ problem is NP-complete.
Proof. We divide the proof as follows: (1) First, we show that for any ring R = Fn with Hadamard
product satisfying |R| = 2Θ(n), then for any elementary symmetric polynomial φ2, the R-Subset-φ2
problem (see Definition 6.6) is NP-complete by showing a reduction to 3-SAT. (2) Second, we show
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the same for any φℓ, where ℓ ≥ 3. (3) Finally, we show how these reductions can be modified to
prove the existence of s ∈ Θ(n), for which (s,R)-Subset-φℓ (see Definition 6.6) is also NP-complete.
For R-Subset-φ2: Given a 3-CNF formula Φ over variables x1, . . . , xN with clauses C1, . . . , Cm,
each containing exactly three distinct literals, the reduction algorithm constructs an instance x =
(a1, . . . , a2+2N+3m, t) of the R-Subset-φ2 problem such that Φ is satisfiable if and only if there
exists a subset S ⊆ [2 + 2N + 3m], such that φ2({ai}i∈S) = t. The reduction algorithm constructs
elements in R = F1+N+m as follows:
1. A special element a1 = α0 ∈ R, whose first entry is 1 and all other entries are 0.
2. A special element a2 = α1 ∈ R whose first n+ 1 entries correspond to 1.
3. For each variable xi (for i ∈ [N ]), define two elements a2+2i+1 = vi ∈ R and a2+2i+2 = v′i ∈ R
such that the (1 + i)th entry of these elements is set to 1.
4. Define three elements a2+2N+3j+1 = c
1
j , a2+2N+3j+2 = c
2
j , and a2+2N+3j+3 = c
3
j corresponding
to each clause Cj (for j ∈ [m]). The (1+N+j)th entry in c1j corresponds to 9, the (1+N+j)th
entry in c2j corresponds to 4 and the (1+N+j)
th entry in c3j corresponds to 2. The remaining
entries in each of these correspond to 0.
5. The target element t is also a vector of 1 +N +m elements in F. The first 1 +N entries in t
are set to 1, while the remaining entries are set to 9.
We now prove completeness and soundness of this reduction:
Completeness. Suppose Φ has a satisfying assignment X. We will construct a subset S ⊆
[2 + 2N + 3m] such that φ2({ai}i∈S) = t. For each variable xi, if xi is set to 1 in X, we include
a2+2i+1 = vi in S, else we include a2+2i+2 = v
′
i in S. We also include the two special elements
a1 = α0 and a2 = α1 in S. Note that, α0 and α1 are the only elements whose first entry is 1, the
first entry of all other elements is 0. This ensures that we have exactly 2 elements with value 1 in
the first column. Thus, the first entry of t is guaranteed to be 1. Also, apart from α1, for each
1 ≤ i ≤ N , there are only two other elements vi and v′i whose (1 + i)th entry is set to 1. Including
one of these for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n along with α1 ensures that there are exactly two elements with
value 1 in the (1 + i)th column. Therefore, we are guaranteed to get 1 in each of the first 1 + N
entries of t.
Since X is a satisfying assignment, each clause must contain at least one literal with the value
1. For each clause Cj , if there is exactly one literal with value 1 in the satisfying assignment X,
we include c1j . Note that S now has exactly one element whose (1 + N + j)
th entry is set to 1
and exactly one element with 9 in this column. All other elements in the subset have 0’s in this
position. This ensures that the (1 + N + j)th entry of t adds up to 9. If there are exactly two
literals with value 1, we include c2j . In this case, there are exactly two elements that have value
1 in the (1 + N + j)th column and exactly one element that has a value of 4 in this position. All
other elements in the subset have 0’s in this position. This ensures that the (1 +N + j)th entry of
t adds up to
(1 · 1) + (1 · 4) + (1 · 4) = 9.
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Finally, if there are exactly three literals with value 1, we include c3j . In this case there are exactly
three elements that have value 1 in (1 +N + j)th column and exactly one element that has a value
of 2 in this position. All other elements in the subset have 0’s in this position. This ensures that
the (1 +N + j)th entry in t adds up to
(1 · 1) + (1 · 1) + (1 · 1) + (1 · 2) + (1 · 2) + (1 · 2) = 9.
Thus, the last m entries in t all add up to 9.
Soundness. Suppose there exists a subset S ⊆ [2 + 2N +3m] whose pairwise sum of products is
t. We show that this implies that there must be a satisfying assignment for Φ. Note that α0 and
α1 are the only elements whose first entry is 1, while the first entry of all other elements is set to
0. Since the first entry in t is required to be 1, both α0 and α1 must be included in the set S.
For each 1 ≤ i ≤ N , there are exactly three elements α1, vi and v′i whose (i + 1)th entry is 1.
Since we have already included α1 in S, if we include both vi and v
′
i, then the (i + 1)
th entry in
result of φ2 applied over S will be (1 · 1) + (1 · 1) = 2. Since the characteristic of the field F is at
least 63, we know that 2 6= 1. Therefore, we are assured that only one of vi or v′i can be included,
but not both. Therefore, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the set S contains either vi or v′i. If vi ∈ S, we set
xi = 1; else we set xi = 0.
We want the last m entries in t to all add up to 9 each. We note that for each 1 ≤ j ≤ m, there
must be at least one element of the form vi or v
′
i in the subset S that has its (1 + n + j)
th entry
set to 1. This is because none of the combinations of c1j , c
2
j , c
3
j that have 9, 4, 2 in this position,
respectively, can add up to give 9 when all other elements have 0 in this position:
• If only one of either c1j or c2j or c3j are included in S, then the (1+n+ j)th entry in the result
is trivially 0.
• If any two of c1j , c2j and c3j are included in S, then the (1 + n + j)th entry in the result is
(9 · 4) = 36 or (9 · 2) = 18 or (4 · 2) = 8, depending on which cj values are included. Since the
characteristic of the field F is at least 63, we know that 36, 18, 8 are all different than 9.
• If all three of c1j , c2j and c3j are included in S, then the (1 + n + j)th entry in the result is
(9 · 4) + (9 · 2) + (4 · 2) = 62. As before, since the characteristic of the field F is at least 63,
we know that 62 6= 9.
Therefore, there is at least one literal in each clause Cj whose value is 1 and Φ has a satisfying
assignment.
Having proved NP-completeness of R-Subset-φ2, we proceed to prove the general case of R-
Subset-φℓ for ℓ ≥ 3.
For R-Subset-φℓ, where ℓ ≥ 3: The reduction algorithm for reducing a given 3-CNF formula
Φ with N variables x1, . . . , xN and m clauses C1, . . . , Cm, each containing exactly three distinct
literals to an instance of R-Subset-φℓ and the proof of soundness for that reduction has already been
discussed in the proof sketch of Theorem 6.9 in Section 6.3. Here we only prove the completeness
for that reduction.
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Completeness. Completeness follows similarly to the previous case. For a satisfying assignment
X for Φ, for each i ∈ [N ], either vi or v′i is included in subset S. Since each monomial is a
combination of ℓ numbers, we include all the special elements α0, α1, . . . , αℓ−1 to get the value 1
in the first column ℓ times. This guarantees that the first N + 1 entries in t are all 1. Since X is
a satisfying assignment, each clause contains at least one literal with the value 1. For each clause
Cj (for j ∈ [m]), if there is exactly one literal with value 1, we include all the ℓ− 1 elements cj . If
there are exactly two literals with value 1, we include ℓ − 2 elements cj . And if there are exactly
three literals with value 1, we include ℓ − 3 elements cj . As before, this ensures that the value 1
appears exactly ℓ times in the last m columns and φℓ will evaluate to the target value 1 in these
positions.
For (s,R)-Subset-φℓ for some s ∈ Θ(n): Let Φ be a given 3-CNF formula with N variables
x1, . . . , xN and m clauses C1, . . . , Cm. It is easy to see that this instance can be reduced to another
3-CNF instance Φ′ with n′ = max(m,N) variables and n′ = max(m,N) clauses by adding “dummy”
variables and clauses. We can then use the reduction algorithms discussed above to reduce Φ′ to
an instance of R-Subset-φℓ with n = ℓ+ 2n
′ + (ℓ− 1)n′ elements in R. Recall that this reduction
is such that for a satisfying assignment X ′ for Φ′, the corresponding witness S for the R-Subset-φℓ
instance contains the following:
• ℓ elements: It contains elements α0, . . . , αℓ−1.
• n′ elements: For each i ∈ [n′], it either contains vi or v′i.
• At least (ℓ − 3)n′ elements: Depending on how many literals have value 1, in clause Cj (for
j ∈ [n′]), S contains at least ℓ− 3 elements cj .
As a result, the subset S for the R-Subset-φℓ instance contains at least ℓ + n
′ + (ℓ − 3)n′ out of
n = ℓ+ 2n′ + (ℓ− 1)n′ elements, i.e., s = |S| ∈ Θ(n) for each ℓ ∈ [n]. In other words, there exists
s ∈ Θ(n), for which (s,R)-Subset-φℓ is NP-complete.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 6.9.
D.2 SNARG-Compliant Multi-Signatures and Subset-φℓ
In this section, we identify the properties of multi-signatures used in Lemma 6.5 to provide the con-
nection with average-case SNARGs. We call multi-signature schemes that satisfy these properties
as SNARG-compliant multi-signature schemes.
Definition D.1 (SNARG-compliant Multi-Signatures). A multi-signature scheme (MS.KeyGen,
MS.Sign, MS.Verify, MS.Combine, MS.MVerify) is SNARG compliant if it satisfies the following
properties:
1. The algorithm MS.MVerify is deterministic.
2. Verification keys are independently and uniformly sampled from a ring R = Fk (for some k)
with Hadamard Product.
3. There exist polynomial-time algorithms MS.Verifyagg-key and fagg, such that given a multi-
signature σms ∈ Xms on a message m ∈ M, corresponding to a set of keys {vki}i∈S for some
subset S ⊆ [n], the algorithm MS.MVerify(ppms, {vki}i∈[n], S,m, σms) can be decomposed as
follows:
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(a) vkagg = fagg({vki}i∈S).
(b) b = MS.Verifyagg-key(ppms, vkagg,m, σms).
4. There exists a PPT algorithm MS.MVerifyInv that on input the public parameters ppms, a
message m and a multi-signature σms, outputs vk ∈ R.
We require that for vkagg = fagg({vki}i∈S) ∈ R and MS.Verifyagg-key(ppms, vkagg,m, σms) = 1,
it holds that MS.MVerifyInv computes the corresponding unique and well-defined key vkagg,
i.e.,
MS.MVerifyInv(ppms,m, σms) = fagg({vki}i∈S).
5. There exist degenerate keys skdeg and vkdeg, and a PPT algorithm MS.Signdeg-key such that
σms ← MS.Signdeg-key(ppms, skdeg,m) satisfies MS.Verifyagg-key(ppms, vkdeg,m, σms) = 1.
We now show that an SRDS scheme based on a SNARG-compliant multi-signature scheme with
key-aggregation function fagg = φℓ, implies SNARGs for average-case Subset-φℓ. This reduction
can be viewed as a generalization of Lemma 6.5.
Lemma D.2. Let F be a field, let R = Fk (for some k) be a ring with Hadamard product, let φℓ (for
some ℓ ∈ N, ℓ > 1) be an elementary symmetric polynomial over R, let 0 < α < 1 be a constant,
and let s(n) = α · n. Assume that |F| = nω(1) and that n/ log |R| < 1.
If there exists an SRDS scheme based on a SNARG-compliant multi-signature scheme with
key-aggregate function fagg = φℓ, then there exist SNARGs for average-case (s,R)-Subset-φℓ.
Proof. We give a construction of average-case SNARGs for (s,R)-Subset-φℓ using an SRDS scheme
based on an SRDS-compliant multi-signature scheme as per Definitions 6.2 and D.1.
1. S.Setup(1κ, 1n) : Run the setup of the SRDS scheme Setup(1κ, 1n) to output crs = (ppms, pp2).
2. S.Prove(crs, x, w) : Given an average-case yes instance-witness pair (x,w) ← Dyes(1n) of the
form x = (a1, . . . , an, t) and w = S, proceed as follows:
• Let α = φℓ−1({ai}i∈S) and let vkdeg be the degenerate aggregate verification key. If α does
not have an inverse in R, output ⊥ and terminate. Else, compute
an+1 = (vkdeg − φℓ({ai}i∈S)) · α−1 = (vkdeg − t) · α−1.
Parse crs = (ppms, pp2) and interpret the set {a1, . . . , an, an+1} as a set of n+1 verification
keys {vk1, . . . , vkn+1}. Note that φℓ({vki}i∈S′) = vkdeg for S′ = S ∪ {n + 1}.
• Choose an arbitrary m ∈ M and use MS.Signdeg-key (as defined in Definition D.1) to com-
pute
σms ← MS.Signdeg-key(ppms, skdeg,m).
• Use the algorithm P (that exists from Definition 6.2) to compute
π ← P(crs, vk1, . . . , vkn+1, S′,m, σms).
• Finally, output (m,σms, π).
3. S.Verify(crs, x, π) : Parse crs = (ppms, pp2) and x = (a1, . . . , an, t), and proceed as follows:
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• Compute an+1 as in the prover algorithm. Interpret the set {a1, . . . , an, an+1} as a set of
n+ 1 verification keys {vk1, . . . , vkn+1}.
• Compute vk = MS.MVerifyInv(ppms,m, σms) and check if vk equals the degenerate veri-
fication key vkdeg (that, by construction, satisfies vkdeg = φℓ({vki}i∈S′)). Set b′ = 1 if
vk = vkdeg and b
′ = 0 otherwise.
• Run the verification algorithm of the SRDS scheme
b← Verify((ppms, pp2), vk1, . . . , vkn,m, (σms, π)).
• Finally output b ∧ b′.
We now argue succinctness, completeness, and average-case soundness for this construction:
Succinctness. Succinctness follows from the succinctness of the SRDS scheme.
Completeness. Recall that each of the values (a1, . . . , an) in an average case yes instance is
sampled uniformly at random; hence, the output of an elementary symmetric polynomial on a
randomly chosen subset S of these values is also uniformly distributed. Given any average-case yes
instance-witness pair (x,w) ← Dyes(1n) of the form x = (a1, . . . , an, t) and w = S, the probability
that φℓ−1({ai}i∈S) has an inverse in R is 1 − k/|F|.22 Since our proof system only works for such
instances, the rest of this argument assumes that this is the case. Given x = (a1, . . . , an, t) and
w = S, it holds that fagg({ai}i∈S) = φℓ−1({ai}i∈S) = t or equivalently, it holds for S′ = S ∪{n+1}
that
φℓ({ai}i∈S′) = φℓ({ai}i∈S) + an+1 · φℓ−1({ai}i∈S) = vkdeg.
Recall in an SRDS-compliant multi-signature scheme, it holds that
MS.MVerifyInv(ppms,m, σms) = φℓ({vki}i∈S′) = vkdeg.
Hence, MS.Verifyagg-key(ppms, vkdeg,m, σms) = 1, i.e., σms is a valid multi-signature onm with respect
to vkdeg. Since the multi-signature satisfies MS.MVerifyInv(ppms,m, σms) = vkdeg, completeness of
SRDS based on an SRDS-compliant multi-signature scheme (see Definition 6.2) implies that the
output of P, given this signature and S′ will be a valid SRDS signature. Completeness now holds
with an overwhelming probability since φℓ−1({ai}i∈S) has an inverse in R with an overwhelming
probability of 1− k/|F|.
Average-Case Soundness. Recall that each of the values (a1, . . . , an, t) in x ← Dno(1n) are
sampled uniformly at random. Let α = φℓ−1({ai}i∈S) and assume that α−1 exists. Since t is a
randomly sampled value, so is an+1 = (vkdeg− t) ·α−1 for any S ⊆ [n]. We interpret the set of n+1
verification keys as vki = ai for i ∈ [n+1]; thus, the verification keys {vk1, . . . , vkn+1} are uniformly
distributed over R. Since n/ log |R| < 1 and the output of elementary symmetric polynomials is
uniformly distributed, then with overwhelming probability (bounded by 2n+1/|R|), there does not
exist a subset S′ ⊆ [n + 1] of size s+ 1, such that φℓ({ai}i∈S′) = vkdeg.
Given (m,σms, π), we check if: (1) σms is a valid multi-signature on m with respect to vkdeg
and (2) if (σms, π) is a valid SRDS on m. Recall that in a SNARG-compliant multi-signature
22We note that all elements of R = Fk, except for the ones with a 0 in any of its vector coordinates, have an
inverse in R.
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scheme, given a multi-signature σms, a message m, and public parameters ppms, there exists a
unique aggregate verification key vkagg with respect to which σms verifies, i.e.,
MS.MVerifyInv(ppms,m, σms) = vkagg.
Therefore, if check (1) goes through, then vkagg = vkdeg is the only aggregate verification key for
which σms is a valid multi-signature on m. As argued earlier, with a high probability there does
not exist a subset S′ ⊆ [n + 1] such that φℓ({vki}i∈S′) = vkdeg. Also, from the soundness of SRDS
based on a multi-signature scheme (Definition 6.2), we know that if there does not exist a subset
S′ ⊆ [n + 1] of size s + 1, such that σms is a valid multi-signature on m with respect to {vki}i∈S′ ,
then the probability of an adversary computing a valid SRDS (σms, π) on a message m is negligible.
Soundness now follows from the soundness of SRDS based on a multi-signature scheme.
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